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LEADERSHIP

POSTMODERN SOCIETY AND ITS IMPACT ON ARMED FORCES | 16

By Miguel
Podestá

ESTRATEGY

03 **NEW WARS FROM A
CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE**

By Ricardo Nibeyro

DOCTRINE

31 **ARMY LEADERSHIP BY
COMBAT FUNCTIONS**

By Leonardo Arcadio Zarza

INTERNATIONAL LAW

47 **OUTER SPACE
MILITARIZATION**

By Pedro Iriarte





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OUR ICON

Our icon is the famous Rubik's cube decorated with the colours of the Argentine flag and the coat of arms that identifies the *Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas*. We have elected this ingenious mechanism for our journal as it is the visual representation of the complex joint actions.

The image shows the challenge to combine in a harmonic way the elements that are part of the Armed Forces to achieve an efficient use of military instruments.

The proper use of the forces allows to set, at the same level, the coat of arms of the *Estado Mayor Conjunto* which implies a mental process to combine variables in a very complex setting.

In order to be successful as to the situation raised, it is necessary to have a broad mindset that allows to have a general perception of the target to be achieved; this defines our "joint perspective".



LIST OF CONTENTS

02 MESSAGE FROM
THE DIRECTOR

Estrategy

03 NEW WARS FROM A
CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE
By Ricardo Nibeyro

10 THE STRANGEST DIRECTION
By Ariel Fernando Lescano

22 PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN
ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS
By Ramón Gustavo Bravo

COVER ARTICLE

Leadership

16 POSTMODERN SOCIETY AND ITS
IMPACT ON ARMED FORCES
By Miguel Podestá

Doctrine

31 ARMY LEADERSHIP BY
COMBAT FUNCTIONS
By Leonardo Arcadio Zarza

International Law

39 OUTER SPACE MILITARIZATION
By Gabriel Antonio Paolini

International Relations

47 STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
SOCIAL ACTION
By Pedro Iriarte

57 ISIS
An ontological Approach
By Horacio Esteban Correa

MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR

General Federico Sidders¹

Speech given by General Federico Sidders at the 9th anniversary of the Institute.

We are today in the Room General Don José de San Martín of the Education Center of the Armed Forces to celebrate a new anniversary of our Joint Staff College created by Executive Order No. 1169/2006 to train Staff officers of the three forces in the conduction of Operational Strategic Level and Military Strategic within the framework of Joint Military Action issues and higher Rank officers to serve as high level advisors in the area of National Defense.

Experience acquired in world armed conflicts of the last decades has shown that military success in the development of operations is only possible through a joint or joint combined war effort. This requires close operative coordination among the Armed Forces of a nation or coalition of intervening nations.

With this purpose, our College adapted professional training processes to search for a homogenous training of excellence for the command of our Armed Forces, improving the integration process.

We have made a great effort to have this place. Many of you will remember that we have worked at different offices, such as the National Defense College, or the National Geographic Institute, from whom we have received collaboration and to whom we express our gratitude.

We have made significant advance in the academic area, research, outreach and evaluation, but we are aware of the fact that there is a lot to be done. We are proud for our achievements, for which the work and dedication of those who served before me and that are part of this group of officers, petty officers, soldiers, civilians and professors was essential. We are grateful for their work as they are the ones who really make this institution.

As from our creation, we have had students from friendly countries, which gives us a different perspective of what happens at regional level and encourages our armed forces at international level. As part of cultural enrichment, we have had the visit of Directors of Colleges of the region (Peru, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, Paraguay and Ecuador) and Europe (Germany and Italy) and also from Africa (Angola and Nigeria). This Exchange has allowed us to talk about our academic activities and exchange experiences.

As regards our academic offer, we are going to present our PhD in Strategy at the National University Evaluation and

Accreditation Committee, which complements our graduate courses. Also, together with the creation of the Universidad de la Defensa, we are analyzing to have a Specialization in Academic Management.

We have made advance with the accreditation of professors and our courses. With the purpose of continuing teacher training, we have carried out workshops and seminars.

With respect to our books, we finished the volumes of Rules of Engagement with the third volumen and we have also published the book Academic Writing in Military Training and Operational Art and Design.

We launched our website in Spanish and English to increase visibility of our Institute. There, you can access education offer, information about areas of work, activities carried out and our publications. This is really important as the Visión Conjunta journal published by our college reaches students, professors, officers and institutions from all around the country in its paper versión and a larger audience through the Internet.

With the purpose of improving access to intellectual production of our institute, we have created the Digital Institutional Repository (CEFADIGITAL) in which we publish the production of professors, researchers and students to reach the whole community with interest in the subject. We, thus, promote the growth of the Joint Staff College as a higher education institute aiming at education excellence.

Many officers classes have studied at our classrooms. We have taught them values and provided them with content that will be with them during all their professional life. But, above all, we have trained them in critical thinking, solution of problems, making difficult decisions, and efficient performance of the roles they will take, which is our best legacy.

I would like to thank Staff Colleges that are part of the Education Center of the Armed Forces, with which we have started a virtuous cycle of cooperation as well as academic, outreach and teacher training activities which boost our individual capacities and contribute to academic excellence. Organizational cultures are different but armed institutions of the nation must operate as a whole thing. It is essential to know, understand and respect the others to complement each other understanding that success of joint military action is based on the strength of specific colleges.

Last, I pray to God that he guides us in the challenging task of training.

1. Director of the Joint Staff College of the Armed Forces



NEW WARS FROM A CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

Continuity and change in post- modern armed conflicts

International community faces old and new challenges and traditional armed conflicts are, even today, a threat. Armed conflicts have not led to a safer world but, on the contrary, they have increased the complexity of managing conflicts causing “new wars”.

KEY WORDS: COLD WAR / NEW WARS / ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS / CLASSICAL THINKING

By **Ricardo Nibeyro**

INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Socialist Republic (URSS) led to a series of ethnic conflicts, such as in the case of former Yugoslavia, Somalia or Rwanda, in which analysts started to discuss a change of paradigm in war which they called “new wars”¹.

Among the most important authors who hold this theory, we can mention Van Creveld, Kaldor, Munkler or Lind, who state

that armed conflicts were caused by the end of the concept of state- nation. In particular, this would mainly take place due to the continuous erosion in the monopoly of the use of force, asymmetrical military means, the growing privatization of actors, the increase in the use of violence against civil population and the greater periods of time military operations take.

Another approach to armed conflicts is presented by the classical thinking, the logic of which is based on



human nature with a historical- analytical perspective. These authors have gone beyond their times, have contributed to understanding and conduction of wars during centuries.

This article aims at giving examples from history and the recent past, the comparison of different approaches, highlighting strengths and weaknesses as regards one of the topics of interest for international relations in their perspective of armed conflicts.

THEORY OF NEW WARS

New concepts for old problems

There are some analysts that have tried to develop different approaches and theories to understand the phenomenon of post- modern wars²; there is not a unique definition of the

concept of “new wars”, but a series of characteristics that make them different from “old wars”.

The renowned writer and historian Martin Van Creveld has been one of the first who favored this theory in his book “The Transformation of War”³, in which Low Intensity Conflicts⁴ (LIC) have relevance and are featured by the loss of the monopoly of force by the state, the little respect for international laws and the unclear limit among combatants and non- combatants or soldiers and civilians. The loss of the political target would be replaced by a mix of religious, cultural, ethnic and technological fanatics⁵.

In this line of thought, Mary Kaldor published her book “Old and New Wars”⁶ based upon the experience in Bosnia and African countries, establishing a relation between ethnic

1. There is not a formal line of thought about “New Wars”, but this shows the thoughts of several authors. Among them, we can find Mary Kaldor, who in her book “New and Old Wars” (1999) finds in globalization a series of indicators that make her think about a new way of understanding war which is different from Clausewitz’s thought.

2. Post- modern wars are understood as the period which starts with the fall of the Berlin Wall or the fall of the former URSS.

3. Van Creveld, Martin, *The Transformation of War*, Ed Free Press, New York and Macmillan, Ontario, 1991. There is a version in Spanish translated by Pissolito, Carlos, Buenos Aires, 2007.

4. Van Creveld, Martin, p. 51.

5. Van Creveld, Martin, p. 69.

6. Kaldor, Mary, *New and old wars organized violence in a global era*, Stanford University Press, 1998.

7. Kaldor, Mary, “A Cosmopolitan Response to New Wars”, *Peace Review*, 8 (December 1996), 505- 14.

8. Kaldor, Mary, *op. cit.*

9. Münkler, Herfried. *The new wars*, Oxford, Polity, 2005

10. Münkler, Herfried, What is really new in new war, quoted by Olsen, John, “On New Wars”, Oslo, IFS, 2007.

This argument is based on the idea of Clausewitz as to the nature of war, in which each war is unique and varies with the political nature of its reasons... therefore; the first act of a statesperson and commandant is to assess the type of war in which they will get involved and remembers that war is more than a chameleon that rapidly adapts to characteristics of each case.

problems, the growing globalization process and the fall of State- Nation⁷.

According to her, the main characteristics of this conflict are the loss of the monopoly of force by the state, little or none respect for international laws, increase of violence against civilians, unclear distinction between crime and war as well as the decline of fight between states to begin civil fights⁸.

Going deeper into the concepts analyzed before, Munkler published his book *The New Wars*⁹ in which the new is present in a combination of characteristics, such as the privatization of war in a colorful combination of combatants¹⁰.

These three authors¹¹, among others, have stated that globalization in its political and economic sense have led to changes in the international system that make Clausewitz's thoughts obsolete with respect to state- nation overshadowing the concept that war is the continuation of politics and, therefore, the Trinity of Clausewitz is not relevant for its interpretation even in Low Intensity Conflicts.

In sum, these authors identify a change in the nature of war which operates through the privatization of actors and the loss of the political target by another one of ethnic or religious status, asymmetry of actors and means, demilitarization of war with a growing number of civil victims and financing of war through other means.

From an evolving perspective, William Lind¹² and Thomas Hammes¹³ introduce a new category of "new wars" from a historical or generation perspective and state that there are fourth generation wars nowadays (4G).

Both specialists claim that great powers develop latest technology weapons systems, but they use operational doctrine and principles of maneuver war (3G) which had their origin in the German *blitzkrieg*.

Also, they consider that the beginning of fourth generation wars (4G) is the theory of the "people war" that Mao Tse Tung¹⁴ immortalized in his book *Guerilla Warfare*. With relation to this approach, we can state that war evolves and will surely continue evolving, but changes observed as regards "targets", "opponents or groups" and "weapons or technology applied to weapons" which seem to be based on context rather than basic.

Last, there is a radial type of the prior approach called "hybrid wars" that is used to describe current conflicts as "multimodal" in which simultaneity of levels (strategic, operational and tactical) and the convergence of modes (conventional, uprising and terrorist) with different levels of intensity (deadliness) and tempo (frequency) aim at physical affectation (destruction of personnel and material) as well as psychological affectation of the opponent. In this type of conflicts, different modes and levels become more confusing¹⁵.

Therefore, what is new and different is the hybrid mode¹⁶, a combination of deadliness of a state armed force together with fanaticism and will of fight of an irregular force¹⁷ and, as an example, we can mention the defense of Grozny by the Chechen and Hezbollah during the attack of IDF in 2006.

CLASSICAL THOUGHTS

Continuation during change

When we analyze the thoughts of classical thinkers, such as Thucydides, Sun Tzu, or Mao Tse Tung, it is possible to ask: are their ideas valid in light of this change of paradigm of "new wars"?

For the purposes of this work, we will analyze classical thoughts¹⁸ based on the following concepts that this thought state:

11. There are other authors, such as Robert Kaplan or Hans Ezensberger who also talk about the beginning of a type of wars that are appearing.
12. Lind, William S. Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson, *The Changing Face of War* y William S. Lind, "The Changing Face of War Into the Fourth Generation, *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989.
13. Hammes, Thomas, *The Sling and the Stone on War in the 21 Century*, Zenith Press MBI Publishing Co, USA 2004 and Thomas Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation" *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 1994.
14. Hammes, Thomas, op. cit., p. 44 (Mao and the Birth of 4 Generation Warfare).

15. Gray, Colin S. *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2006 y John Arquilla, "The End of War As We Knew It", *Third World Quarterly* 28, N° 2, March 2007 369.
16. Hoffman, Frank G, Ltcol (Ret.), "The Hybrids War and Challenges", *JFO/issue* 52, 2009. Compound multimodal war takes place when irregular means are used in different areas or theaters and they are essentially different organizations. An example of this is TE Lawrence or the Spanish against Napoleon.
17. Hoffman, Frank G, Ltcol (Ret.), p. 37.
18. Handel, Michael, *Masters of Wars: Classical Strategic Thought*, Routledge, 3er Ed, 2001, p. XVIII.

Throughout history, guerrillas, insurgent people and other actors have always tried to affect the will of fight of the opponent before their means (physical and human), the difference is that today they have greater access.

- › War contributes to the political interest of the state (group, tribe or violent non state actor)
- › In spite of its rationale, there are restricting factors, such as friction, opportunity and uncertainty, passion, incompetence and irrational behavior
- › War cannot be the first resource and it is not always the last one
- › Military victory in itself is not sufficient and must be complemented with other acceptable diplomatic and political measures for long lasting peace
- › Its rational aspect includes establishing clear objectives, analysis of cost/benefit and rapid development of its ideal model
- › A classical paradigm is based on observation of human nature and historical evidence although it is pessimistic given that war is part of human relations
- › There is a trinity concept of analysis

What we can state is that the different representations of modern wars do not necessarily make a “new war” or “war generation” in the historical occurrence of armed conflicts. What they do reflect are context and specific aspects of target, band and weapons that underlie together with unchanging elements.

This argument is based on the idea of Clausewitz as to the nature of war, in which each war is unique and varies with the political nature of its reasons... therefore; the first act of a statesperson and commandant is to assess the type of war in which they will get involved¹⁹ and remembers that war is more than a chameleon that rapidly adapts to characteristics of each case²⁰.

Therefore, war is the manner to get the political purpose that can never be considered isolated from its purpose.

In a similar manner, Mao talks about the political nature of war and reminds that, unless current circumstances of war, its nature and relation with other things are understood, you will not know the laws of war and will not be able to get victory.

Given the complexity to understand the nature of the conflict, Clausewitz introduces the concept of analysis of the “trinity paradox”²¹ reducing the endless multiplicity in three dominant basic trends of a triangle, the edges of which are passion and violence, opportunity and probability and political reason and calculation, joining this with a second triangle, people, the commandant with the army and the Government, in which each one plays an important role in the definition of the type of war to be faced. As an example, during the Vietnam War, Northern Vietnam moved the people (passion, violence and motivation) surpassing Southern Vietnam that resorted to military power (opportunity and probability) with the help of the United States using traditional war with emphasis in the power of fire but without adapting to particular circumstances of the conflict –its nature- and, as it happened with the French, failed.

Two millennia before and on the other side of the world, Sun Tzu used a similar metaphor to compare malleability of water with individuality of each conflict: as water flows according to the surface on its way, a successful army adapts to the situation of the enemy and, as water does not have any shape in particular, there are no constant conditions at war²².

Military thoughts of Mao were inspired in “The Art of War” and their own observation of revolutionary war in China and liberation war against Japan (1937- 1945), which made him state that revolutionary war is the war of multitudes... the army and people are the foundation for victory... under absolute leadership of the party²³. Here, the trinity concept of Clausewitz can be applied to “the war of people” introduced by Mao, in which the party is the government.

This Maoist strategy²⁴ was inspired in “The Art of War” of prolonged has been adopted and adapted to different latitudes of the planet with particular success following an evolutionary pattern. Vietnamese case, the Sandinista refinement in Nicaragua, the Cypriot guerrilla (EOKA)²⁵ against Great Britain, liberation wars in Africa, Palestine

19. Carr, Caleb, *The Book of War*, Sun Tzu & Karl Von Clausewitz, Modern Library Paperback, Ed. 2000, Book 1, 27.

20. Carr, Caleb, *op. cit.*, Book 1, 28.

21. Carr, Caleb, *op. cit.*, Book 1, 28.

22. Sun Tzu and Sun Bin, *The Art of War*, Foreign Language Press, Beijing, China, 2007. Sun Tzu can also write like Sunzi

23. Army Command and College of CPLA Handbook, *Mao Tse Tung Military Thinking*, Chinese People Liberation Army (CPLA), Ed. 2006, p. 7

24. The three phases of the Maoist strategy are: 1) propaganda with little military action; 2)

Get strong and consolidate a basis area with balance of regular and irregular forces and 3) Transition to regular forces in the final attack. Army Command and College of CPLA Handbook, p. 52. This is also known for the Strategy without Time.

25. Grivas, Giorgio, *War of Guerrillas, lessons of fight for the freedom of Cyprus*, Ed. Rioplatense Bs As, 1969. EOKA means Ethniki Organosis Kipriahou Agonos.

26. Intifada means, in Arab, uprising.

27. Arreguin, Ivan, “How weak win wars, *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 93–128

28. Thucydides, “The Landmark of Thucydides: the Peloponnesian War”, Google eBook, edited by Robert Strassler, 1998.



intifadas²⁶ and in the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan may be examples. This type of strategies is known as the thesis of “how weak win wars”²⁷.

May the trinity analysis be applied to chaos or stasis²⁸ situations like the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph?

The answer is yes, because even when they start as a spontaneous representation of intifadas, ethnic or religious fights end of creating an independent with Government, People and Armed Forces as it happens with the Palestine example.

What is important and cannot be changed from the classical is because of the validity of concepts and usefulness of works even in post- modern times to describe the nature of the conflict.

WHEN PAST MEETS PRESENT

Methods, cause and civilians

When the past meets the present, it is necessary to ask whether the new theoretical developments are a representation of a change in the nature of war, or what has changed in war that makes it new and different with respect to classical ideas. And should something have changed, what is the use of the expression “new wars”? For this, methods, asymmetry and human impact will be analyzed.

As regards the changing nature of methods and modes of

war, the growing privatization of actors (among which there are insurgence, guerrilla, terrorists and armed groups) is not new as they have been present in many conflicts, especially if we relate this with civil wars, such as the American civil war (1861- 1865), the Russian civil war (1917- 1923) and the Spanish civil war (1936- 1939).

In terms of guerrilla or insurgence, we can find the peninsular war in Spain (1807- 1814), the Philippines against the Japanese or German occupation during World War II in France, Yugoslavia, China or even anti colonialist wars for the independence of Algeria (1954-1962), Rhodesia (1966-1979), Angola (1961-1975) and Mozambique (1962-1975), just to mention some examples.

Hezbollah, which faced the Israeli in Lebanon (2006) and which some authors called “hybrid war”²⁹ only shows that the type of war³⁰ has been wrongly selected in its nature with a wrong training of the Israeli Defense Forces, the focus of which was of a Low Intensity Conflict.

On the other hand, the increase in the training of

29. Hoffman, Frank G, Ltcol (Ret.), op. Cit.

30. Biddle, Stephen and Friedman, Jeffrey, “The 2006 Lebanon Campaign And The Future Of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy”. Available at <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>. This article has a critical analysis of the conflict.

Hezbollah which focused on the weaknesses of the Israeli Defense Forces is similar to Stage 2 of the war of guerrillas of Mao and, in this sense, there is nothing new³¹ as to the nature of the conflict.

With respect to asymmetrical war as a feature of the nature of war, the expression is trendy nowadays and discourse will be temporary³². It is not necessary to exaggerate a concept that is not new because war and combat have always been asymmetrical³³ and it is totally rational that one of the groups tries to search for a comparative advantage. Moreover, if someone is in inferior conditions, they know they will lose the combat against armed forces that are better trained and equipped and, therefore, avoid frontal combat or will try to find a more favorable advantage of non-conventional type.

As in the case of the war of Algeria or Vietnam, the lack of modern equipment led these people to adopt an asymmetrical strategy in means and methods that were successful.

Throughout history, guerrillas, insurgent people and other actors have always tried to affect the will of fight of the opponent before their means (physical and human), the difference is that today they have greater access³⁴. When

Van Creveld, Kaldor, Munkler or Lind state that armed conflicts were caused by the end of the concept of state-nation.

terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda³⁵ use human bombs promoted by religion, they only want to take Western influence away from Muslim world but, in the end, the purpose is political.

Contention strategy of the United States against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is another example of the use of the comparative advantage and the asymmetrical response not to directly but through means with which one becomes stronger, such as economy or technology.

However, we can find the origins of asymmetrical war in Clausewitz about the war of people³⁶, in which they describe the basis for them to be effective and, in their classes about “small wars”³⁷ in the Academy of War in Berlin.

Another author that dealt with this topic was Jomini³⁸.

As regards human impact with relation to the increase in the number of civil victims and extreme savagery, “new Wars” understand that force is addressed against civil population, such as the systematic killing to control an area, ethnic cleaning or simply displacing population.

The example used by Kaldor is Bosnia (1992/1995) in which the ratio between civilians and military men is 8:1³⁹, being World War I its counterface (1:8).

However, the Documentation Center from Sarajevo⁴⁰ (CDS) published a document with the total number of victims (almost 100,000) with a ratio of 40% civilians, which is very different from the 8:1 stated by this author.

Even more, the lack of historical accuracy did not consider the brutality of World War II in the Eastern side



From left to right: Martin Van Creveld, Mary Kaldor and Herfried Munkler.

From an evolving perspective, William Lind and Thomas Hammes introduce a new category of “new wars” from a historical or generation perspective and state that there are fourth generation wars nowadays (4G).

or in Germany⁴¹ (8,5 million of displaced people) during the Russian advance or the Pacific Theatre.

Going back in history, we can see the savagery model adopted by European powers between 1830 and 1914, during the colonial wars in Africa in which brutality was part of peace campaigns by the Armee de Afrique and the British or Portuguese troops in those latitudes. The United States have made their part in Philippines (1898- 1902), where there has been a ratio of 200,000 civilians dead against 20,000⁴² military men. As Hugo Slim states: unfortunately the death of civilians has always been present at war⁴³.

Therefore, victimization and savagery are not particular from these “new Wars”, as massive migration flows, which is more visible for public opinion and will, therefore, be present in collective conscious.

Last, when we try to analyze the reasons for which people fight or go to war in terms of causes, Thucydides answered this question more than 2500 years ago: men go to war for honor, fear or interest⁴⁴. This is as relevant today as in the Peloponnesian War (431- 404 BC). When comparing this sentence with human conflicts, it will be difficult for someone to escape from these concepts.

CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War has not significantly changed the dominant features of the last 50 years. New forms are not

as new as it has been explained but they have received more attention and became visible.

The theory of “new wars” caught the attention of certain representations of nature of post- modern wars, but getting confused with their context and empirical approach, in particular, with intra- state conflicts. This shows a great weakness to capture elements for continuity and change in the nature of war.

Changes presented in terms of causes, objectives, methods and victims are more apparent than real, they explain isolated cases rather than linear or significant historical changes.

What we can recognize as a contribution of this approach is the adaptation characteristic of internal conflicts of rebellion and insurgence to get support through transnational organized crime when there is no protection of super powers (United States- URSS) as it happened in Colombia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Some authors have even observed a correlation between human aid (UN or NGO) and diaspora in the extension of the conflict as it is a financing source for combatants⁴⁵ and, therefore, part of the political equation.

Today, more than ever, classical theory of war reminds us of the complexity and reciprocity of the nature of war in its moral and irrational dimension, in friction, uncertainty, probability and opportunity within political context which, as permanent elements, cannot disappear.

For this reason, decisions of actions must adapt in darkness or in cases of shadow⁴⁶. Maybe some shadow may be lightened with advanced technological means and it may be possible to operate better with light than in shadow but as soon as this happens with a group, the other one will increase counter measures increasing the secret and, therefore, shadow. As a result, darkness and shadow with some rays of light will be constant in the context of war and it will be difficult to escape from this maxim.

Present requires to carry out a critical analysis of classical thoughts with universal feature and their relation with post- modern wars to find continuity and change in their fair context.

31. Peters Ralph, "Lesson from Lebanon- New model terrorist army", Recuperado de <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/lessons-from-lebanon/>

32. Gray, Colin S.

33. Storr, Jim, *The human Face of War*, Continuum UK, London, Ed 2009, p. 104

34. Echevarria, Antulio J., *Deconstructing the Theory of Fourth-Generation Warfare*, in Terriff, Karp, and Karp, 59.

35. This Muslim group will be referred to as "AIQ" hereinbelow.

36. Sun Tzu and Sun Bin, *Book 6, Chap 28 The Peoples in Arms*, pag 777. See also Jomini

37. Daaze, Christopher, *Clausewitz and Small Wars*, in Strachan and Herberg-Rothe, "Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century", p. 183. Para mayor información sobre la concepción de Clausewitz y las guerra de guerrilla se puede ver en Handel, Michael, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, Frank Cass, London, 1986, 127-33.

38. Jomini, Antoine, "The Art of War", p. 25, quoted by Handel, Michael, *Master of Wars*, p. 120.

39. Kaldor, Mary, op. cit., p. 105. He mentions the example of Bosnia and Abkhazia

40. See Documentation Center from Bosnia. Available at <http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=247>

41. Beevor, Antony, *The Second War World*, Back Bay Books; edition 2002, pp. 28-32, 326, 410. During February and April, 1945, 8.500.000 German left their houses because of Russian fear.

42. Boot Max. *The Savage War of Peace -small war and the rise of American power*, Basic Books; edition 2003, Pag115.

43. Slim Hugo. *Killing civilians: Method, Madness and Morality in War*, London Hurst, 2008, Pag 3, citado por Adam Roberts, "The Civilians in Modern War" en Hew Strachan & Sybille Scheipers (comp) en "The Changing Character of War", Oxford Press 2013. Page 358.

44. Thucydides. *The Landmark of Thucydides: the Peloponnesian War* (Google eBook), edited by Robert Strassler, 1998.

45. Munkler, Herfried, *The new War*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 87

46. Carr, Caleb (Ed), *The Book of War*, Sun Tzu & Karl Von Clausewitz, Modern Library Paperback, Ed 2000, Book 2, 24

THE STRANGEST DIRECTION

Relative strategic position to be successful

Humankind, throughout 5000 years, has had different types of war and to rule this broad scope, it was necessary for the strategy to be developed and modified aiming at a deep renewal.

KEY WORDS: WARS / STRATEGY / POLITICS / MILITARY / THINKERS / THREATS

By **Ariel Fernando Lescano**

INTRODUCTION

Wars have historically been, together with trade and diplomacy, one of the main forms of relation among states. It is difficult to explain causes that lead societies to sacrifice in battlefields. It is difficult to confirm certainty of complex roots that underlie this particular relation.

It is also difficult to give a good explanation as to the causes of wars. It is important to highlight the importance of getting victory without war.

Winning without fighting is not only a manner to express a smarter manner to defeat the other one. It is a serious strategic position and it considers that destruction and destruction as a consequence of a battle leave some residue that is the basis for future conflicts.

As stated by Sun Tzu: as a general rule, it is better to keep intact an enemy rather than destroying him [...]. For this reason, those who win all battles are not really professional; those who make other armies surrender without fighting are the best masters of the Art of War [...], a real master of martial arts defeats other enemy forces without battle, conquers other cities without bothering and destroys other armies in little time¹.

Strategic actors must assess their means and consider them as superior to the opponent's, consider the target in dispute as important or relatively important and have a greater or smaller degree of freedom of action.

Therefore, we could ask what would the convenient relative strategic position that allows to be successful in a dispute?

It would be prudent to show as part of this work that the essence of strategy is not only to choose a way that leads us to victory but a position from which most ways we can take lead us to victory.

STRATEGY POSITIONS

The position that a strategist must adopt is not command of units in presence, this is something that a tactical and logistical chief, that is someone who better knows how to manage means, is in charge of.

A strategist is a mediator between politics and tactics and he must also arrange thoughts with a scheme that relates events in which there are ends (that is convenient to consider as political) with means that provide force to harmonize both with proper means to reach ends.

Ends are expressed as purposes, modes are expressed as plans as to the way to operate and means are expressed in



physical and psychological strength. The political purpose requires to have this sequence: a strategic plan and a tactical-logistical resolution.

The political purpose, understood as a purpose of will that comes through the ear, is words. If discussed, it would be a debate. The strategic mode, as a plan of reason comes through vision, is vision. If drawn, it would be a scene. The tactical mean, as a resolution comes through touch, is contact. If measured, it would be an effort: a comparison or collision of forces present in the Theater of Operations.

All these considerations have caused different opinions as to the current nature of strategic problems. This is beyond the simple classification of only three levels of analysis: political level, strategic level and tactical level.

Below is a possible summary of the reflection process as to strategic contents:

- › The French treatise writer Bonnal² satisfied himself with considering Strategy as the art of conceiving operations and Tactic as the art of carrying out combats.
- › The British military thinker Liddell Hart³ highlighted the specific presence of the political purpose in the election of the indirect mode to operate rather than what may be required in the classical or traditional action of Napoleon.

- › The French treatise writer André Beaufre⁴, after 1945, limited even more the operational strategy to the art of carrying out political objectives. He presented his opinion, an opinion that is inherent to a military man from the middle years of the 20th century, regarding the concept of deterrence.
- › Clausewitz, on the other hand, accepted that the decisive battle was the center of gravity of the strategy in which wars were to be won. Tactic in itself lacked value if it was not linked to the strategy due to its great results and this was not relevant either if it was not linked to political issues. Therefore, many other civil and military treatise

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, several editions, Chapter III, "On positions of victory and defeat"

2. Henri Bonnal. French general theorist and military man, of infantry division, who served in Algeria from 1866 to 1868 and during the French- Prussian war of 1870 was a war injured. He was an Officer of the Honor Legion. Professor of Military History, general strategy and tactic. He has written several publications.

3. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart. He was born in Paris, France (1895 - 1970). British military historian, writer and journalist. He was famous for his contributions to the theory of military use referring to indirect approach.

4. André Beaufre (1902 - 1975). French General, he ended World War II with the Rank of Colonel. Known as a military strategist and model of an independent French nuclear force.

writers put attention to the concept of deterrence during long decades that took the Cold War. The concept of best strategy is not to defeat the enemy but deter them from the armed fight.

However, if we stop our watch in the initial stage of the Cold War, both in the drawing of the steel curtain in a bipolar world as in the ambition of a new world order that is close to society without wars and welfare state, the state of the question is expressed with the detailed study of the most prestigious models of that moment.

The word strategic defines a position, as indicated by the French General Ailleret⁵ when the Cold War began: (...) This is a level from which analyzing or dealing with questions related to war, whether referring to direction or preparation, or the use for political purposes of the situations that result from it or, last, deterrence that the threat may cause among possible opponents.


Close to Ailleret, General Beaufre has insisted on

Winning without fighting is not only a manner to express a smarter manner to defeat the other one. It is a serious strategic position and it considers that destruction and destruction as a consequence of a battle leave some residue that is the basis for future conflicts.

two considerations: a very basic one, Strategy, the art of dialectics of will is also the art of using force to reach the objectives of politics and a very graphic one, there is a pyramid of different and independent strategies. This is the idea that pluralizes strategic models above what has been usual in the year 1939.

In order to value conductors of great operations throughout universal history in all cultures and civilizations, whether old or modern, preferences of created power were taken into account (or military command) with respect to several strategic models.

5. General Charles Ailleret (1907 - 1968). He was a student of the Polytechnic School, one of the institutions that most generals has trained for the French Army. In 1942 he joined the resistance against the German, in the north of France and in 1961 he was appointed supreme commandant of all French forces in Algeria. He was officer of the Honor legion.



The best distinction lies in knowing whether the model elected is for action or deterrence. The action model includes the use of armed force while deterrence prefers mere presence of force.

Once the model has been defined which, in the case of the action, has relation with the breaking of hostilities and in the case of deterrence, with keeping a certain order of safety, other two distinctions will be considered: one based on ends (nature of each purpose) and one based on means (features of military means that are tested).

› Based on ends, a strategic model may be:

- a) Hegemonic (which suggests conquest)
- b) Autonomous (which suggests resistance)

The first one is linked to attack while the second one to defense. It may happen that during some time, the prevailing position is hidden but the true purpose is made clear when studying operations being carried out.

› Based on means, a strategic model may be marked because of the possibility to serve from what is technically specialized or the possibility to resort to the law of number (general mobilization of the country to war); in sum, search of quality or the resource of quantity.

MEANS FOR STRATEGIC LINING UP

In the decision to adopt a model, considering action or deterrence, ends or means, they have to keep a line-up position with the purposes established at political level when preparing military strategy. This is the most important as the lack of agreement between them is the most direct path to defeat, even before being in contact with the enemy.

Wrong lining up models⁶ are multiple and their examples may be seen in the main historical cases.

› The first wrong model refers to the use of improper military means to get the desired political result. The classical example of mistakes is the United Kingdom during the American Independence War.

A version of the model is when the manner in which military force is used may cause counter-productive political effects, for example actions by the United States in Vietnam.

› The second wrong strategic lining up model is when strategy takes politics or the military concept of victory overlaps the political concept of victory. The best example is the performance of General Mac Arthur in the Korean War that led to his removal by President Truman.

An alternative is tactification of strategy that is produced when existing capacities generate missions rather than otherwise.

Ends are expressed as purposes, modes are expressed as plans as to the way to operate and means are expressed in physical and psychological strength. The political purpose requires to have this sequence: a strategic plan and a tactical- logistical resolution.

- › A third wrong model is that politics become so abstract or ambiguous that it is difficult to line it up with strategy. A clear example is the idealist attitude of President Wilson during participation of United States in World War I and their attempts to create a new international order in post-war.
 - › A fourth wrong model is when there are policies that are so expansionist and/or political purposes are so ambitious that they may create too many enemies and exceed military capacities. Clear examples are those of Napoleon and powers of the Axis in World War II.
 - › The fifth wrong strategic model is when limitations imposed by politics for the use of force are so restrictive that they make it difficult to reach victory. The best example is the performance of the United States in the Vietnam War and of NATO in Kosovo in 1999 that was very close to failure.
 - › The sixth wrong model is when risks to expand the use of force, such as the intervention of a third party, possible use of weapons of mass destruction, the breaking of one's own coalition and the appearance of an insurgence exceed one's own reward. The best example of going "too far" was the invasion of the territory of Northern Korea until the Chinese border was reached in 1950.
 - › The seventh wrong strategic model is when costs of military action exceed the value of the object sought, understanding by costs the magnitude and duration or number of casualties, economic and political costs. The historical example that better fits this pattern is World War I, even for successful powers such as Great Britain.
 - › We could talk about an eighth wrong strategic model in light of the existence of badly conceived victory theories with false assumptions on how military operations will translate into political purposes. This case is the most common one, from the Peloponnesian War to the invasion of Iraq.
- Therefore, once the strategist has understood complication of wrong lining up of strategy with political purposes, they will consider a conceptual scheme that will relate events. To do this, they will relate ends and means

6. González, C. F., "Estrategia militar y política: temas, teóricos y aplicación práctica", Boletín de Información, 2009.

The strategic position is a body of thoughts that, despite its complexity, must be a practical guide to reach the ends of politics in the best way possible, especially to prevent mistakes about which history talks with many examples.

and to what extent freedom of action takes part in this compound without failing to consider what costs there are and risks to be taken.

Thus, depending on relative means of the two adversaries and the relevance of offer, the strategic plan will be ordered pursuant to different models, from which we will examine the most relevant ones:

Direct threat: If there are very powerful means and the objective is modest, the only threat of these means may take the adversary to accept conditions that are imposed and to withdraw more quickly from the intention to modify the existing status quo. This model of direct threat relates to the possession of atomic weapons and is the basis for the huge building of dissuasion strategy.

Indirect pressure: On the contrary, although the objective is modest, if there are no sufficient means to become a decisive threat, it will be necessary to find the decision through more or less deceptive actions of political, diplomatic or economic status. This model of indirect pressure is a strategy that corresponds to cases in which the area of freedom of action of the force is reduced.

Extended total fight: If the room for freedom of action is big but available means to reach a military decision are scarce, there may be a conflict strategy of great extension which aims at reaching moral tear and flexibility of the opponent. In order to last in this position, means used must be very rustic and it will be the technique to use them (generally a total war supported by a generalized guerrilla) which requires a more important effort that cannot be kept forever. This extended total fight model with weak military intensity has been successfully used in decolonization wars. This strategy requires a huge moral effort by the one that takes the initiative implies a strong passion element and a very good cohesion of the national soul.

Last, there is the option of violent conflict: If military means are very powerful, the decision sought through victory in a violent conflict and short. Destruction of opponent forces may be enough, especially if this is not



essential for the opponent. This violent conflict model which tends to military victory corresponds to classical strategy.

Thus, in light of these alternatives, we go back to the problem of election of one of the models previously analyzed. We can see that direct threat models, force consecutive actions and violent conflicts are the concept based on the search of decisions or dissuasion from the use or existence of military forces considered as the main mean, also called direct strategy.

On the other hand, indirect pressure models, consecutive actions that do not mean direct pressure and extended total fight inspire all forms of conflict that do not directly search for a decision through confrontation of military forces, but through less direct procedures, whether political or economic, or even military, by means of successive actions interrupted by negotiation.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of different strategies does not certainly simplify the problem and shows the complexity of the topic, helps to recognize that necessary abstraction of strategy leads to practical conclusions and that these, as they are found, make existing relations among different actors easier, the domain of which is absolutely essential to conduct war or keep peace.

This is why the strategic position from which horizon must be looked at will be, first, to have lining up with



politics objectives. This position cannot be overlapped with the main aspects of national strategy: operational and tactical strategy.

Strategic position will allow to make a correct interpretation of the ends sought with means available previously assessing costs that acceptance of the position taken would have and what risks to be taken would be. Also, it is important when deciding if the action or dissuasion to reach victory are to be adopted.

The defeated one then deserves his destiny because defeat is the result of thought mistakes made before or during conflict. The strategic position is not an intelligence game on realities of war or a conceited or pedant way to think about problems presented.

The strategic position is a body of thoughts that, despite its complexity, must be a practical guide to reach the ends of politics in the best way possible, especially to prevent mistakes about which history talks with many examples.

This position that goes from suggestion to physical destruction is the most important part of strategy. This election allows to face more difficult situations and frequently gives victory to the weakest one. It is difficult to adopt a strategic position without study bodies provided, without a proper method to analyze situations, without a perfect knowledge of the evolution and technological possibilities that may be used. There are many contexts of strategy that were not explored enough or unexplored.

Once the strategist has understood complication of wrong lining up of strategy with political purposes, they will consider a conceptual scheme that will relate events.

As regards a group of analysis as the one imposed by a correct strategic position, we can say that this millenary art, due to the pressure of events is becoming current again.

In order to domain phenomena of the extension and diversity of Cold War, revolutionary and atomic and total war, among others, it is necessary for classical strategy to be considerably extended and renewed.

This was the campaign of General San Martín in Perú considered by Antonio José de Sucre who would then be the Great Marshal from Ayacucho when he writes to San Martín a few days after he entered Lima... The famous marks of military victory of Your Excellence fight for preference, but it is true that making a great country and a great section of America without committing a battle is the result of rather well combined calculation and the strangest direction in a campaign in which art and prudence have replaced power of the enemy.

It will lie with the view, creativity and professionalism and experience of the strategist to have a position to reach victory.



POSTMODERN SOCIETY AND ITS IMPACT ON ARMED FORCES

Challenges for indirect military leadership¹

It is important to recognize variables of social evolution that have an impact on armed institutions and their implications in military leadership. In light of this, armed forces must be “flexible” to adapt to new transformation criteria, economic changes and domestic and international contexts which will allow them to comply with war and non-war missions without losing the essence of their role.

KEY WORDS: POSTMODERNISM / SOCIETY / WOMAN / DYNAMICS / LEADERSHIP / VARIABLES / PERMEABILITY

By Miguel Podestá

INTRODUCTION

In his treaty on the nature of war, Clausewitz² explains the existence of a paradoxical trinity composed of a physical and spiritual force that arises from the will of fight of people that are part of a nation, aspects of military conduction inherent to armed forces and their subordination to the political reason of their use decided by the government. The balance of these three components will be essential to get the desired end in an armed conflict.

These three trends are like three different judicial codes closely related to their field of study but they keep very variable relations. A theory that ignores any of them or that aims at establishing among them an arbitrary fixed relation would be in conflict with the reality that, for this reason, would not be useful³.

A hundred years later and on the other side of the world, Mao Tse Tung⁴, in the context of the Japanese invasion to China (1937-1945), would say: The Army must be one only

thing with the people and must be considered by them as theirs. It would therefore be unbeatable.

In a similar sense to what has been expressed by Mao Tse Tung, this article would try to get closer to the relation “society- armed forces” in postmodern times, trying to think about a topic that is not present in the agenda of military institutions normally focused on specific topics of the profession.

Society supports with taxes and people the effort to defend a nation; consequently, the existence of a harmonic relation between it and its armed forces would be essential. In light of this, it is important to recognize variables of social evolution that have an impact on armed institutions and their implications in military leadership of higher levels.

In light of the many existing approaches to the concept of postmodernism, we will use the one of the Royal Spanish Academy which defines it as:

Artistic and cultural movement of the end of the 20th century featured by its opposition to rationalism and prevailing worship of shapes, individualism and lack of social commitment.

A SCIENTIFIC INPUT TO THE SUBJECT

In the research *The Postmodern Military*⁵, there are five important characteristics of these times:

- 1) The increasing permeability between civil and military contexts
- 2) Reduction of differences between different hierarchies and combat and support weapons.
- 3) Extension of duties of military men.
- 4) Increase of operations legitimated by international bodies.
- 5) Increasing internationalization of military organizations (combined forces).

In order to think about the relations between society and its armed forces, the authors of the research propose a comparison of the evolution of eleven variables in twelve western countries throughout three periods:

In the same idea and three years after the two hundred anniversary of the *Exodo Jujeño*, it is worth remembering this as an inspiring model of an integral concept of a national defense that relates the people of a nation with their armed forces.

The group of the Commander in Chief (Belgrano) is clear and energetic. This document summarizes the sacrifice that no other province has made for independence and this is why all generations must bear it in mind as an example of what love to one's country can do. Let's think about those hundreds of souls... all of them or almost all of them were born within those walls. Leaving everything for an idea that had only caused disruption and deception” (Bidondo, 1968, pages 133-134)



El Éxodo Jujeño – Museo Histórico Provincial de Jujuy

1. For leadership levels, see Podestá, Miguel, “El liderazgo militar y sus niveles”, revista *Visión Conjunta*, Year 3, Volume 3, Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta, Buenos Aires, p. 13.

2. Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War*, Ministry of Defense of Spain, Madrid, 1999.

3. Clausewitz, Carl von, op. cit., p. 196.

4. Tse-Tung, Mao, “Sobre la Guerra Prolongada”, in *Obras Escogidas*, Volume I, Platina, Buenos Aires, 1959, p. 433

5. Done by professors related to the Interuniversity Seminar Society – Armed Forces of the Loyola University, Chicago, United States. Available at <http://www.iusafs.org/>

- 1) Modern: from the Treaty of Westfalia (1648) which coincides with the recognition of the principle of national sovereignty to the end of World War II.
- 2) Late modern: From 1945 to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
- 3) Contemporary: From 1990 to nowadays. Results in the case of the United States (considered in the research as witness) may be observed in Table 1 updated (2014) by students of the Master's Degree in Military Strategy of the Joint Staff College. Among the relevant conclusions of the study⁶ we can mention that there is a prevailing trend to the dissolution of lines that distinguish civil from military society, both in structure and culture, that we are in times when forms of social organization may be more relevant than the level of military technology⁷ and, last, movement to military fully into postmodernism will not necessarily continue in the future.

On the other hand, in the analysis of the evolution in Argentina of the variables mentioned carried out by the master's degree mentioned, there were trends that are similar to the features of the social, cultural and historical context. Some examples of this are:

“The basic form tends to a force of volunteers with a mission of multiple forces increasingly androgynous in the manners and ethos and greater permeability with civil society”.

C. Moskos, D. Segal and J. Williams

- › Distinction of concepts of national defense and domestic security.
- › Movement from compulsory military service to voluntary military service.
- › Abolition of the Military Justice Code (Law 26394/2008).
- › Promotion of gender equality.
- › Tendency to combined forces with the creation of the Task Force “Cruz del Sur” with the Republic of Chile and the

THE ARMED FORCES IN THE THREE AGES: THE UNITED STATES CASE

TIME VARIABLES	MODERN (PRE COLD WAR) 1900- 1945	MODERN LATE (COLD WAR 1945- 1990)	POST MODERN (POST COLD WAR) SINCE 1990	UPDATE 2014
THREAT	ENEMY INVASION	NUCLEAR WAR	[ILLEGIBLE] ETHNIC VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, ETC.	COUNTRIES WITH MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, GROWING INFLUENCE OF CHINA AND RUSSIA
FORCE STRUCTURE	CONSCRIPTION MASS ARMY	GREAT PROFESSIONAL ARMY	SMALL PROFESSIONAL ARMY	TREND TOWARDS LIGHT, MULTI PURPOSE AND VERSATILE FORCES
"GREATER MISSION DEFINITION"	TERRITORY DEFENSE	ALLIANCE SUPPORT	NEW MISSIONS (PEACE FORCES, HUMANITARIAN)	GREATER MISSION KEPT HIGHLIGHTING RELEVANCE OF SUBSIDIARY TASKS
DOMINANT MILITARY PROFESSIONAL	COMBATANT LEADER	ADMINISTRATOR OR TECHNICIAN	STATE SOLDIER, STUDENT MILITARY MAN	HIGH VALUE IN INDIRECT LEADERSHIP OF JOINT AND/OR COMBINED EXPERIENCE AND POST GRADUATE STUDIES
PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARDS MILITARY MAN	SUPPORT	AMBIVALENT	INDIFFERENT	THEIR INTERVENTION GENERALLY GETS SOCIAL RESPECT AND ATTENTION
RELATION WITH SOCIAL MEDIA	[ILLEGIBLE]	MANIPULATED	COURTED	FOCUSED ON SHOWING ASPECTS THAT BREACH LAW
CIVIL EMPLOYEES	MINOR COMPONENT	MIDDLE COMPONENT	COMPONENT	"TREND TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY NON- GENERATIVE ACTIVITY INCREASE OF OUTSOURCING"
WOMAN'S ROLE	SEPARATED OR EXCLUDED BODY	PARTIAL INTEGRATION	TOTAL INTEGRATION	IN 2016, ALL COMBAT ROLES MUST BE CAPABLE OF INCLUDING WOMEN
MILITARY MAN'S WIFE	INTEGRAL PART	PARTIAL INVOLVEMENT	NO INTERFERENCE	EACH WIFE DECIDES AS TO THEIR LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT
HOMOSEXUALITY OF MILITARY MEN	PUNISHED	TOLERATED	ACCEPTED	[ILLEGIBLE]
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION	LIMITED OR PROHIBITED	PERMITTED [ILLEGIBLE]	INCLUDED IN OTHER CIVIL SERVICES	ACCEPTED AND INCLUDED IN ALL SERVICES

Adaptada de Moskos, Charles, Segal, David y Williams, John. (2000). The Postmodern Military. New York: Oxford: University Press. Tabla 2.1 de la página 15.

Nota: la actualización 2014 fue realizada por el Equipo de Trabajo de la Maestría en Estrategia Militar: integrado por Bravo, Luis (FAA), Dalle Nogara, Marcelo (ARA), Gunther, Steve (USNAVY), y Torres, Federico (EA).

Engineers Team “General San Martín” with the Republic of Perú.

) Significant participation in peace missions.

The first of them is included in the objective⁸ of promoting dialogue and cooperation with civil society to keep a defense policy with high level of agreement.

DYNAMIC OF VARIABLES

Possible variables of the relation between society and armed forces do not have fixed features that have a dynamic for each nation and historical period of time. In order to prove this, we will focus on one of them that is the role of women in armies. Today, the debate (finished in most aspects) focuses on the presence of women in near land combat roles.

Perhaps due to the favourable impact that the news⁹ had about the fact that Margaret H. Woodward, a 50-year-old brigadier with 3800 hours of flight commanded the Operation¹⁰ Odyssey Dawn over Lybia (2011), making her become the first woman in the history of the United States that controlled an operation of air attack over a foreign country, in that country at the beginning of 2013, the rule of the year 1994 that prohibited the presence of women in direct combat roles, infantry, armored vehicles and special forces was abolished.

In the opinion of MacKenzie¹¹, some events promoted this decision: fourth generation wars in which the front line mitigates validity, opinion surveys of the American society, support of defense authorities and studies referring to impact of these tasks over the cohesion of units or physical abilities of women to comply with those roles.

The main obstacle for women who want to serve their country is a group of old biased assumptions about their place in society¹².

However, there were different ideas, such as the opinion of the captain (US Marines) Katie Petronio¹³: I can say, based on my direct, personal experience in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than only on an impression, that we have not started to analyze and understand specific issues of gender health and physical damage to women caused by continuous combat operations.

In a careful position, the Ministry of Defense of the United Kingdom¹⁴ announced on July 3, 2014, a new revision (the

“The best armies of old times were not those that opposed to habits of that time but those that found the manner to exaggerate and exploit wishes of their soldiers. The best generals of old times did not oppose to main trends of their time but let themselves be carried by the deepest waters”.

J. E. Lendon

previous one was in 2010) on the current exclusion of women in near combat roles.

Without questioning individual capacity of women to hold some positions, concern lies mainly in the impact that their incorporation would have on the cohesion of small groups that have both male and female members, for example in case a woman is seriously injured: would standards established be complied with? Or acting according to pre-existing cultural standards, men will neglect fulfillment of their mission to deal with that? Or will they give priority to a man injured who requires urgent assistance?

It is also interesting to know how society can react when women act in direct combat. We could imagine the social impact of an image of a combatant in Afghanistan injured who is the mother of two children who are with their father in their country.

These subjects are very complex and they imply interdisciplinary approaches rather than only military approaches. On the other hand, this topic has become relevant in the last years as small units, due to their versatility, have become the most proper ones for many conflicts of our times (low intensity or stabilization operations).

6. Moskos, C., Segal, D. & Williams, J., *The Postmodern Military*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 11.

7. With respect to this, we can observe the difficulty to interpret the meaning of the new state in creation called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as social organization.

8. Ministry of Defense of the Argentine Republic, Management objectives. Available at http://www.mindef.gov.ar/institucional/politica_nacional_de_la_defensa/objetivos-de-la-gestion.html, 2014

9. Pisani, S., “Una mujer a cargo de una campaña aérea”, *La Nación*, March 24, 2011.

10. Authorized by Resolution of the Security Council UN 1973.

11. MacKenzie, M. H., “Let Women Fight”. *Foreign Affairs*, January 2013

12. MacKenzie, M. H., *op. cit.*

13. Petronio, K., “Get Over It! We Are Not All Created Equal”, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Volumen 97, Issue 3, 2013

14. United Kingdom Government, Ministry of Defense, July 3, 2014. Revision of the issue of women in land near combat roles. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/review-of-women-in-ground-close-combat-roles>



Dynamics that we observe in this topic and that has been used as an example would be applied to most variables analyzed in chart 1.

WARNING

Results of the so-called socialization processes intensified in some European armies since the fall of the Berlin Wall and, consequently, the appearance of a two-pole world were questioned by the former Allied Supreme Commandant in Europe, John Sheehan¹⁵. He stated that it may be said that the failure of the Netherlands Battalion in their mission to protect refugees in the city of Srebrenica (1995) within the framework of the UN UNPROFOR¹⁶, who indirectly with their inaction, made it possible for eight thousand Muslim-bosnians to be executed by Serbian forces from Bosnia in what has been considered the greatest massacre in Europe after World War II.

These statements replicated in the western northern hemisphere, apart from the great controversy they caused and its immediate rejection by Dutch authorities made it possible to consider the difficult balance implicit in the slogan “as civil as possible, as military as possible, which, in some manner¹⁷ inspired in this country the defense policy

towards the search for an integration of armed forces with their society in a complete and quick manner.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIRECT MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Going from a uniform and slightly changeable staff management context to a diverse and changing one, from the necessary formal discipline in a mass army to conduct an army of professionals and apply lethal force in an unrestrictive manner to do this with the principle of proportional response to aggression received are, among others, changes that impact on leadership.

In subjects such as management of diversity to obtain from each person the best of their capacities, the search for answers to complex problems with deep

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“Social time includes phenomena that take place at different speeds, overlapping and getting confused with each other. Leaders and institutions are a navigation charter in the confusing sea of society and history”.

E. Fianza

professional knowledge and the use of interdisciplinary approaches that do not exclusively come from the military environment.

Also in the idea that in the use of force there is a slight limit between application of violence in self-defense of the victim, even if it is a national state, and social perception which, generated by an excess in the use of violence, make Armed Forces be perceived as murderers affecting national will to support them or their legitimacy before international community¹⁸.

As regards competences required, those related to knowledge and action, inherent to direct leadership, there are those related to being and knowing how to be, relating with other people at higher levels of the institution and/or interacting with government and non government organizations (a common circumstance in peace missions) keeping standards that correspond to ethics of people that serve in public institutions¹⁹.

Knowing how to be implies a high power of persuasion and communication in which respect for other people's thoughts given by knowing how to listen and one's own argument based on deep knowledge rather than superficial of the problem to be dealt with and the capacity to arrive to summaries that contribute to achieve the purpose sought will be the most valued skills.

The character of war as social phenomenon is changing, understanding implications of that change is a responsibility of that leadership level.

For this, it is not enough to know military specialty, but it is necessary to have a general culture according to responsibilities that allows to correctly consider complexity of problems that will normally be presented as a combination of ambiguity, mutability and uncertainty and, in some cases, they are tried to be resolved with pre-existing concepts separated from reality or capacities of means actually available.

Military aptitude requires a large general culture fund to be ruled. Methods to organize and apply violence at any

time in history are closely related to any cultural scheme of society.

As it happens with its limits, law is confused with history, politics, economy, sociology and psychology, the same happens with military aptitude. Even more, military knowledge also has borders with natural sciences, such as chemistry, physics and biology.

In order to understand this function, the officer has to have an idea of his relation with other fields of movement and the manner in which this may contribute to their purposes. Also, it is not possible to really develop their analytical capacity, comprehension, imagination and judgment if he is only trained in vocational disciplines²⁰.

A FINAL CONCLUSION

In an increasingly changing world that depends on commerce, communication, energy and transport in which borders lose their meaning, Argentine Armed Forces have the main mission of invoking and repelling any state military external aggression, in order to guarantee and save in a permanent manner vital interests of a Nation, such as sovereignty and self determination, territorial integrity, life and freedom of their inhabitants.

In a post modern society that values exaltation of manners, diversity, freedom, rights and extols individuals, Armed Forces promote in their operating units austerity, uniformity of procedures, order, responsibilities and cohesion of the group to fulfill their mission.

Understanding their dynamics and achieving balance among these variables in permanent tension is a hard and delicate goal for military conductors.

Not knowing the first terms of the equation would mean to be far from reality and social demands of a certain historical period of time, doing this with the second ones would mean to leave capacities that allow for the effective use of force when government decides.

15. Services Armed, Committee, 18 de marzo de 2010, Hearing To Receive Testimony Relating to the "D-ont ask, D-ont tell" Policy. Recuperado de www.senate.gov, p. 13.

16. UnitedNationsProtectionForce.

17. Van Der Meulen, J., The Netherlands: "The Final Professionalization of the Military". En C. Moskos, & D. a. Segal, *The Postmodern Military*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, pp. 101 - 120.

18. Be it observed that the impact the knocking down of a comercial aircraft by the Russian forces of the provinces of that country has had on the perception of the Ukraine conflict received a unanimous sentence.

19. Established in Law 25188, 1999, Ethics in the exercise of public function.

20. Huntington, S., *El Soldado y el Estado*, Circulo Militar, Buenos Aires, 1968, p. 28.

21. Guidelines for Organization and Functioning of Argentine Armed Forces.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

Principles of war, tested several times throughout history, guide military conduction to achieve success. In current settings, there are conflicts called asymmetrical, featured by a clear imbalance among opposing forces in dispute.

KEY WORDS: ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS/ PRINCIPLES OF WAR/ OPERATIONAL PLANNING/ DECISION- MAKING

By Ramón Gustavo Bravo

INTRODUCTION

War implies imposing to the weakest one defeating the will opposed. This power superiority is not only measured by men and means, but also the type of conflict in which those forces are opposed must be considered.

Asymmetrical conflicts have three general features:

1. They aim at causing a significant psychological impact on the people.
2. They require a prior analysis of the opponent vulnerabilities.
3. They are based on tactics, innovative and non traditional weapons or technology.

In order to properly face said conflicts, it is necessary to make planning at operational level that will turn into a Campaign Plan. This planning is based on operational art prepared by a series of Elements of Operational Design.

If we observe conflicts of the last decades, such as the Vietnam War (1959-1975), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), we can state that most of them are asymmetrical, which makes it necessary to analyze how principles of war affect operational planning in an environment of this type, conditioning decision- making of the Commander of the Theater of Operations.

ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

One of the first thinkers that talked about Asymmetrical Conflicts was Mao Tse- Tung, Chinese statesman and

politician that proposed a revolutionary war of this type. This design was seen in the Vietnam War¹.

Colonel (retired) Rodolfo Ortega Prado of the Chilean Army, wrote: (...) *Asymmetrical war is a conflict in which there is a great disproportion among forces opposed, not only military, but also all those resources or manners of fighting that may be used to dissuade the opponent from their objective, whether they are conventional or irregular forces. Here, the setting is not estimated as in traditional war, even many of the classical principles of war are replaced by innovative harassment tactics that wear away any army*².

As examples of asymmetrical conflicts, we can mention:

- › What happened in March 1993, in Somalia streets when 18 soldiers of special troops of said country died.
- › Terrorist attack to the Twin Towers in 2001.
- › Iraq War in 2003, among many others.

According to Iván Arregín Tolf, specialist in asymmetrical war: (...) *weak actors have defeated in 30% of conflicts since 1809 and with time, this will deepen even more*³. We can then state that most current conflicts are asymmetrical.

1. Prado, Rodolfo Ortega. "Asymmetrical War and Information Operations", Military Review, Estados Unidos, May- June, 2011, p. 24.

2. Prado, Rodolfo Ortega, op. cit., p. 22.



In this type of conflicts (...), *there is no determined side, nor conventional military actions. On the contrary, it is based on a combination of political and military actions that generally involve civil population in different operations (psychological, attacks, veil and deceit, among others)*⁴.

Based on these definitions, we can observe that in these current settings, the field of war becomes unclear and includes unimaginable areas. Threat is not only an adversary power but can be limited to a hostile group, either of small dimension or transnational scope.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

We must consider that there are principles that guide those that conduct war in the correct direction in order to achieve success and that they were applied to conventional conflicts in many situations.

Colonel John Mattox of the US Army indicates: the word principle appeared at the end of the 14th century and means a truth or main statement on which many others depend. The word comes from the Latin word *principium* which refers to the head of an Army, Staff and General⁵.

In the first half of the 19th century, Antoine Henri Jomini, stated that: main principles in which all good combinations of war lie, have always existed and we must refer to all other principles to understand their respective merits. These principles are unchangeable, independent from weapons used, time and places⁶.

On the other hand, Carl von Clausewitz, contemporary with Jomini, did not share the idea of universality of principles and concluded that they can only serve as important and general guides as it stated that war could not be made with fixed rules⁷. Other authors have also written about the Principles of War⁸.

In conclusion, evolution of all conflicts from sword, going through rifles and latest technology weapons, including satellites and cyber attacks is based on the principles of war although these change depending on the importance or nature of action. Success will depend on the fact that those who conduct actions⁹ have the capacity and opportunity to apply them.

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

After the Franco- Prussian war, in 1870, the German

3. Prado, Rodolfo Ortega, op. cit., p. 4.

4. Locatelli, Omar, "Asymmetrical War: a new war equation - Evolution to a new type of war", second part, Information Manual, Buenos Aires, p. 10.

5. Mattox, John Mark, "Separar el grano de la paja: Cambian las épocas o los principios?" Military Review, United States, January - February, 2009, p. 8.

6. Glenn, Russell, "Se han eliminado los principios de la guerra?", Military Review, United States, May- June, 1998, p. 21.

7. Glenn W. Russell, op. cit., p. 21.

8. Glenn W. Russell, op. cit., p. 22.

9. Mattox, John Mark, op. cit., p. 9.

introduced a classification of the levels of war into three: strategic, operational and tactical. Operational is the link between both levels making national strategic objectives clear to those merely tactical¹⁰.

After the experiences of the Soviets in World War I and the Russian Civil War explanations started to be sought as to complexities of war¹¹.

For them: Military strategy had increased so much that it included a great diversity of activities, including planning and preparation at the highest levels, orchestration and prioritization of all means available and identification of objectives that ended with direct application of military power for the achievement of the objectives of the State¹².

It is necessary to take into account that in order to solve a problema in the military context, it is advisable to apply a planning method defined by the Joint Staff.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN ASYMETRICAL CONFLICTS

In the Argentine Armed Forces, there are eleven principles upon which this article will be based:

Principle of command unit: Its purpose is to assure unity of effort to the order of a commandant responsible for each operational objective.

For its application, it is necessary to have cooperation and coordination in order to reach a common purpose¹³. Unity of

effort is necessary to efficiently apply full combat power of forces available¹⁴.

In asymmetrical conflicts, there are organizations formed by civilians (transnational corporations, non-governmental groups, the media, private organizations and NGOs)¹⁵, some of which will fight to keep autonomy and interests complicating Unity of Command of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations.

In such manner that it is important to implement a chain of command that allows the Commandant of the Theater of Operations to make decisions, to be able to control them in any operation or circumstance so that they can reach the Operational End State¹⁶.

Objective: It is based on the correct determination of an objective that must be clear, defined, decisive and reasonable for all types of operations within the Theater of Operations¹⁷. This objective must be essential for the fulfillment of the mission of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations and attainable with means available and within the limits of time and space imposed¹⁸.

Defining the objective is of vital importance in any type of conflict as once it is established, efforts will be directed for their obtention.

According to Herfried Münkler, Professor of Political Theory at Humboldt University (Germany), 21st century wars will be fought by soldiers and, in its greatest part, will not be



Principles of War have a positive influence on operational planning posing a condition to the decision making process of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations as lack of application may disregard important points to be considered during planning, which affects the course of the campaign.

directly addressed to military objectives. Military objectives are being replaced by civil objectives, from cities and towns invaded and looted by leaders of militia and military heads to economic and political power symbols that were the target of the September 11 terrorist attacks¹⁹.

Security: Its purpose is to prevent the enemy from acquired an unexpected advantage²⁰.

Within an asymmetrical context, the non-conventional opponent will try to use concealment and surprise to carry out their actions while state forces are highly identifiable and this is why security is a principle to be considered to preserve one's own forces.

In this sense: support to people is subject to the perception they have as to which band actually assures welfare and protection. Perception of security of people is highly important for the success of the operation²¹.

Suprise: The intention is to keep initiative without providing the enemy with time to react in the proper manner²².

It is necessary to have a proper information system together with the application of technological advance and great speed in maneuver developed within the campaign.

This will require: proper veil and deceit plans, active

intelligence, efficient counter intelligence, an agile and flexible decision making process and forces with tactical, strategic and operational speed²³.

Attack: Its purpose is to exploit the initiative, imposing the will to the enemy, which contributes to get the necessary freedom of action to manage one's own forces properly²⁴.

In this sense, non conventional forces tend to mix with civil population and they will be the ones that can use this advantage in a broader sense, as they will be the ones that generally have the initiative of actions.

Concentration: The intention is to provide sufficient means at the decisive moment and in the place as well as the necessary means in secondary areas.

In the asymmetrical context, it is necessary to take into account that for the Commandant of the Theater of Operations, this concentration does not only refer to military means, but it must also refer to economic, psycho social efforts and NGOs, for example, a situation that will make the mission even more difficult. Also, it will be difficult to apply concentration if the enemy is permanently hidden and moving.

Maneuver: The intention is to position forces in such manner so as to obtain an advantage over the opponent, keeping freedom of action and own initiative. This maneuver will be influenced by the logistics of the Theater of Operations, as the operational scope of forces and their direction depend on this.

Here, non conventional forces will have the advantage due to their intention to keep themselves invisible trying to get and keep initiative. It is necessary to take into consideration that in asymmetry, there are no fronts or devices specifically defined in such a manner that it will be difficult to carry out a maneuver.

Morale: Keeping morale is one of the most important factors in asymmetrical wars. The famous strategist and historian

10. Mattox, John Mark, op. cit., p. 185.

11. Menning, W. Bruce, "The origins of Operational Art", Military Review, United States, May-June, 1998, p. 3.

12. Menning, W. Bruce, op. cit., p. 8.

13. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. Manual of Strategy and Planning for Joint Military Action, Operational level – La Campana 2013. MC 20-01 p 186.

14. Glenn W. Russell, op. cit., p. 28.

15. Ramirez, Gonzalo Martin, "Asymmetrical War – Fourth generation conflicts", a Revista, Nro. 546, Buenos Aires, July- September 2002., p. 30.

16. Tievias Marcelo. Validity of principles of conventional war and appearance of new principles in the creation and direction of a Campaign, in a context of Fourth Generation War. Final Assignment. Buenos Aires. 2011. p. 12.

17. AArgentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. Manual of Strategy and Planning for Joint Military Action, Operational Level – La Campana, MC 20-01, 2013, p. 187.

18. Llocatelli, Omar, op. cit., p. 13.

19. Herfried, Munkler, "21st century wars", International Journal of the Red Cross, No. 849. Recuperado de <http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/etfipo/eticaa/docs/20.pdf>.

20. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 187.

21. Artelli, Michael – Deckro Richard, Fourth Generation Operations: principles for the Long War. Available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09592310802061372>.

22. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 188.

23. Tievias Marcelo, op. cit., p. 14.

24. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 188.

In asymmetrical conflicts, there are organizations formed by civilians (transnational corporations, non-governmental groups, the media, private organizations and NGOs), some of which will fight to keep autonomy and interests complicating Unity of Command of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations.

sir Basil Liddel Hart wrote: The loss of hope, rather than the loss of lives is what actually decides success of war²⁵.

The use of the media, management of public opinion and effects of psychological action are very important to get success in a campaign. The power of affectation, initiative and surprise that non conventional actors have caused that soldiers, beyond being persuaded of the cause they defend, feel mental and psychical pressure of this type of conflict that make them rethink what the limit of their action is²⁶.

Support: It is based on the capacity and skill of the commandant of the Theater of Operations to keep their force, supplies and material required to support their force.

Here, it is necessary to state that non conventional forces will find difficulties when dealing with this support due to the characteristics of this type of conflicts as they will act in an isolated manner to keep a logistic chain and it will be necessary to interact with civil population.

Simplicity: This refers to preparing plans that are clear and easy to interpret by those who will execute them preventing risks and confusion of operations.

For non conventional forces, it will be easier to act and prepare their plans, carrying out specific, concrete and simple operations. As regards plans of conventional forces, they tend to be more complicated as it will not be easy to distinguish the opponent when they have to face the unlimited enemy imagination.

Freedom of action: The intention is to have a favourable military situation that allows for freedom of action of one's own forces and deny action of opponents. It refers to having the initiative taking advantage of the moment indicated. We can say that freedom of action allows to keep attack or go for it²⁷.

Taking this into consideration, we must also consider the difficulty of conventional forces to reach freedom of action, contrary to non conventional.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR. OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICTS

The planning method selected by the Joint Staff to plan the campaign is the Joint Planning Procedure which has seven steps to reach the solution of the problem and is detailed in the Strategy and Planning Manual for Joint Military Action-Operational Level- The Campaign.

This method has great scope in the military environment due to its vertical and hierarchical nature and because it is rational and logical, which can be applied in conventional conflicts²⁸. Operational planning is based on operational art which is the use of forces aiming at getting operational objectives through interrelation, organization and conduction.

The center of operational art are the elements of operational design, therefore, we will explain how the principles of war affect those elements, which only have direct implication in Step 2 of the planning method mentioned.

End Operational State: It is defined as: Conditions which, when achieved, fulfill the mission. At this level, these conditions get the objectives stated for the campaign²⁹, taking into account that identifying said objectives correctly will be key to reach success of the campaign.

In this element of the operational design, we must apply the Principle of the Objective, considering that in some occasions it will be difficult to determine it due to the uncertainty caused by the asymmetrical context. Not applying it correctly subjects the End Operational State wrongly directing decisions of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations.

Center of Gravity (COG): It is the group of characteristics, skills and sources of power of which a system derives its freedom of action, moral or physical force and will to win. In sum, it is the skill of the opponent that defeated or eliminated will force one or another to surrender or negotiate peace³⁰.

For this reason, it is essential to determine one's own Center of Gravity to protect it properly and determine the one of the opponent in order to direct efforts to eliminate or neutralize it.

In asymmetrical conflicts, there will be a person or organization that will not be visible as in conventional conflicts, in which the Center of Gravity will be materialized

25. Tievias, Marcelo, op. cit., p. 17.

26. Locatelli, Omar, op. cit., p. 15.

27. Martínez de Campos y Serrano, Teoría de la Guerra, Ediciones Ejército, Madrid, 1945, p. 25.

28. Martínez de Campos y Serrano, op. cit., p. 91.

29. Vergara, Evergisto de, "El Planeamiento Operacional", Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos de Buenos Aires, 2003.

30. Argentina. Ministry of Defense - Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 47.



(at this level), among others, by the division of the army, a natural resource, a command structure or national will³¹.

On the other hand, the Center of Gravity is materialized by a series of Critical Factors that are part of it³²:

Critical capacities: It is the primary skill or a group of skills which gives force to its Center of Gravity. It refers to causing destruction, creating effects or preventing success of enemy forces.

Critical requirements: These are specific conditions, components or essential resources for the functioning of critical capacities. It is necessary to pay attention to those critical requirements that break a critical capacity and may be considered as such.

Critical vulnerabilities: Once critical requirements have been determined, it is necessary to analyze which one is vulnerable to neutralization and/or destruction in order to significantly affect it to cause collapse of the enemy Center of Gravity.

This item is closely related to the principle of security as once one's own Center of Gravity has been identified,

Due to the complexity and uncertainty of asymmetrical conflicts, it is difficult to identify the enemy and it is almost impossible to determine what their possible objectives are, reasons for which, it is not possible to state different modes of action and capacities of the enemy on which operational planning will be based.

it must be protected preventing the opponent to acquire an unexpected advantage and acts over one's own critical vulnerabilities.

Another principle that influences is morale. Loss of morale of forces may cause the collapse of one's own Center of Gravity. In this sense, the Commandant of the Theater of Operations cannot disregard morale of their forces under no circumstances.

Modes of Action and Capacities of the Enemy: Modes of action are the possible solutions to the problem while capacities of the enemy are the possible modes of action of the enemy.

31. Vergara, Evergisto de, op. cit.

32. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 51.

Due to the complexity and uncertainty of asymmetrical conflicts, it is difficult to identify the enemy and it is almost impossible to determine what their possible objectives are, reasons for which, it is not possible to state different modes of action and capacities of the enemy on which operational planning will be based.

Therefore, it is necessary to apply the principle of the objective for which it is necessary to identify, at any moment, the objective in spite of existing difficulties.

On the other hand, the mode of action must be supported in a logistic manner in all dimensions and it is impossible to support it without taking into consideration support of intervening forces.

Also, for the intelligence area of a Staff, it is very difficult to determine capacities of the enemy considering support of the opponent's forces due to the dispersion of forces and support by civil population.

Operational planning is based on operational art which is the use of forces aiming at getting operational objectives through interrelation, organization and conduction.

Moreover, the Commandant of the Theater of Operations must consider the freedom of action that they will give to the modes of action. Planning must be such that Specific Commandants have freedom of action in order to carry out their own detailed planning.

Momentum and tempo: Momentum can be defined as the opportunity to carry out actions that allow to exploit the opponent's vulnerabilities. This is closely related to the initiative they have. Tempo is based on keeping a constant pressure over the opponent in order not to give them enough time to successfully develop their actions³³.

It is necessary to take into account that operations will be carried out at a high tempo, both for the conventional and the asymmetrical actor, due to the speed in the action of the latter. This is possible once the objective over which there is an intention to act has been identified.

The Commandant of the Theater of Operations must consider the principle of attack, the purpose of which is to take, retain and exploit the initiative imposing their will to the enemy. It is not easy to find a proper moment to make a certain strike over the asymmetrical opponent who generally has the initiative and acts surprisingly and wrongly where it is less expected. This principle also tries to apply proper pressure to retain freedom of action from the enemy.



If we observe conflicts of the last decades, such as the Vietnam War (1959-1975), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), we can state that most of them are asymmetrical, which makes it necessary to analyze how principles of war affect operational planning in an environment of this type, conditioning decision-making of the Commander of the Theater of Operations.

In order to apply proper effort in the proper moment, the principle of Unity of Command and the essential cooperation and coordination in order to reach success. Moreover, in order to keep high tempo, it is necessary to have a unified command to prevent interference or lack of precision in operations carried out.

Effort and operational maneuver. Operational effort is defined as the application and/or correction of means, forces or effects and time given, through which a Commandant expects to reach success of the Campaign³⁴.

Operational maneuver is the combination of said operational efforts, whether they are main or secondary, to be carried out by means of the best use of resources and forces available in a given time and space in order to break up the Center of Gravity of the opponent and reach the operational objective³⁵.

We can see the difficulty to make efforts in an operation against an asymmetrical opponent due to the fact that they carry out rapid and concrete actions in an unexpected manner, in illogical occasions and even in unexpected geographical spaces.

In general, these operations will be isolated and carried out by small groups of men. This is why it will be difficult to apply one or several efforts over a particular target.

The Commandant of the Theater of Operations must apply the Principle of Maneuver in order to get an advantage over the opponent keeping freedom of action and initiative.

In order to carry out maneuver in a synchronized and successful manner, it is necessary to have a proper Unit of Command to dispose of forces with the corresponding coordination and control in time.

Culminating Point. It is defined as the situation given in the development of the conflict in which the relation

of power among actors, within the space in which they interact prevents one of them from keeping the ongoing operational attitude with reasonable expectation of success forcing to take a change of path that preserves from a highly likely failure³⁶.

It is necessary to consider that the asymmetrical actor receives support from people that gives: logistic support, hiding places and intelligence information, among others. This support will make it difficult for operational attitude over the enemy that will try to hide among civil population to make it difficult for the conventional actor to act. This is why the culminating point is easier to be reached by conventional forces than asymmetrical ones.

In order not to reach this point, the Commandant of the Theater of Operations must consider the principle of support, thus assuring an uninterrupted logistic chain.

Another point to be considered is morale. A low morale makes one's own forces to reach one's own culminating point.

Here, the use of the media managing public opinion and the effects of psychological action are really important.

Operational scope. It is the capacity to act within a certain area, that is in line with the magnitude and support of one's own force³⁷.

Conventional forces do not generally find difficulties with their operational scope as they are made up of coalitions or Armed Forces that belong to countries which are superior in means and keep a proper logistic support of their own forces.

Operational pause. This is a pause in activities during an extended time in order to try not to reach the culminating point of one's own force or generate combat capacity to face the enemy³⁸.

In these conflicts, operational pause is given due to the lack of identification of the enemy, their dispersion or even constant help of civil population. Here, operational pause is less controlled than in conventional conflicts which makes it difficult to get success of the campaign.

Principles that influence this element of design are morale and support. It is important for the Commandant of the Theater of Operations to apply the principle of morale as in this type of conflicts, the opponent will try to use this point in their favor trying to reduce morale of

33. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., pp. 63 - 64.

34. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 69.

35. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 66.

36. Barrales, Paulo Jorge, "Punto Culminante y Estado Final Deseado". Gazette of the Navy Center No. 835. Buenos Aires. Jan / Apr 2013.

37. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 73.

38. Argentina. Ministry of Defense – Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 72.



their opponent in order to take conventional forces to an operational pause.

The principle of support is also applicable as interruption of logistic chain of one's own forces leads to an operational pause that affects operations and may represent a turning point in the campaign.

In graphic No. 1 and in order to make it easier for interpretation, we will establish relations that exist among different concepts.

CONCLUSIONS

We can state that these are not rules to be followed and that lack of compliance with one of them does not prevent anyone from getting success of the campaign.

We must consider that it is not easy to apply these principles and that conventional forces face an opponent that in many occasions it is not visible because, as it has been said,

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it gets mixed with population and it may be used as a human shield, if necessary, and also they do not follow logics but make wrong movements.

Not all these principles adapt to Operational Planning in asymmetrical conflicts. Those with greater influence are: Target, Security, Attack, Morale, Support and Freedom of Action.

It is worth mentioning that Principles of War have a positive influence on operational planning posing a condition to the decision making process of the Commandant of the Theater of Operations as lack of application may disregard important points to be considered during planning, which affects the course of the campaign.

We can question the following:

- › If it is not advisable to analyze another planning method for Asymmetrical Conflicts as in case the Joint Planning Procedure method is applied, all branches of non conventional conflicts analyzed in light of Principles of War will not be considered.
- › If in order to face Asymmetrical Conflicts, there is the possibility to rephrase principles used by Argentine Armed Forces.

Joint doctrine specifies the planning method of the operational level but it does not define its application to this type of conflict.

There is the need for Argentine doctrine to have a planning method that allows to face Asymmetrical Conflicts.

ARMY LEADERSHIP BY COMBAT FUNCTIONS

Army Leadership must be aware of the influence of digital age to achieve information superiority before launch any conflict. Currently, military commands need to adapt their traditional affairs and areas of management achieving a broader scope by means of digital tools and applying those innovations to Joint Staff organized under combat functions to execute joint operations.

KEYWORDS: LEADERSHIP / POWER OF COMBAT / DIGITAL TOOLS / OPERATIONS/MANOEUVRE / CIVILIAN AFFAIRS

By **Leonardo Arcadio Zarza**

INTRODUCTION

An arm force leadership is managed by National Executive Power and this includes the group of activities of design, planning, preparation, employment and supervision of available means in order to fulfil the final operational and strategic end determined in the National

Defence Strategy. In general terms, strategic leadership arm force is pursued over all forces assigned to the operations and it also embraces the group of planning, preparation, and execution activities needed to the pertinent function. National Defence military instrument is efficient and capable as long as it was conceived, planned and act in



an integrated way; besides, it synthesises joint action that involves a series of characteristics that define and guide its instrumentation.

Envisage an integral solution to military affairs is challenging because it is necessary to attune efficiently and helpful the availability of force capacities by means of a deep comprehension about the whole result and influential aspects that permit its fulfilment. Arm Forces enlist, train and keep operational capacities in every area by Military Instrument with the sole objective of execute the tasks in the *Theatre of war and/or the Theatre of Operations*.

Arm Forces, men, women and means attach to their traditional way of working; though, they are aware of the necessity of being updated in means of communication and giving instructions embedded in a virtual world ruled by social cybernetic range, however, it does not imply the lack of violence since there is a little gap between virtual to real facts. A commander lead and control in basis of General Staff. Contemporary commands are provided with leadership fields combined with computer-based systems operations according to combat functions. Nowadays, there is a steady upgrade in the work procedures of Join General Staff. Due to the increasing need to obtain information it is mandatory to filter immediate and essential facts; this decision would be prioritised by the commander.

Century XXI, information age, military leadership is influenced by technology in such a way that commanders were forced to use digital tools to pursue the force command

GRAPHIC NUMBER 1: COMBAT FUNCTIONS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS



Source: Publicación Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América, JP-3-0 Joint Operations, 11 agosto 2011.

A commander lead and control in basis of General Staff. Contemporary commands are provided with leadership fields combined with computer-based systems operations according to combat functions.

in operations besides this allow the leaders to conceptualize military activities in terms of combat functions for joint operations. Currently, arm forces mainly appeal to Command and Control, Intelligence, Firepower, Movement and Manoeuvre, Protection and Sustainment to turn potentiality of plans into power in real combat (graphic N° 1).

FIELDS AND AREAS OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership fields involve inherent and connected activities related to army management actions. The fields are: Operations, Intelligence and Logistic. Leadership area is essential because this clusters related functions and activities. The classification of these areas is based on organization and planning needs. The area of Operations leadership field includes: Training, Operations, Civil Affairs, Command-control-communications-informatics and Electronic War.

Intelligence field includes an area identified by the same name, last but not least, Logistic area implicates: Personnel, Finances and Logistic¹.

Due to the arising of the Internet and its operability is important to bear in mind those Operations, Intelligence and Logistic and corresponding areas need from General Staff a new systematization and informatisation in the transmission plans and orders process. It does not imply that General Staff organizes the management or functions separated between themselves, but these must be area-function coordinated and leadership areas appeal to function system to work synchronized.

Joint Functions

It refers to a group of activities and related capacities that every Commander requires to lead, to synchronise and to integrate joint operations. In every stage of a war leadership, these functions of military performance (regular tasks of joint operation) involve²:

- › Command-Control.
- › Intelligence.

1. Armed Forces Joint General Staff, Basic Doctrine for Joint Military Action, PC00-01, Edition 2012.

- › Firework.
- › Movement and Manoeuvre.
- › Protection.
- › Sustainability.

These functions strength and complement themselves in order to achieve the mission fulfilment. Command function is applied to all joint operations while Fireworks is used according to the mission. In fact, there are subordinated missions, capacities and tasks that are helpful to functions definition and even they might apply to different function simultaneously³.

Command and Control

These functions embody the Commander's leadership exercise and authority over attached and assigned forces to the compliance of the mission. The leader establishes his point of view about operational issues by means of instructions and guidelines that become assertive decisions to lead joint force.

- › **Command:** The authority and responsibility that a commander in the armed forces has to use effectively the available and assigned missions' accomplishment. The command at every level is the ability to lead and encourage to the staff and the organizations to implement suitable actions in pursuit of mission fulfilment.
- › **Command Relationships:** Every commander makes use of interrelated responsibilities to control and manage

the operations. Among them, it may be possible to find: operational command, operational control, tactical control, functional control, or assigned and attached support.


- › **Control:** Inherent to any command, this function is necessary to be aware of the status of arm forces organization effectiveness as well as is essential to identify any variation regarding the standards and fix possible uncertainties.

The key for a successful leadership is not fastness of decisions but it is necessary the commander take timely and prompter decisions before adversary commander would do. For example, some tasks to be done are the following:

- › Establish, organize and operate the Commanding Post of Joint Force.
- › Lead subordinated joint forces.
- › Make a plan which must be adaptable to the scenario, as well as orders and guidance.
- › Assign Operations Areas and requirement tasks.
- › Management of risk.
- › Communicate and management of information.
- › Supervision of tasks accomplishment, setting up conditions and goals' achievement.

2. Caslen, Robert, "First modification Campaign manual3-0" How US Army fights in current days, Military Review, July-August 2011.

3. United States Army Joint Publishing, JP-3-31 Command and Control of Joint Land Operations, February, 2014.



- › Coordinate, synchronise, and when it would be necessary, integrate joint operations with intra and interstate and allied organizations.
 - › Lead properly institutional communication from Operations Area.
- › **Operation Areas and functional considerations**
- › **Command and Control in Area of Operations:** According to the location where the joint operations are developed (land or insular) usually Naval and Terrestrial Components Commanders will be the supported.
 - › **Air and Space Operations Command and Control:** The authority of coordinating Third Dimension Joint Air Operations: This includes Aerospace Control Authority and Aerospace Defence Commands, Control and Command

System, Joint General Staff, Liaisons, Coordination and Control Measurements, Informatics and Communications Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Acknowledgement.

- › **Network Operations:** Currently, military operations are led digitally way and in the cyberspace. This field demands an accurate and efficient Cyber Defence Command by joint forces able to restrain and discourage any intent of active or passive cyber-attack by the enemies.
- › **Essential Elements of Information (EEI)/Other Requirements of Intelligence (ORI):** Every commander must consider the proper choice of these to route adequately the joint effort.
- › **Tempo War:** It refers to the group of daily briefings, meetings and requirements that commanders and Staffs must perform in order to ease the command and control efficiency in joint operations.

Argentinean Armed Forces leadership should adapt and transform its leadership areas and fields with Combat functions computer-based systems to achieve an efficient operability

The commander has to communicate and share the interpretation-comprehension of the issue to all General Staff and Subordinated Commands. Currently, due to the large variety of entanglement scenarios, it is necessary a suited management of information, collaboration and shared awareness between joint command, the allied, General Staff and Subordinated Commands.



Currently, arm forces mainly appeal to Command and Control, Intelligence, Firepower, Movement and Manoeuvre, Protection and Sustainment to turn potentiality of plans into power in real combat.

- › **Risk Management:** All military operation involves a risk. Therefore, it is mandatory to assure a balance between safety and mission accomplishment.
- › **Communicational Strategy:** In every military operation, the Joint Commander must be particularly aware of the matters related to information management as well as the relation between the forces and civilians in order to launch operations according to National Constitution and Armed Forces Chief Commander's orders. It must be optimized the adequate handling of institutional communicational body together with social information.
- › **Civil Affairs:** It refers to the actions executed by the commander during a military conflict to maintain safe relationship among armed forces, authorities and civilians. These activities have to mitigate the underlying causes that might interrupt military operation developments.
- › **Concealment and Deception:** It is common to plan in deep these operational performances because they would mislead the enemy's decision to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests and facilitate own actions.
- › **Cultural, Regional Expertise and Language:** Every commander and General Staff must be immersed in the multifaceted culture and adapt the scenario where the operation is held by the Armed Forces

Since 2006, after Israel military intervention in the Lebanon, leading armed forces has noticed some failures in command and control digital systems highly automatized, this has provoked the return to leadership version more personal performed by the commander known as **Mission Command**.

This version implies the leadership focus on the commander's intention while the subordinated echelons operate with a great independence but synchronised in order to achieve the result established by the commander. Despite that, the Mission Command itself requires for the leadership combat functions, leading area

called **Knowledge Management Cell (KMC)**. It has as aim to organize and to provide "relevant information management" to the commander in operations. He needs to have his digital high-payoff target list updated as it happens, but also, he has to be handled the traditional list in paper.

Intelligence

It contributes to the commander with identification and comprehension of the operational environment by means of integration, assessment, analysis and interpretation of the outer military assailants' information, foreign nations as well as potential or actual operational area. Operational level intelligence must portray what is performing the enemy, the movements to be done or any action of the future. Intelligence area includes the following aspects:

- › Planning and leadership intelligence activities and counterintelligence to protect espionage and sabotage actions.
- › Data collection.
- › Processing and collecting data to generate relevant information.
- › Analysis of information and production of intelligence.
- › Disseminate and integrate intelligence with the operations.
- › Evaluation and feedback of intelligence's quality and effectiveness.

Commitments fall to Joint Commander, Joint General Staff and Subordinated Commands. These duties involve own intelligence activities, counterintelligence, surveillance, acknowledgement, human intelligence, aerial and electronic collecting of information.

Employing Fire

This stage refers to the use of muzzle of guns apart from other available systems to create a lethal or non-lethal effect over the target. Joint Fires are executed in a coordinated way together with two or more forces to obtain better results. Employing fires may produce lethal effects but there are actual means and resources non-lethal including electronic and cyber-attack which may be pulled out with or without physical effect destruction. For example, Fires might involve:

- › Joint Targeting.
- › Joint Fire Support.
- › Missile and Aerial Defence.
- › Interdiction Fires.
- › Strategic Attacks Leadership.
- › Engage capacities of Information Operation (non-lethal fire support).

- › Cyber Defence Operations.
- › Damages Evaluation.

Movement and Manoeuvre

This tactic is based on the arrangement of joint forces to lead operations from a relatively favourable position before or during the combat operations, also taking advantage of the tactic successful to assess operational and strategic aims. Unfolding and movement of troops into operational area execute deep manoeuvres needed to offensive, defensive or retrograde purposes, besides the securing of own forces' mobilization.

The following procedures might be involved in this stage:

- › Movements to gain a better operational scope in comparison to opponent's gravity centre or decisive locations.
- › Unfold, rearrange or move joint forces in an operational area (operational efforts) by means of land, naval or aerial.
- › Manoeuvre joint forces combined with fires kept in specific locations, besides to achieve favourable positions above the opponent.
- › Provide mobility towards joint forces to facilitate the movement, manoeuvre and prevent the delay overcoming every kind of obstacles and geographic features.
- › Delay, canalize or seize the movement or manoeuvre from outer state enemy or threat. This scenario might include counter to mobility, support firmly the execution of penalties, seizures or blockages.
- › Ensuring the control over operational areas because its possession or control provides to one side of the participants an operational advantage.

Movement and manoeuvre superiority in comparison to enemy's will be considered as an advantage that will be not only the result of the manoeuvre and joint fires but also the handling by every leading principled commander who would take into account group and forces saving.

Protection

Joint function Protection pretends to incorporate Civil Protection; due to the rising of complex scenarios and new technologies of digital command and control, this demands in current days the necessity of take into account joint function of Protection for every military operation.

Protection function is focused on preservation of joint force power of combat by means of:

- › Active defence measures that protect joint force, information, operation basis, required infrastructure,



Joint Functions refers to a group of activities and related capacities that every Commander requires to lead, to synchronise and to integrate joint operations.

and communication lines that warn opponents possible attacks.

- › Passive defence measures designated to make it difficult to locate and to destroy joint forces systems.
- › Application of technology and suitable procedures to reduce the fratricide's risk.
- › Supporting actions to community and preventing emergency situations result of accidents, health conditions or natural disasters.

It might be included in the stage the followings tasks:

- › Civil Protection.
- › Missile and Aerospace Defence
- › Cyber Defence.
- › Electronic War.
- › Evacuation Operations/Recover od non-combatants.



- › Physical Safety for Forces and means.
- › Chemical, biological and nuclear Protection Operations (CBNP).
- › Counter terrorists Support Actions.
- › Community's support, humanitarian aid humanitarian assistance in emergencies and natural disasters.

- › Calculation of movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel.
- › Acquisition, building, keeping, operation, facilities and installations' provisions.
- › Acquisition and financing of services.
- › Financial management.
- › Legal issues support.

Sustainment

This function set the physical limits of every military operation. Sustainments involves the capacity of supplying and keep forces and needed resources to assess operational scope, maintain military operations in accordance with the mission, logistic autonomy and operational self-reliance.

Logistic planning assesses to provide logistic support to joint forces operations' feasibility and acceptance. The following tasks might be included:

- › Set a proper logistic design for the development of joint operations.
- › Provide personnel logistic support to joint forces.
- › Provide finance logistic support to joint forces.
- › Design, estimations and unfold purchase, storage, movement, distribution, keeping, evacuation and allocation of material.

CONCLUSIONS

Argentinean Armed Forces leadership should adapt and transform its leadership areas and fields with Combat functions computer-based systems to achieve an efficient operability. Thus, the Argentinean Armed Forces should do a technological transformation according to actual digital information as well as the interoperability performance required by the Latin-American regional allies. Among other things, this transformation demands a great technological infrastructure, networks, data basis, fibre optic, satellites, communication bands management, network encryption.

Regards Command and Control, the first refers to authority exercise and make decisions since the leadership is art more than science. In Argentinean Military Doctrine is known as Leadership. The

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latter portrays “how the commander assesses the leadership” and it is more science than art.

In the military operations carried out by the NATO countries in Middle East it is noticeable a space technology dependence.

There is a remarkable unbalance among technological advance, doctrinaire evolution and knowledge management. In order to solve this situation, it is estimated that an Information Management Plan should be necessary.

Modern Technology has enhanced not only the capacity of collecting and spreading information but also it boosts data’ superiority is important, likewise the knowledge and situation awareness ‘dominance. It will necessary to seize the predominance of accurate decisions in Command and Control centres and nodes.

For example, the e-mail might be used in military operations although it is considered a double-edge sword. In Leading General Staff equipped with digital command and control systems has implemented the existence of *Knowledge Management Officer (KMO)* in order to assist in designing *Common Operational Picture (COP)* to adapt to Operational Commanders’ demands.

Argentine Republic Armed Forces are transforming its organization by shaping it according to the current digital age. Proof of this can be seen in the digital control and command projects executed now by the three Forces; recent creation of Cyber defence Joint Command as well as the Nation’s achievements due to communications satellite ARSAT-I launching on October 2014. The ARSAT- II and the following launchings, all of them are in pursuit of the region peace’s assurance, that peace time that finally will obtain the double reward in the posterity.



OUTER SPACE MILITARIZATION

Launching of the first satellite burst the conquest of outer space. Global community has established norms to preserve its specific use, however, the recognised nuclear powers interests interfered in a fairy agreement.

KEYWORDS: OUTER SPACE / OUTER SPACE LAW / MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION / SATELLITE

By Gabriel Antonio Paolini

During last century, scientific and technological developments allowed great breakthroughs and achievements on unknown fields until that period of time. Launching the first artificial satellite into the outer space on October the 4th in 1975¹ by the Soviets, it set the framework for Space Age and the superpowers were anxious to outer space dominance. At the end of the Cold War, both superpowers have delivered into orbit thousands of missiles for military application under the suspicion of *Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)*² terms.

According to this scenario and being aware of the situation, international community' unease led superpowers to reach legal regulation in order to restrain outer space arms race. In this perspective, the *Committee in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPOUS)* was set by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 1958 to review the scope of international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, to monitor the activities performed and to deal with legal affairs arising for the exploration of the space. In September 1967, it was signed *Outer Space Treaty (formally known as Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States)*³ together with other agreements, conventions, resolutions and treaties has been the global agreement regarding international space law and peaceful exploration until today. Despite of those agreements, it is important to bear in mind, however, if the space is militarized or not.

PROCESS UNTIL THE END OF THE COLD WAR

As World War II ended, United States had implemented *Paperclip Operation*⁴ to include the best German scientists, engineers, and technical specialists in rocketry and other science fields. For instance, Werner M.F von Braun together with 500 men of his team work surrender to US before being captured by the USSR. On the other hand, Sergei Korolev from USSR expert in rocketry was set as manager of different projects. After the war, German engineers hired provided their knowledge; in 1947 the team

Launching the first artificial satellite into the outer space on October the 4th in 1975 by the Soviets, it set the framework for Space Age and the superpowers were anxious to outer space dominance.

could launch the first Soviet V-2 and quickly began with the design of the first intercontinental ballistic missile which could launch 5 tons atomic bomb over US⁵.

First artificial satellites had limited capacity of communication, however, in 1960 the US launched Discovered XIV a spy satellite used in Corona programme and in 1962 the USSR developed Kosmos, in both cases the missiles had the capacity to observe earth surface and recover the images by using rudimentary tools⁶. Therefore, both superpowers began an arm race that included Outer Space militarization, which was half-retained by international community treaties as well as the *Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)*.

United Nations was responsible for Outer Space international Law regulation, then in 1959, it was founded the COPOUS; this committee included the *Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STS) and Legal Subcommittee (LS)*⁷ focused on Outer Space Law Affairs.

When space race began, it seemed enough to control the situation the *Treaty Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, also known as *Outer Space Treaty* which opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on 17th January 1967⁸ but the this entered into force on 10th October 1967.

The treaty might be considered as international law basis for peaceful use of outer space and it outlined the basic framework of International Space Law⁹. Over the next years until now, the UN has developed several

1. De Sola Domingo, M. (1986). SDI: Outer Space Militarization and Law. *Afers Internacionals* n.º 9, Estiu-Tardor, 29.

2. Mutual assured destruction or mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. This doctrine has never been officially adopted but it led to an arm race between nuclear power nations.

3. United Nations. (2008). United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. File recovered on 14th April in 2014, de http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/tos/tos_ph_s.pdf

4. Hernandez, J. (2009). All you need to know about Second World War. Madrid: Nowtilus Edition, S.L.

5. Casado, J. (2011). Way to Cosmos: Astronautics secrets. File recovered on 16th April 2014. <http://libros.metabiblioteca.org/handle/001/2774>.

6. Casado, J. (2011), op.cit.

7. United Nations. (2008), op. Cit.

8. United Nations. (2008), op.cit.

9. United Nations. (2002) UN Treaties and Principles about Outer Space. Recovered on 14th April 2014 from web site: <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11S.pdf>

10. United Nations (2002), Op. Cit.

11. United Nations. (2014). United Nations office Outer Space Affairs. Recovered on 14th April 2014, from web site: <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html>

12. Gaddis, J. L. (1988). *The Evolution of a Reconnaissance Satellite Regime*. New York: Oxford University Press, 353-372.

13. Calduch, R. (1991) *International Relationships- Massive Destruction Weapons (MDW) and Current dissuasion nuclear*. Madrid: Social Science.

14. Calduch, R., op. Cit.

agreements, principles and resolutions complementing the *Outer Space International Law*¹⁰. By the 2012, a number of 100 countries have engaged to the Outer Space Treaty meanwhile other 26 nations signed the agreement but had not ratified it yet.¹¹

Nevertheless, the Treaty lacked of important measures since there was a prohibition to active militarization but it was not included the passive activities which received Arm Forces direct support. This scenario implied dual use of artificial satellites, civil and military application, in particular, communications area, land observing, exploratory and warning about antagonist military activities. Despite of the fact that US and USSR agreed to the International Law conditions of the Treaty, there was an informal field to act where it was accepted the legality of the activities held in that side of the relationship between both nations including mutual espionage¹².


Meanwhile, the *Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)* were developed in order to enhance the on-board thrusters, guidance system as well as warheads. Both nations intensified the number of silos Land-based ICBMs located in their own area but also those settled in allies countries¹³. The arising of Mobile-based ICBMs would become this kind of missiles more difficult to detect but easier to locate the target, since it was

possible to set them in mobiles platforms such as on trucks, ships and submarines.

In 1970, the US developed the *Minuteman III (LGM-30G)* containing 3 warheads of 170 kilotons each one but in 1973 the USSR created R16/SS-7 similar to the American's missile. *Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)* had the ability to deliver several warheads along separate trajectories, which confer it, flexibility of multiple targeting. Then, it was possible not only to intimidate several targets with the same missile, but also to defeat extraordinarily anti-missiles defence systems¹⁴.

However, the Outer Space Treaty was flouted by the use of the MIRVs since in one of the missile trajectory stages took place within earth orbit. This procedure was

Therefore, both superpowers began an arm race that included Outer Space militarization, which was half-retained by international community treaties as well as the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).



overlooking the meaning of peaceful use of the outer space. In 1969, the US and USSR began to deal with a solution to reach the disarmament of both countries. May 1972, it was signed *Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT I)* both superpowers began negotiations about the curtaining of manufacture of strategic missiles and set the limitation to the number of inter-continental missiles as well as submarine launchers. In addition, this agreement also banned anti-missile defence system placement as it was established in *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM, 1972)*.

Controversially, those agreements seemed to deride the “horror balance” since to be successful measurements, the US and USSR must limit the use of missiles to protect their population from a nuclear attack; apparently, the only solution possible was the implementation of MAD¹⁵.

On 18th June 1979 it was signed the *Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II)* although a new controversial scenario was arising, in fact, US president Carter dismissed

International community’ unease led superpowers to reach legal regulation in order to restrain outer space arms race.

the US Senate to deal with this recent agreement, and finally it was not ratified due to USSR invasion of Afghanistan. However, the United States and the Soviet Union voluntarily observed the arms limits agreed upon in SALT II in subsequent years¹⁶. One of the most remarkable limitations for both countries to achieve an agreement was the inability to set a land verification system. The solution emerged in the use of satellite resources contemplated in the *National Technical Means of Verification (NTMV)*.


The satellites act as triggers of Cold War because they neutralized arms race, limited any excessive use of weapons, provided mutual information about missiles locations apart from being crucial to strengthen nuclear threat reliability by means of MAD application. During Reagan’s presidency it was proposed U.S. strategic defensive system against potential nuclear attacks from *USSR intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)* by intercepting the missiles at various phases of their flight without nuclear intervention. Then there were required pulsed lasers, continuous wave lasers (CW), particle-beam weapons, accelerator mass, missiles, among other resources scattered over the orbit or missiles launched from earth once ICBMs were detected.¹⁷

The US government was forced to seek a broader scope different from the AMD’s one, however, a new



concept was considered hazardous and impossible to apply not only by scientists but also politicians. By the end of the Reagan's presidency, it was implemented the C4ISR (Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). These series of activities were based on satellite procedures, in order to achieve synergic action among National Forces all over the world. C4ISR provided accurate information to foresee clean wars and avoiding the use of nuclear deterrence.¹⁸

Technology has evolved significantly, in particular the US has achieved an overwhelmed supremacy on military application. Technological developments were focus on satellites used in diverse fields, for example, communications, meteorology, positioning and navigation system, early warning, target acquisitions in order to guarantee the accurate source of information and the stage of operations development in every part of the world. Though, global sudden shift that depicted the end of Cold War led to quit Star Wars hypothesis along Bill Clinton presidency and the anti-missile defence became a second-tier affair, but it emerged after 11th September terrorist attack. In addition, there was a research and essays reversal that US and USSR had developed since 1966 until 1967 respectively.



The satellites act as triggers of Cold War because they neutralized arms race, limited any excessive use of weapons, provided mutual information about missiles locations apart from being crucial to strengthen nuclear threat reliability by means of MAD application.

This research was focused on neutralization or destruction of enemy's satellites launched from land-based structures although the results were not the expected ones; also, weapons platforms projects orbital based. The *US-USSR Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty*, known as *START I*, was signed 31st July 1991 while *START II* entered into force on 3rd January 1993. Both agreements played an indispensable role in ensuring the predictability and stability of the strategic balance and serving as a framework for even deeper nuclear reductions.¹⁹

DEVELOPMENT UNTIL NOW/BEGINNING AND CURRENCY

To maintain NATO Forces advantages all over the world, it was necessary the use of satellites and technological development during the Gulf War (1991). By means of satellite devices, it was possible to detect Iraqi troops movements next to the border some days early Kuwait Invasion (1990), unfortunately, the US did not consider it important until the invasion began²⁰. But it was not until Kosovo War with satellite technology and guidance systems enhancement, when it was able to acquire a higher accuracy in the use of weapons since there were used satellite internal devices capable of locate the target. Even more, it was possible to reach people and objects on land to become target of missiles. Most

15. Ocaña, J.C (2003) History of XX Century International Relationships. File recovered on 18 th April in 2014 from website: <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/GLOS/SALT.htm>

16. Magnasco, M.A. (2006). Caei.com.ar. Analysis of Treaties and Agreements about Massive Destruction Weapons. File recovered on 20th May in 2014 from web site: http://www.caei.com.ar/sites/default/files/44_1.pdf.

17. Garcia Moreno, A. (January-March 1986). The Strategic Defence Initiative: New Technologies, old Antagonists. File recovered on 20th May in 2014 from the website: http://codex.colmex.mx:8991/exlibris/aleph/a18_1/apache_media/8N7E59RK4UDPP5RPT62BYMR1SIM2M8.pdf

18. Freedman, L. (April de 1998). The Revolution in Strategic Affairs. Oxford University Press. pages 13-14

19. Magnasco, M.A. (2006)., op. Cit.

20. Pike, J. (7 th April in 1997). Federation of American Scientists. File recovered on 1st May in 2014, from website: <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/operate/ds/images.htm>.



remarkable fact about space systems was the effective dislocation of Forces involved in this conflict.

During the 90's the US government ratified the necessity of space control, therefore, it was approved in the White House the National Space Policy (1996) by William J. Clinton.

This policy was in concordance to Outer Space Treaty terms as for US developments, management and control of space activities to guarantee a broader freedom of action but set limits to the adversaries²¹; however, this agreement was lacked of unrestricted and peaceful use of outer space. In May 2001, George W. Bush Jr. announced in his speech at National Defence University the development and implementation of National Missile Defence (NMD) which consisted in maritime, air and mobile land-based interceptor missiles²². Despite of the fact that this policy was in controversy to ABM statements, the critical scenario after 11th September 2001 attack would be encourage the intervention of NMD policy²³. Hence, the US government abandoned the ABM treaty terms to wriggle free to apply NMD. By the end 2003, it was announced the *U.S Air Force Transformation Flight Plan*²⁴ which is currently in force until 2020. This plan implied not only the use of ASAT weapons but also The US Air Force airborne laser (ABL) which was a high-energy laser

The Outer Space Treaty (1967) might be considered as international law basis for peaceful use of outer space and it outlined the basic framework of International Space Law.

weapon system for the destruction of ballistic missiles carried on a modified Boeing 747-400F freighter aircraft, together with EAGLE laser weapons²⁵. Tungsten rods with the explosive power of an intercontinental ballistic missile were launched to hit any target on land with a power like a nuclear weapon²⁶. Evidently, these devices were defying Outer Space Treaty terms.

In 2006, George Bush stated clearly that the aim of *US National Space Policy*²⁷ was to strength national supremacy in outer space and to dismiss international treaties signed previously to achieve the goal. However, the global repercussions of the Bush's decision arrived immediately; in fact some nations demanded the outer space demilitarization. For example, in 2001 *UN*

Conference on Disarmament, Popular Republic of China stated a formal submission, then in 2004 the *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space* (PAROS)²⁸ supported by Popular Republic of China and Russia. It was not until June 28th 2010, during Barack Obama presidency when a new National Space²⁹ policy arose; the main goals: international cooperation as well as take into account the terms stated by *guns control measures* only if these procedures would be verifiable, equitable and be able to bolstered US National Security.

However, under no circumstances it was abandoned the concept of Anti-missile Shield that achieved Europe's security. By 2015, it was believed that this policy must come into force in response to Iranian threat.

US president decision about a new policy was not accepted favourably by Russia; in fact, Russian government considered that the American plan only pretended to stay strategically ahead of them³⁰. OTAN possess active missiles RIM-161 SM-3 anti-missile system and anti-satellite weapons (ASAT).

In 2003, it was used satisfactorily SM-3 capable to destroy an American spy satellite out of control. This system was combined with other mechanism able to detect, search and trace simultaneously a large number of missiles called Aegis³¹ Combat System Lockheed-Martin³² Corporation. Meanwhile, Russia developed anti-missile technology and ASAT, incorporating besides S-300 to be replaced then by S-400s which were active during 2007 but the developments continued until S-500 became the most accurate device³³. On January 7th 2007, China's Popular Liberation Army destroyed a self-satellite put into orbit in 1999 with a ballistic missile called SC-19 Fengyun-1C from a mobile platform launcher; this action portrayed a sophisticated guide and control system, then China become an ASAT country as US and Russia.

According to this scenario and being aware of the situation, international community' unease led superpowers to reach legal regulation in order to restrain outer space arms race.

US reaction to China activities arose quickly; American government was aware of the fact that their military capacity soon has become vulnerable, therefore, it was decided to shoot down an American inoperable spy satellite but then the government argued to public opinion that it was merely a safety measure since the satellite might collapse against earth surface and produce severe consequences³⁴.

On January 2010, China made another test and launched surface-to-air-missile HQ-19 armed with a kinetic vehicle which destroyed other Chinese satellite in orbit; it was only another way to depict its ASAT capacity³⁵.

Those military tests infringe the Outer Space Treaty terms, this is a negative influence to outer space safety since there are a lot of remains from those tests which are not monitored properly and might be dangerous for satellites in orbit.

CONCLUSIONS

International Law implemented in Outer Space Treaty is a relatively new affair after the first launchings. Although this treaty is supported by experts from UN, many of them cannot achieve an agreement about some issues since the performance of these scientists about space militarization was not enough. Rather, the UN seemed to ignore the matter or being under the influences of power turning a blind eye to space transformation process.

21. EUU. (19 th September in 1996). whitehouse.gov. File recovered on 12th April in 2014, de National Space Policy: <http://search.whitehouse.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&query=National+Space+policy+1996&m=&affiliate=wh&commit=Search>

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23. Magnasco, 2006, op.cit.

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As a matter of truth, the space militarization has been carried out by chosen nations, the ones which have the technologic resources to afford the change; the major question was that these governments crowded around international community rights that were supposed to imply a peaceful use of outer space. The superpowers consider the space as a fundamental and strategic mean that provides them vast opportunities and advantages. Despite of the systematic violation to International Law in pursuit of the US National Security,

"Space is not a mission, is a place. It is an operations stage and it is time we consider it properly". (USAF) Army Commander C. Henry

the US government has positioned in first place of military developments. On the other hand, Russia has pretended to enhance the weaponry, but China dare to give balance to the struggle between US and Russia in arms race affair.

We should admit that in Cold War period the military space development acted as a fence, but at the end of it, the global environment changed and the idea of a space as a sanctuary was a fact; even today, the militarization apparently seems not to be solved. It is also alarming the uncontrolled military tests because there would be an excess of hazardous devices remains and consequently this would block safe access to other nations to this common good. It is necessary International Law perks up against the imminent space arms race; neither UN nor Disarmament Commission could be able to restrain its overgrown advance. To make the matter worse, it cannot discern at short-term a disarmament treaty that would be accepted by every nation.





STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL ACTION

Peruvian- Colombian experience

In the Amazon region, rural communities are moved away from the State presence. Through Armed Forces, Peru and Colombia cooperate with sustainable social action focused on safety, welfare and community integration.

KEYWORDS: SOCIAL ACTION / SUSTAINABILITY / ITINERANT PLATFORM / AMAZON

By **Pedro Iriarte**

INTRODUCTION

The forested areas of a country constitute a large reservoir of energy and natural resources highly important for its development. For instance, most of Amazon Rainforest is in Brazil however significant areas extent to Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. This area depicts a natural reservoir of infinite and immeasurable resources as well as a priceless cultural importance due to it preserves the most ancient indigenous people intrinsic nature.

The immensity of the Amazon represents a large area of each country mentioned before; its extension and complex geography compose a location extremely difficult to monitor. The global importance of this region is undoubtedly; scientific studies reveal the regulating effect this natural area provides global weather. It constitutes the largest reservoir of fresh water in the world, therefore, its importance increases even more if we take into consideration the slightly reflections from scientists. Its singularity is built by the ecological

AMAZON BASIN: DELIMITATION OF THE AMAZON REGION IN SOUTH AMERICA

heterogeneous and diverse habitats together with its enormous biodiversity, knowledge, innovations and routines performed by the native tribes.

From geopolitical and geostrategic 'perspective, this area is highly important since it represents the entire

border among Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. More than 14,000 kilometres of navigable rivers frame the most important waterways of communication and traffic in the Amazon Rainforest. These features are essential to Peru and Colombia, nevertheless, in real life, there were flawed structural policies to guarantee a steady and sustainable development for people, especially in connection with the environment they live in. As a result of the lack of strong policies, the depletion of some resources, beside the insufficient state's presence, there was a progressive increase in illegal trade in the area.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The most remarkable reasons of Peru and Colombia' underdevelopment is the absence of social programmes and demographic infrastructure in connection with the slight awareness of cultural and socio-economic situation. Originally, the implemented management systems were based on inaccurate preconception about the extension and tangled Amazon areas. Usually, these systems have an urban bias kept insufficiently adapted to the rural communities' lifestyle.

Although the establishment of control posts, military bases and detachments along the Amazon Peruvian- Colombian area is considered vital to enforce the regional safety and State's presence, criminal organizations 'activities have spread and evolved in organization and a obtained a broader scope. Drug

PUTUMAYO RIVER AERIAL VIEW

Source: Peruvian Air Force (2012)

“After being studied, analyzed and considered as a unit, then it led the military strategist to bear in mind social, moral and psychological factors to coordinate military actions”.

Karl Von Clausewitz

traffickers, terrorists and criminals “traditional framework was focused on weapons smuggling, illegal drug trafficking; however, the main activity has expanded to a wide-ranging and systematic approach in order to optimize the capacity and gain a greater profitably.

Criminal gangs seek for inhospitable and remote areas far from security forces to proceed with illegal activities which are centred in explode civilian population to supply their necessities; such operations are widespread organized, transnational developed, characterized by the invasion to different levels in native communities, and dynamic financial standing connected to illegitimate issues. The desolation in the middle of the forest, the negative effects of the climate changed, poverty in rural population, being settled far from developed urban areas, the absence of State and deprivation of opportunities have become a prosperous scenario to perform unlawful actions.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

With internal and external threats’ arising, all countries involved in the Amazon Rainforest were forced to take a determination about the institutional challenges immediately. Legality and legitimacy were the axis of the decisions to be considered, therefore, it was mandatory to maintain, to enforce and to enhance ethical and professional standards being focused on respect for and protection of International Humanitarian Law in order to foster mutual confidence between people.

By means of deterrence and repression strategies besides enforcement measures, each government had set the stage for military forces and police work together against the public order and foreign safety’ menaces. A new safety context emerged due to the success of these policies implementation in order to protect nation democracy; this situation leads the illegal organizations to seek other tactics and strategies to perpetuate their power. Despite of the fact that these measures were satisfactory, the threats had evolved in such a way that they adapted to de dynamic of the conflict.

As result, temporal weakness of illegal organizations’ safety system, criminal gangs connected to drug

PERUVIAN AMAZON ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ORGANIZATION



Source: Peruvian General Command of Operations (2013)

trafficking turned up. Consequently, it was necessary to be updated according any sort of variations in the most dangerous areas; armed forces monitoring included any detail of communities in order to be aware of the consolidation steps of each region. The idea of these procedures was to be stepping forward the criminals and take into action on time.

The strategy combined three concepts: sustainable development, sustainability principle and social action. **Sustainable Development** is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the resources and possibilities from the future generations. Naturally, a sustainable action deals about an activity that can endure for a long period of time. Nowadays, it is known that many activities which are performed over medium and long-term time are non-sustainable¹.

The **Principle of Sustainability** is based on environmental studies and sustainability science²; both settle the bases for analytical and philosophical structure, however, the figures are obtained by means of sustainability measures. The results of these studies are implemented in sustainability policy plans³.

Social Action refers to individual or group behaviour that involves interaction with other individuals or group especially organized action toward social reform⁴. Therefore, Colombia

1. U.N World Commission on Environment and Development, Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, Dec. 1987

2. U.N. Annual Report United Nations Human Development Programme 2010, 2009, 2008-2007. Ed.2007.

3. RRojas Mullor, Mauricio; Progress idea and Development concept; 2011; page 21.

4. Weber, Max; Economy and Society, 1977; page 32.



State owns Social Prosperity Department which attempt to fulfil social action's principles.

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR INTEGRAL ACTION

Agree with mentioned principles and policies, each government implemented the Strategic Plan for Integral Action which establishes a framework for working together:

- › Be aware of the actual difficulties and be able to solve them creatively and consciously, then the Integral Action procedures will be successful.
- › To achieve a greater efficiency, it will be necessary astuteness, Integral Action initiative and thorough planning.
- › The definitive primer for all the actions to be performed will be principles, norms and Military Honour.
- › To achieve synergy between Armed Forces and government offices 'institutional effort, it will be indispensable to reach an effective recovery and social insertion.
- › National and international citizen trust consolidation by means of legitimacy and legality towards Armed Forces.

Since 2010, Colombia's government have determined to innovate integral action campaigns in order to reinforce troops' combative principle and patriotic discourse; in few words, why the armed forces fought

The immensity of the Amazon represents a large area of each country mentioned before; its extension and complex geography compose a location extremely difficult to monitor

for. The goal was to earn respect and support under legitimacy and legality Armed Forces' framework with the intention to restore and consolidate quietness. In cooperation with other State Departments, the aim was encouraging voluntary disarmament by means of individual or collective demobilization process.

On the other hand, since 2011 Peruvian government has promoted as development and social inclusion national plan, diverse social programmes in order to assist the most vulnerable Peruvian people to emerge from poverty; therefore, they would be able to become part of productive chains that encourage the country's development; the aim was to break the generational poverty and generate labour force. All these social programmes were carried out by

Government Departments uttered by Prime Minister's Office what has contributed to the development and social inclusion of the countries in the last five years.

Hence, Integral Action must broaden the spectrum of action to prevent civilians, especially younger, from choosing as way of living illegal activities characterized by trickery and untruth or just as basic needs for survival. In addition, people who have access to media (web pages, newspaper, magazines, radio, social media network, etc) is provided with an accurate, clear, appropriate and truthful message in favour of Armed Forces and State's credibility. It is precise to keep contact with people and important figures which are considered vital for this purpose; mainly, the aim was to give the exact and positive information to understand the real role of Armed Forces and State' intervention by means of Integral Action.

MILITARY INSTITUTIONS IN THE AMAZON

The image of Armed Forces and National Police members has been rejected at first instance owing to the scarce presence of both in previous times; to make the matter worse, it was complicated to get information about the criminal gangs since people refuse to be in contact with law enforcement authorities. In fact, it was necessary to recruit younger for being part of Armed Forces, unfortunately, many of them were not able to enlist because of they lacked basic education.

Development and Social Inclusion State policies were supported by Ministries of Defence according to the articulation of its Departments (Army, Navy and Air Force) through a series of social assistance programmes aimed at improving the quality of life of those people who are helpless.

Colombian and Peruvian Armies have collaborated efficiently and steady all isolated places over Amazon Rainforest to support indigenous communities' development, in particular safety and basic education

TWIN OTTER HYDROPLANE OF PERU AIR FORCE IN THE AMAZON AREA



Source: Peru Info Environmental Press Agency(2010)

There were flawed structural policies to guarantee a steady and sustainable development for people, especially in connection with the environment they live in. As a result of the lack of strong policies, the depletion of some resources, beside the insufficient state's presence, there was a progressive increase in illegal trade in the area.

affairs. Continuous air patrolling over specified Amazonia airspace was part of the monitor system to alert in case of illegal activities. Moreover, Air Forces provide logistic support by means of regular flights over isolated areas; they also used air assets as hydroplanes that were convenient at coastlines or even helicopters were helpful to reach places in which it can land and take off.

Services and infrastructure settings provided by Colombian and Peruvian Naval Forces were the centre of technification basis and development to contribute to technical and professional's structure needed in each society.

It is important to mention Colombian and Peruvian' Shipyards and Navy Engineering Company intervention in metal-mechanic and technology together with waterway navigation in Amazonia Area.

Efforts performed along these years by Armed Forces from Peru and Colombia, in particular the Navy from both countries; were it not for the legitimacy and social acknowledgment from Armed Forces, these interventions would not lead them to acquire a thorough and integral knowledge from communities along Amazonia Rivers.

ARMED FORCES ROLE IN AMAZON RAINFOREST

Colombia and Peru Army own operating and logistic equipment spread over Amazon Rainforest that allow them to operate successfully and guarantee each government Integral Action Plan to be performed. Despite of the fact that monumental efforts to encourage safety and integral action, diverse threats against social welfare it was necessary to adapt to the evolving scenario settled by criminal gangs to thwart State's plans. In other words, individual institutional actions were useless for develop an effective performance, if it were not for the multiple tasks carried out by forces in group, then the results would be completely different.

Countries' efforts to fight against at criminals can endure up to 2010, since the social scenario began to change, so

Originally, the implemented management systems were based on inaccurate preconception about the extension and tangled Amazon areas. Usually, these systems have an urban bias kept insufficiently adapted to the rural communities' lifestyle.

each government has to readapt to those variations. The aim was focused on those isolated areas because of their susceptibility to increasing threats. To put into practice their policies responsibly, there were two ways: on one hand, River Control that consisted in coastal monitoring, on the other hand, sustainability of social action that pretended to guarantee the State programmes' endurance with regards to health care, nutrition and education. Simultaneously, State could gain population's approach and trust, this relationship was fundamental to develop an accurate control in the area together with safety oriented to Amazonia people' need and characteristics.

ARMED FORCES AND STRATEGY GUIDELINES

The strategy was framed within State Policy of Social Inclusion and Development; it was oriented to integrate and coordinate every public and private area's efforts to assist population properly by means of the governments programmes for health, education, nutrition and safety. As well, it was important to foster structures which make feasible and promoting sustainable population's development, therefore, there will be a long-lasting inclusive status taking into consideration the following guidelines:

- › Strategic development to fulfil population' safety demands in face to criminal activities.
- › Prevention activities are priority.
- › Evolution of Assistance approach towards sustainable development.

COMPLETION OF THE BINATIONAL CIVIL ACTION PERU-COLOMBIA 2014



Source: Diario La Región Loreto. Julio 2014.



- › Innovative approach from Armed Forces to Social Development.
- › Population as central core of State action.
- › Multispectral and coordinated State's working group.
- › Stages' perspectives to national forecast.
- › New priorities for assistance.
- › Respect for indigenous' culture and identity.
- › Enlarge native people labour activities.
- › Geographic approach of river basins.
- › Amazon reality adaptation and flexibility.
- › Corporate and institutions' integration.
- › Conservation of environment, biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources.
- › Integral planning of coordinated displacements, independent execution and integrated supervision.

According to the initial overview, governments evaluated if it was prosperous or not establishing sustainability social action with the intervention of Armed Forces. It was concluded that this strategy applied transversally and adaptable to Peru and Colombia will achieve in short- and medium-term inclusion and protection of Amazon population; the goal was to release



communities from criminal networks of drug trafficking, illicit mining, human trafficking, illegal logging among other infringements. State intervention and social programmes guarantee population' assistance they needed to become independent from illegal activities.

STRATEGIC PLANS DEVELOPED

Both countries considered safety, development and defence fields in order to achieve the fulfilment of the roles and mission of the State besides work together with other departments, as a result, this co working led them to participate in the weaknesses of Amazon community's reality. Developed plans were settled by three strategies well determined to specific areas in which private and public assistance articulate themselves in order to work in pursuit of national purposes achievement.

STRATEGIES FRAMING

› Social sustainability and Occupation of remote areas: This action allows government to settle the state apparatus in those regions where it was absent o has been snatched by criminals. In this way, State can reach the rural people

needs and by means of services, social programmes carried out by responsible institutions providing basic attention to communities.

› Surveillance and Safety of the area: This strategy allow State to align bilateral and trilateral mechanisms of South American Sub region considering both

AREA	STRATEGY	PARTICIPANTS
Safety	Occupation of remote areas	Armed Forces, police, public institutions related to safety.
Development	Social sustainability	Public or private sector institutions dedicated to manage or collaborate with social programmes.
Defence	Surveillance and Safety of the area	Adjacent countries.

NAPO RIVER PIAS WORKING TOGETHER WITH MORONA RIVER AND PUTUMAYO RIVER



Source: Naval Army of Peru 2015



aspects, Sustainability Social Action and Occupation of remote areas, therefore, it could be possible to fight against the complex network of illegal activities co-ordinately.

Evidently, the compound scenario demanded a concerted effort to achieve the materialisation of these initiatives besides the compromise of multiple institutions and departments. For that purpose, some academic and informative workshops were held; these were named as social action workshops, and the idea was to align and agree on intervention criteria by creating flexible strategies which adapt to circumstances and conflicts demanding an integral solution.

Each social programmes were coordinated and interrelated due to the strategy must not to being overlapped, distorted or replaced by any institution or initiative which look for relevance, or a parallel works that generate a huge damage to this endeavour pursuing social identification and authority's acknowledgement by means of the main organism, the State.


DESIGN OF NATIONAL STRATEGY (P.I.A.S)

State articulation and steady intervention are essential to design a national strategy. Therefore, there were created three kinds of action platforms which were controlled and administrated by Coordinated Platforms.

The following are described each of the main components of the strategies:

- › **Itinerant Social Action Platform:** Consists of the implementation of fluvial transport itinerantly operated by Navy. Methodically, its aim is at providing State services and programmes to rural Amazonia people. Complemented by Local Platform, both State strategies required assistance from Air Force.
- › **Local Management Platform:**
 - › Local Management Councils: Integrated by local participants such as community's authorities, businessmen, community leaders, and public and private institutions people who work all together in local areas.
 - › Local Infrastructure: Medical centres, schools, police precincts, military bases stores, programmes monitoring centres, watering holes, solar panels, generator sets.
- › **Telecommunications Centre Platform:** State Management of new information and communication technologies.

AXIS ARTICULATION AND INTERVENTION PLATFORMS



Source: Peruvian General Command of Operations (2013)

PLATFORMS	INTERVENTION MECHANISMS	OBJECTIVE
Itinerant Social Action Platform	Itinerant Social Action Platform Vessel (P.I.A.S)	Methodically, its aim is at providing State services and programmes to rural Amazonia people where Local Platform has partial or null intervention. Complemented by Local Platform, both State strategies required assistance from Air Force.
Local Platform	Support Committee Local Infrastructure Strategy	Integrated by local participants such as community's authorities, businessmen, community leaders, and public and private institutions people who work all together in local areas.
Support Platform	Tele State Network (telecommunication centre platform)	State Management of new information and communication technologies. This became the bases to a successful function of Local Management and Itinerant Platforms.
Coordination Platform	Social Action Coordinated Centre	This centre allows State to administrate and monitor the programme part of Coordination Platform in all basins involved in the Amazon area to articulate the planning according to the circumstances.

This became the bases to a successful function of Local Management and Itinerant Platforms.

› **Social Action Coordinated Centre (CCASS):** This centre allows State to administrate and monitor the programme part of Coordination Platform. In this context, by the middle of 2013, a number of 12 Itinerant Social Action Platforms (P.I.A.S) was set by Peruvian government to assist seven river basins managed by Prime Minister's Office (PMO). This programme started at functioning in Mazan City located in Loreto department, it was known as Napo River (Rio Napo). Currently, this platform is working actively in Amazon Rivers and the activation of the second platform is forecasted to end of 2015.

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Professionals from different areas of expertise take part in this crusade, for instance physicians, dentists, social workers, nurses, bank assistants and other public and private sector workers collaborated to develop properly each stage of the platform. In case of emergency, it was foreseen the use of Air Forces by means of hydroplanes to transfer staff and/or material.

A number of health care services are provided, for example, odontology, gynaecology, laboratory testing, immunizations, general medicine, triage, vaccination, telemedicine, deliveries and surgeries. Paying and civil registry are controlled by National Registration of each country; then it was provided an identification Card (ID), Health insurance, Integral health system affiliation. In addition, payment and bank deposits in cash machines of National Bank, even more, everybody who was registered in the social action programme it could be possible for him/her to affiliate anybody else to the system of P.I.A.S. Moreover, it was provided advice on child abuse and mistreatment of women, giving information about also to professors to be involved in the campaign as well.

CURRENT SITUATION ANALYSIS

Regards to information obtained by community local platforms it was possible to develop and implement programmes to capacitate social and State workers. The idea was to strength management ability between community and government. Service performance is no assistance character, but supporting and complementing State Departments (City Halls decentralised Bodies) when it was provided the services through P.I.A.S.

The intervention of different agents along the Amazon area actually act as a local support network close to information technologies and then generate telecommunication mechanisms to connect basins communities. As result, this teamwork assures the efficiently management and application of the services included in the platforms (Education, health, protection to vulnerable people, provide identity, justice).



In order to go ahead, the National strategy demanded regular and updated interinstitutional agreements which overcome inter sectorial operation, in particular, Armed Forces role in country's development.

Nowadays, for a period of four months, Peruvian and Colombian government are developing sustainability social action in Rio Putumayo basin making use of naval, ground and air equipment provisioned by both countries' Armed Forces. In the same way, it is being developing in Napo River basin in Ecuador.

National Armed Forces civic action role is implemented in countries which suffered from the same social needs; this led Armed Forces to work together in other to achieve the same goals.

The diffusion campaign of Armed Forces' flourishing role, in particular P.I.A.S Platform, provides the opportunities to achieve a closer relationship between society and State besides the new concept shared to international Armed Forces about the new role of internal order of a country and benefits of this advantage.

CONCLUSIONS

Peru and Colombia have developed national range strategy, in a coordinated and jointly way in order to achieve the following objectives:

- › Contribute to obtain the solution to multiple and complex issues in Amazon Rainforest.
- › Provide an adequate platform for arguing, achieving an agreement, being aware of the reality in order to create and establish policies and programmes to guarantee safety and development.
- › Pursuit a new safety approach to facilitate a closer relationship with population that is considered as "The Core".
- › Incorporate researching, technology and professionals to create and implement means and mechanisms to support development and safety process.
- › Portray a pivotal scheme of Regional Integration in boundaries countries.

- › Suggest a new Armed Forces' role in pursuit of society and country progression, therefore, State Institutions' presence will be considered by communities.
- › Incorporate as political instrument this kind of strategy at international scale within border communities.

It was fundamental the creation of communities- State trustiness bonds to the development of sustainability social action strategy because of up to that period of time, there was a little presence from the government. Without the Armed Forces active intervention, strategies' implementation would be impossible. The Army has provided infrastructure, material and personnel to achieve the successful of Itinerant Platform. As a result, Armed Forces' institutional image has become superb due to the ideological and logistical support provided to the enlargement of countries. Consequently, Army has become in an example for Peruvian and Colombian population, in particular to isolated communities which lacked of State' assistance.



ISIS

An ontological Approach

The author describes how the caliphate state appeared in Iraq and Syria describing theological concepts of the Islam and how they are used in a biased way by ISIS, reducing it to a stereotype¹.

KEY WORDS: ISLAM - ISLAMISM - CALIPHAL STATE - ARAB LANGUAGE - ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

By Horacio Esteban Correa



LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Specialists of Arab- Islamic studies state that, even more than in other cultures, the Arab language has great importance in the construction of this identity. The Arab demonym comes from the verb *c araba* عَرَبَ which, in one of its different meanings², refers to the idea of “that one who speaks clearly”. Even in literature, the semantic field of this verb refers to ideas such as “the language of God”. The importance of language and words, as well as its body, the writing, which maintains and makes it last, may be seen in the Quran Sacred Texts, an essential element of the Islamic Confessional category, which in Arab means “reading” قُرْآن and implies one of the attributes of the concept of tradition. The word Quran comes from the verb *qara'a* قَرَأَ which means to read, gather and collect.

Quran is “written word of God”. Islamic doctrine sees in the Quran word the very expression of the Spirit of Gods (kalima³ *Allāh* الْكَلِمَةُ اللهُ). The word “is wind that does not stay, and only writing can retain it” as it is expressed in *Isrā'liyyāt*³ إِسْرَائِيَّاتٍ, writing is the matter in which the spiritual lies.

THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS

The Arab language is closely related to Islamic confession. Quran is written in that language and specialists, such as Waleed Saleh Alkhalifa, hold the hypothesis that classic Arab has been totally consolidated with the expansion of Islamic power and the extension of sacred reading, replacing Aramaic as vehicle language in the region. For this historical association, Arab (as a linguistic category) overlaps with the Islamic (as a confession category).

The word “*yūtihād*” “يُتِيهِدُ” in its meaning VIII comes from the verb “*yahada*” “جَهَدَ” which means to make an effort. The word “*yuhda*” “خُهِدَ” quiere decir gran esfuerzo y “*yuhda*” “خُهِدَ” means up to the limit. The word “*yihād*” “خِهَادٌ” contrary to what it is generally believed in the Western world, does not mean war, but fight and, above all, internal and moral fight in the sense of achieving victory in the name of God. The warrior *mu'yāhid* مُجَاهِد is, above all, a spiritual warrior for the cause of God *mu'yāhid fī sabīl 'illāh* فِي سَبِيلِ مُجَاهِدِ 'اللَّهِ. The Arab word for war is “*harb*” “حَرْبٌ” and it belongs to a semantic field that is totally different from the one of “*yihād*”.

In order to clarify the concept without explaining different theological interpretations and the current uses

The word “*yihād*” “خِهَادٌ” contrary to what it is generally believed in the Western world, does not mean war, but fight and, above all, internal and moral fight in the sense of achieving victory in the name of God.

and meanings of the word, we can quote Cardinal Paul Poupard, director of the Dictionary of Religions, a book written by Catholic thinkers. Monsignor Michel Delahoutre had the mission to coordinate experts that worked on Islam. Robert Caspar, member of that team, states: “*Yihād*, usually translated –for no reason- as “holy war” (a word that does not exist in the Arab language) is an important element in the life of a Muslim believer [...]. The word and its derivatives (*mu'yāhid*, “the one who fights...”) mean the effort necessary to achieve a goal. This is an abbreviation, the complete word of which –frequently mentioned in Quran– means the *effort in God's path*, in the sense of an effort to make the rights of God prevail, for which different means may be used. One of them is the “military” effort, when referring to defending the Muslim context and also when it is necessary to “open” a country that rejects the pacific invitation to embrace it to Islam. Trying to avoid differences among detractors and apologists of any type of Islam, it is necessary to note that in Quran the use of the word is frequent in the context of fight. This “military” aspect of *yihād* will be frequent in the history of Islam, not only against the non- Muslim, but also among Muslims, which is illegitimate. Jurists ruled conditions and limitations (with respect to the elder, women and children, priests, monks and religious buildings, among others). However, Quran and Islam do not exclude this form of military *yihād*, this is not the only or most important form. Among moralists and mystics, the “great *yihād*”, would be the equivalent to out “spiritual combat”, and military *yihād* is left as “small *yihād*” [...].⁴

Caspar's explanation seems to be an objective and clear summary. On the contrary, Elías Caneti, who did not explain this theological concept of Islam, has considered it a religion of war. With the same criteria adopted by Caneti,

1. Analysts of the Islamic- Arab world distinguish Islamism from Islam. The first one refers to a stereotype and the second one is an archetype. According to cultural diversity researchers, the stereotype is a biased, reduced, static, polarized view of a cultural archetype, its caricaturization and determinism. Once established in the collective unconscious minds of a human group, it is very difficult to modify it. Cultural archetype is defined as a conceptual structure that underlies the deep collective behavior of a community. It is structured from utopia, myths and taboos that are part of collective unconscious minds and give them values and a material shape to culture. A

stereotype is not the archetype that conducts and leads to it. A stereotype is a cut, a part of the cultural archetype.

2. There are nouns in Arab that come from verbs, these have different manners that shape semantic fields of the language.

3. *Isrā'liyyāt* are short stories introduced by Jewish converted to Islam during the first times of this religion. They were compiled in books during the times of the caliphate Umayya with its capital city in Damascus.



with respect to the word *yihād*, we could say that it is also a religion of peace. The word Islam comes from the verb “*salama*” which means, among other things, “to be in peace”, “to be subject to docility”.

What this Islamic concept of *yihād* refers to is a concept similar to *ius bellum*⁴ elaborated in the Roman tradition and then developed by Saint Augustine, Vegetio and Frontino. The elements of the concept of *yihād* are duly documented in the Quran and in the texts written by Islamic thinkers and jurists.

The question is that there may be great differences between what Saint Augustine states as regards war and what a crusader does in the conquest of Jerusalem, in the same way a *muḥāhid* may be different from the concept expressed in the Quran.

It is important to analyze the double aspect of the concept of *yihād* in light of a “حديث” “*hadīt*”⁵ of the Prophet who,

when returning from a war expedition, had said: “We have come from the small Holy war to go into the great holy war”. The military combat against the disloyal or the enemy that threatens the country or “أمة” “*ummat*”⁶, with all the costs it implies, is the small holy war “*al-yihād-āsgar*” “*للأصغر الجهد*”, while the spiritual combat against the inner enemy to get control over one self is called great holy war “*الأكبر الجهاد*” “*al-yihād-ākbar*”. If the great war is lost, there is no sense in winning the small war. The important thing is to “defeat oneself” and to win the “inner war” which according to Jung’s deep psychology is the cause of all “external wars”.⁸

Since the times of Saint George to King Arthur and his Noble Knights, the Western world has been aware of the Christian Cavalry institution. In Islam, there is also a tradition based on the Islamic *yihād*, possibly with more singular roots given the mystic relevance of the horse and courteous love⁹ in

4. POUPARD, PAUL; Dictionary of Religions; Herder; Barcelona; 1987; p. 1844.

5. This refers to the concept of fair war.

6. The *ahādīt* (plural) (plural) have a general meaning of “narration” of anecdotes and stories about the Prophet, experienced by one of their contemporaries or taken from their own sayings during the first times of the Islamic community. This is a story that provides with information about the Sunna and can therefore be translated also as “tradition”.

7. This means community, specifically community of Muslims. It belongs to the semantic field of “*umm*” which means “mother”. Its deep meaning would be matrix community and in the West, it is usually translated as “nation”, a word that does not exist in the Arab language.

8. According to Jung’s psychology, historical events, and wars in particular, are the result of psychological transfers (*Übertragung*) that individuals make from the individual psyche

to culture. This would become a collective trauma that is held as “unconscious shadow” in the very collective unconscious minds. There is “another” self to whom the collective trauma and the unsolved own psychic conflict may be transferred; this “another” one gets the elements of an enemy which is reasonable to be declared war. It turns into an essential evil which, paradoxically and because of projective ethics, is the result of a transfer mechanism. However, this energy is found in the very own unconscious mind. As a result of a dual conscience that aims at being released from guilt as it also has obscure elements, it needs someone else so that it can transfer said elements with its psychic energy to be free of sin.

Wars, as any other historical event, start in the psyche of persons and in the collective unconscious minds of communities and they then appear and are shown in history.



the Arab world: “the Arab knight is called *fāris* or *fatā*, and his virtues are bravery, loyalty and love for the truth, protection given to widows, orphans, generosity, worship of women and liberality, especially with respect to poets [...]”¹⁰

The Arab horse is a talisman, a principle of divine compassion, a present of God in this world. For this reason, it is “pure- bred”, “noble in origin”, it has strong lineage and roots”. In several ways, this is the meaning of the expression *al-farās asīl* الفَارَسُ أَصِيلُ, translated into Spanish as “pure-bred mare (horse)”¹¹

Another concept to be taken into consideration is *Hīyraʿ*, (usually translated as Hegira). In the Mecca, the Prophet and the Muslims were persecuted and mistreated. Therefore, in 622 a.D., the Muslim emigrated, starting the Muslim era with the *Hīyraʿ*. They moved to the city of *Yatrib*, which after the successful settlement of the Muslim, would be named *Madīnaʿ-l-Rasūl* (the city of the Messenger-Medina). The word comes from meaning VIII of the verb *hāyara*, which means to emigrate in its meaning I, while in its meaning III *hāyara* هَجَرَ it means to “go with conviction; to leave a place with conviction” and to arrive to a fairer place where peace and the laws of God prevail. Thus, the one who emigrated with the Prophet to Medina is *muhāyir* مُهَاجِرٌ who, with the help of the residents of Medina who converted to Islam, *ansār* نَصَارًا (the auxiliary)¹²; will form the community, that is, the “*ummaʿ*”, This is how the Islamic State, where religion and politics go together, began.

Three battles took place in Medina against Pagan and Jewish Arab tribes that paved the way for the consolidation

The warrior muḡāhid مُجَاهِدٌ is, above all, a spiritual warrior for the cause of God
muḡāhid fī sabīl i illāhi مُجَاهِدٌ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ.

of the Islamic State. Each of them has had a great meaning as divine revelation and message from God. Here, the “small *yihād*” had to be made and the “great *yihād*” was not forgotten. The new situation could be seen in the Quran verses from Medina. In this case, the connotation of “small *yihād*” associated to military combat was clearly expressed. We have to understand that these “battles” were rubbed as no more than those that take place among tribes. In fact, they are referred to as “struggle”. We cannot imagine a great deployment of troops or complex tactical mechanisms.

In the period of Medina, loot was authorized and it was distributed according to the Islamic hierarchy rather than the military one and payment was recorded on a list.¹³

Authorization to loot¹⁴ is based upon the fact that emigration to Medina implied the expropriation of the property of the Muslims who left the Mecca. In order to compensate for their losses, the Muslim attacked trailers of the Meccan, “in this context, *yihād* gets its new meaning of Holy War. Verses from Quran revelation authorize this war while their limits are defined: a well- defined cause and an enemy; strict limits and ethics of war”¹⁵.



Mu'yāhid, "the one who fights..." means the effort necessary to achieve a goal.

The effort in God's path, in the sense of an effort to make the rights of God prevail.

for the cause of God and change the world when this has got lost from *fitra'*¹⁶ فِطْرَةٌ, that is, when divine creation and its nature, disposition, origin and potential of the world have been separated from men and things. The *fitra'* is distorted by *Šaitān* (Satan), which derives from the verb *šatana* شَطَنَ and it means to annul, suppress, to make a cut.

Satan (*Šaitān*) has other names, such as *Garrār*, the deceitful, seducer, misleading and the Heaven's serpent is named *Iblis*; a name that comes from the verb *labasa*, which means to make something obscure, incomprehensible, to dress. In its meaning *V talabsa* تَلَبَّسَ means to be covered, coated, to be pulled, to make something obscure and incomprehensible, to let devil get in. The action of *Šaitān* causes *fitna'*¹⁷ فِتْنَةٌ which, among other things, was the cause of division in the Dar al Islam, between the Sunni and the Shia.¹⁸ *Fitna'* means test, temptation, seduction, sedition, charm, fascination and, at the same time, all of this leads to uprising, turmoil, discord and civil war, leading the world and men to ruin.

A caliphate state would ultimately be based upon the idea of restoring the ontological essence of things, men and God, thus protecting *fitra'* and preventing *fitna'*.

There is another assumption to be taken into account. Historically, the evolution of nation- state is a European creation. With this, we can highlight that the operational functionality of this cultural- legal- political- historical creation, is successful in Europe. None of these concepts, state and nation, exists in the Arab- Islamic world with the same connotation it has in the European world. The so-called "Arab states" come from geopolitical designs created by Western powers after World War I. The nation does not have an important role in this culture, but tribe has. There is no word in Arab for nation; for tribe, there are at least five words to talk about its variety and hints.

This gave origin to the collection of taxes by the Islamic State that was established in Medina and then the historical and dynastic caliphates.

The idea of a state under caliphate is based upon the concept that comes from the verb *jalafa* حَلَفَ. The verb means to succeed. Caliphs were the ones who would succeed the Prophet, and in Islam, this coincides with the fact that the four caliphs that succeeded the Prophet after his death governed with wisdom and bravery. His government was like a Golden Age of Islam. Beyond the fact that caliphate became an administrative unit of government which was divided into Wilayahs (ولاية *wilāyah*, territory of associates, protector sirs, liberated, clients called *mawla* مَوْلَى), the theological concept of the caliphate expresses the idea that the human being is a merciful representative of God on earth. Any person without genre distinction must be regent and manager accepting the challenge to be caliph (successor) of their own existence. Implementing a caliphate ultimately means to intercede

9. Kind love, which is pure and virgin, to women as "crumb" of God. Fighting for a woman and honoring her as it is a complement for Adam.

10. DE FUENTES, ÁLVARO GONZALO; *The Romantic Epic and Arab Tradition*; Gredos; Madrid; p. 18.

11. The Spanish word to refer to the military rank of second lieutenant comes from the word al-faris.

12. In fact, one of the groups allied to ISIS that fights in Syria against Assad's administration is called *Ansār-al-Islam*.

13. Said list was called *diwān* ديوان, from which the Spanish Word for "customs" comes from.

14. This is probable the only difference between Augustine's *ius bellum* because Hippo Roman-Christian stated that just war does not accept the taking of the booty. In all other aspects,

the idea is similar, even the idea of disregarded combat, without hating the enemy, only for the duties, is shared in both ideas.

15. AL-^c AŠMĀWĪ, Muhammad Sa^o id; *Islam and Political Order*; Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change. Series IIA. ISLAM, Vol. 1; The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy; Washington D.C., 1994; p. 71 (Author's translation).

16. This means "essential nature of things and beings, the order created by God".

17. This means division, seduction, sedition, temptation.

18. Political- theological concept presented by Muhammad b. ^cAbd al-Wahab (1703-1791) founder of the Wahhabism within Sunni Islam.

The latin word *stato* which means “order” and from which state derives, has a different connotation from the word “*dawla*” “دَوْلَة” which comes from the verb “*dawala*” “دَوَّلَ” and it is related to succeeding, take turns, to be substituted, to change periodically, to change luck. It was used before for dynasty or empire as in its meaning III “*dawāla*” “دَوَّالٌ” it means to take that rotation, to succeed in the “international” context, that is, to make it an empire. This word is nowadays used in Arab countries as a synonym for state and, in fact, it is used by ISIS with the acronym of *Daish*, simplifying the name of *al-dawla-l-islāmiyya' fī -al-Fraq wa al-šam* (Islamic State of Iraq and the Uprising).

Every theological concept aims obviously at balancing themselves with reason, in a similar way to what Catholic thinkers, such as John Paul II in his encyclical letter *Fides et Ratio*, have explained. Although it may be noted that the Arab- Islamic world is declining with regard to its position in the 10th century with the imbalances between faith that, in one of its representations, tends to fanaticism and a reason that is minimized (this has been highlighted by both Arab and non- Arab historians)¹⁹; we know that there is a great rational tradition in the Arab- Islamic thinking which, in part due to effects of said decline, cannot be balanced with faith in some of its current expressions.

Many Muslims value the age of the four wise caliphs and the Prophet in the same way some Christians esteem Medieval Christianity values. But they also understand that this was appropriate for certain time and space and these values must be adapted to the current situation undergone by the Arab- Islamic world.

In the case of ISIS which responds to a special line of thinking within Islam that does not imply the whole religious and cultural movement but a very specific line, different theological- political- ideological concepts are combined with the geopolitical situation. ISIS uses Islamic theological concepts that are biased, reduced and turned into stereotypes. These are the concepts that were previously explained apart from the concept of *Šarī'a* or Islamic law: “[...] most Muslims believe that the ideology of groups such as ISIS is not correct in the Islamic context [...] These Islamic extreme groups describe themselves as true Muslims, highlighting several Islamic terms and concepts such as *yihād* and *ummāt*. When dealing with this issue, it is necessary to consider the potential of *Šarī'a* which is misunderstood and misused. [...] When *Šarī'a* is reduced to a social and political ideology, this is an explicit change of their purposes and great abuse”²⁰. The Islamic law is the path to a watering hole, the way to take, the source of water full of blessing.

It is important to mention the regional and international context in which the ideas of ISIS could be developed. Among other factors, Dr. Sayyed Hassan Akhlaq Hussaini states the

A caliphate state would ultimately be based upon the idea of restoring the ontological essence of things, men and God, thus protecting fitra^t and preventing fitna^t.

evident weakness of the states of Syria and Iraq, regional and international interests at stake, international intervention to overthrow or support Assad and the increasingly difficult relations among the Sunni and the Shia.

A HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION


The traditional division between the Sunni and the Shia gave rise to four Sunni orthodox legal schools (Hanafi, Šāfi[°], Māliki y Hanbali) and one Shia school (Yā'farī).

There is a special form of Sunni that is called Wahhabism. This pure line of Islam owes a lot to three important persons in History:

- 1) Ibn Hanbal (780-855).
- 2) Ibn Taymiyya (who died in 1328).
- 3) Muhammad B. ° Abd al-Wahab (1703-1791).

Ibn Hanbal is the founder of Hanbali School which makes a literal and strict interpretation of Quran and Sunnah.²¹

› In order to avoid *fitna^t*, it is compulsory to obey the leader even if he is not merciful. Not following the leader means



to break the union of the Islamic community and the Dar al Islam.

- › Among other recommendations, said school states that the son of dead Christians should be converted to Islam and a *basileus (military)* captured should be killed.

Ibn Taymiyya, whose model is derived from old Muslims (*salaf*) and from the first orthodox caliphs who were wise and warriors, consolidated the following concepts:

- › The breaking of Islam occurs when a Muslim disobeys the *Šarīʿa* (Islamic law).
- › It is necessary to fight against declared enemies: tartars, crusaders and their allies.
- › Discredit Muslims that introduced foreign practices and inventions (innovation) into Islam, especially Kurdish Yazidis, Sufi cofrades, the Druze, Alawites or Nusayri and Shia in general.
- › To have rigid and inflexible positions as regards usual issues: for example, not to play chess because it creates distance with the true *dīn* (religion).
- › Avoid *fitna'* that divides Dar al Islam.

al-Wahab in the 18th century justified its doctrine as a reaction to worship of holy men and foreign practices introduced from other religions.

- › Rituals had to be the same as the ones described in the Quran and Sunna and it was necessary to follow the behaviour of the four orthodox caliphs.
- › Tobacco was prohibited and even coffee was banned at the beginning²².
- › Amulets and rings were banned.

- › Monotheism and unity of God (*tawhīd*) become very important. Also important are the elimination of any Trinity aspect and meditation (worship of Saints). These trends lead to polytheism and blasphemy.

He was also the one whose practices and texts had caused the division of society in two groups: the new units of their followers represented *Dar-al-Islam* (House of Islam) and the unfaithful who did not agree with his opinions represented *Dar-al-Harb* (House of War), the blood of which was legal to shed and it was fair to take their property.²³

Moreover, he established an important Alliance with the House *Sa'ud* in 1744, when Muhammad b. Sa'ud got married to the daughter of b. al-Wahab. Therefore, the house Sa'ud made Wahhabism its own ideology to reinstate Sunna in its purity and to face *bid'ā* بَدْعٌ, a word that comes from the verb *bada'a* بَدَعَ that means "to do for the first time, to be the first one to do something, innovate and in its meaning VIII *ibtad'a* اِبْتَدَعَ it means to defend a heresy which is derived from innovation.

19. Ibn Jaldūn and Felipe Maíllo Salgado, among others.

20. AKHLAQ HUSSAINI, Sayyed Hassan; *The Intellectual Foundations of Islamic Culture*. An Introduction; chapter 6; Washington D.C.; p. 190-191. (under edition). (Author's translator).

21. This means use and habit. It is a pre-Islamic concept and represents the set of regulatory customs of Old Arab. It refers to the tradition that has to be lived and what was taught by the Prophet.

22. Coffee initially traded by the Arabs was discovered in Ethiopia in 570 a. D., the Spanish word "café" is an Arab word that comes from qahwa قَهْوَة.

23. Alkhalifa, Waleed Saleh; *El ala radical del Islam*; Madrid, Siglo XXI, 2007, p. 28.



This historical Alliance created an archetype that still exists as “Wahhabism gave the House of Saud religious legitimacy and strength which was essential for the consolidation and expansion of their political power. This violent movement was a kind of rebellion against the Ottoman Empire which fought against it without success until Muhammad ʿAli, Ottoman governor of Egypt defeated them in 1811”.²⁴

With this historical context, we can explain rivalry between the current powers of the region: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Shiite Persian Iran. These actors determine geopolitics and their interests in the “Middle East”.

Considering this ideology that has biased aspects of Quran and Sunna which do not represent the whole Islam, we can understand why they fight against other religions such as Christians (Maronite Church, Orthodox Christians, Melkite), Kurdish yazidis and the rest of Muslims, Shia and Alawites, even moderate Sunni and also their extreme cruelty against archeological monuments with symbols of old religions.

The concept of *tawhīd* (unity of God) interpreted by Wahhabism and, in general, by other Islam sectors, rejects Christian dogma and the Holy Trinity. Christians believe in three Gods instead of one and this is not in line with *tawhīd*. Like the Jewish, when Christians worshipped the Golden calf and were reprehended by Moses, they fell in veneration, that is, *širk*²⁵. This veneration is not mere worship of other

gods, but the association of them to God (*Al-lāh*) and the beliefs that accept any incarnated form of God.

The same happens with Western political ideologies, such as Marxism and Fascism, which many “lay” dictators from the Arab world have tried to adapt to their culture. They fall into *širk*, as they put men in a position above deity: “The one who commits that sin, *mušrik*, who associates God to other deities, will directly go to hell. According to the rules of *yihād*, *mušrik*, did not have any other choice than to accept Islam or to die”.²⁶

It is worth mentioning that the concept of *tawhīd* which exists in a moderate manner in some sectors of Islam, is exacerbated in Wahhabism, who call themselves “the Unitarians” “*muwahhiūn*” and define themselves as Hanbali Sunni.

Christian, Shia, Alawite²⁷, Druze, Yazidi²⁸, Mazdayasna, Sabians and other minor religions would be guilty of *širk*, and even of being “*kāfir*” (unfaithful) as they deny the determination of human acts.

The Wahhabism strict position aims at coming back to the first times of Islam which were considered to be perfect and to reproduce exactly the moment that was left behind in History. Therefore, any innovation is not well seen.

ISIS belongs to a movement which sometimes calls itself “Jihadist- Salafism” in reference to the old “Salafi” Muslims, which were part of a golden age of Islam.



The reduction of Islamic concepts, polarized by ISIS, together with the military tactic of wild terrorism form the Islamist stereotype.

ORIGIN OF ISIS

In Iraq, the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the effect of the Arab Spring over Syria have weakened both states. It is necessary to consider that the logic of nation-state is not a construction of these cultures, but Arab identities have made similar copies²⁹ of the European culture that had them as colonies as from the slow but progressive disintegration of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire.

The idea of creating a lay state, independent from colonial powers and superpowers has been constant in the History of the region during the 20th century.

The party Ba'z, a word that means rebirth and comes from Pan-Arabism, which began in Egypt with Colonel Nasser, had this strategic vision: "[...] created in Damascus in 1940 [...], its purpose was, as heir of secret societies of the end of the Ottoman Empire, to expel the French from Syria and work for the reunification of the Arab nation that was free from Imperialism, becoming a political expression of Arabism [...] has been rather an ideology movement of lay trends; during the episode of Suez, it merged with the socialist party of Akrān Hūrānī and adopted socializing manners."³⁰

Upon the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Iraqi state was disintegrated and the Arab Spring caused the same effect on the Syrian state. This event was, as stated by Cockburn, a strange mix of revolution, counter-revolution and foreign intervention.

The new Iraqi state has serious legitimacy problems and institutions that were created from it, such as the

Army, are in the same situation. Institutional weakness responds to the fact that the inter-religious context in which different confessions can co-exist peacefully under the new state, failed.

COCKBURN stated: "Many armed men that started to appear in the streets of Bagdad and other cities were Shia militiamen; some of them belonged to Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a dissenting group of the Shia populist group that followed the nationalist religious man Muqtada al-Sadr. This organization was controlled by the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and by Iranians. The fact that the government depended from a sector militia to defend the capital was a sign of the collapse of state security forces and the national army."³¹

The occupation of Mosul, which took place on June 10, 2014 and during which 1300 militiamen of the ISIS left 60000 soldiers out of the Iraqi army, brings the memories of Andalusian defeats³² against Christians during the so-called Reconquest, in which the lack of strong institutions was a characteristic of said culture.

As regards the lack of legitimacy of the Iraqi army, this lies in the fact that it is seen as a foreign occupation force given the Shia predominance and its influence on it. The administration of Iraq, which was mostly Shia, is the first one in an Arab country since Salah ad-Din defeated Fatimi dynasty in Egypt in 1171.³³

With respect to Syria, the "Arab Spring", a reaction against the authoritarian regime of Assad, supported by Iran, Russia and Hezbollah, instead of putting an end to a secular claim, it became a Salafi riot because of Saudi influence together with Qatar and Turkey.

The attempt to adapt the functional logic of the nation-state carried out by authoritarian governments of Iraq and Syria may be explained because of the election of the word politics in the Arab language. The concept is explained with the word "siās" which in the meaning IV of the verb, it is

24. Alkhalifa, Waleed Saleh; op. cit.; p.26.

25. Correa, Horacio Esteban; Jung y el Islam; Buenos Aires; Biblos, 2014, p. 79.

26. Maíllo Salgado, Felipe; Vocabulario de Historia Árabe e Islámica; Madrid; Akal; 1996, p. 222.

27. Alawites or ausayriyes are a branch of Shia known as ansāriya founded in Iraq by Ibn Nusayr in 859 a. D., during the religious crisis of the Abbasi. They are different from Ismā'ilism, Shia who believe in the Messianism weight of the arrival of the Seventh Imām, in which Alawites expect the Eleventh who, upon arrival, will complete the Quran revelation. They believe in a trinity with other ideas that form a sacred and mysterious word based on the Prophet's initials, of the caliph 'Alī and of bāb (gate). Alawites are present in the Syrian government and have been the link of the alliance between Hezbollah and Iran forming the so-called "Shia Crescent" with the Syrian territory as a bridge. These beliefs turn them into enemies of Wahhabism and of ISIS which fights government forces of the Syrian Army and other organizations that respond to Assad's regime.

28. Yazidi are most of the Kurdish ethnic group. Lalish is their holy city and it is 60 kilometres away from Mosul. Their mythology is pre-Islam and their cosmogony is associated to old Persian religions; there is, therefore, a Zoroastrianism influence. Yazidis are the result of a

syncretic process of thousands of years that was crystallized with the Sufism Islamic input of 'Adī Ibn Musafir to Kurdistan worships. Its most important symbol is the Angel of the Indian peafowl which is also called Lucifer. This has an old interpretation rather than a pejorative one. Lucifer is the angel of light, Islamic Purists, such as Wahhabism, associate it to Šaitān (Satan) and the symbol of the Indian peafowl is a challenge for tawhīd (unity of God). This is more challenging for Wahhabism purist as in the Arab language, the Angel of the Indian peafowl is the Malik ʿĀūs. ʿĀūs is the Word for peafowl and it comes from "theos" (Zeus). They believe in reincarnation and in being descendants of Adan rather than of Eva. They do an annual pilgrimage of six days to the tomb of the Sufism sheik 'Adī in Lalish.

29. Las analogías entre culturas se dan por funcionalidad operativa, las homologíaes son por esencia. El ejemplo que da Belohlavek es que un pájaro y un avión vuelan, son análogos pero no homólogos.

30. MAÍLLO SALGADO, Felipe; op. cit.; p. 47.

31. COCKBURN, Patrick; ISIS el retorno de la Yihad; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 2015; p. 14.

32. Nombre con el que los arabistas e historiadores del Islam, designan a los antiguos habitantes del Estado de al-Andalus en la península Ibérica.

33. See COCKBURN, Patrick; op.cit.

ISIS is an actor that is functional to contradictory interests in the region and accelerates the most important geopolitical redesign process in the Middle East since the end of World War I.

“asāsa” “أَسَاسٌ” and it means to make something workable, flow. In passive voice, the adjective “āisa” “سَاسٌ” means to be docile, fluent. In the same semantic field, we can find the word “sās” “سَاسٌ” which is used to refer to the tamer of wild animals.

There is nothing individual freedom has to do with these semantic fields.

The Quran states: “iBelievers! Obey Al-lāh and obey the Messenger of God”³⁴. From this Ayah³⁵ we can deduce the words of the Prophet: “He who obeys, he obeys God and he who obeys his boss, he obeys me”. Beyond its religious meaning, all renowned specialists in Arab- Islamic studies recognize the mark of the Islamic confessional category in the Arab culture, even if laicized. On the other hand, the weakness of institutions is replaced by the individual leader who is the centre of rewards and punishment. This explains the political organization of the governments of Hussein and Assad.

CONCLUSIONS:

It becomes clear that, in light of the many stereotypes built regarding Arab- Islamic identity, ISIS is a biased creation of what Islam represents, in its dimension of great cultural and religious tradition of humankind. As stated before, a great number of ISIS enemies are other Muslims who “depart from” the Salafi purism which, according to Akhlaq Hussaini, is an abuse of the traditional Islamic law.

Extreme movements in any culture represent its stereotypes. At semantic level, they are expressed with “ism”: nationalism is the stereotype of national; imperialism, of empire; communism, of community and Islamism, of Islam.

ISIS has taken advantage of the lack of values in post-modern western culture postmodern, taking combatants from other nations, who are mostly young people descendant from Muslim immigrants that undergo an identity construction process; and also the weakness of the states of the region that are affected by Arab riots and the contradictory interests of regional and world powers.

From this scenario of contradictory interests, ISIS has taken advantage of its interstices to turn its strategy into operations.

Its strategic vision is based upon the idea of a return to the Islam golden age taking advantage of that great tradition and making what was no more than an intention for other Islamic



groups become real: the creation of a caliphate with its own territory that has eliminated Syrian and Iraqi borders.

The caliphate is based on an administration and it organizes militia that will become an army with financial resources derived from oil and other funds from other Arab countries. It attracts “citizens” from Sunni tribes in conflict

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with the Shia and also youngsters who are disappointed by the Western world and try to find their goals in life.

Its tactic, terrorism, which is announced in real time by social networks, is a characteristic of asymmetric war.

The reduction of Islamic concepts, polarized by ISIS, together with the military tactic of wild terrorism form the Islamist stereotype.

The idea that the stereotype is not an archetype but it refers to it, is key to distinguish between Islam and Islamism and is expressed by Maíllo Salgado: “While many Muslims of other regions say that ISIS atrocities have nothing to do with Islam, this is a suspicious opinion from the intellectual point of view and it is also quite reckless. Would anybody agree with the idea that crusades have nothing to do with Christianity? Too many Muslims seem to be more upset about the pictures in a newspaper which are, in the end, unimportant than for the detestable picture of Islam, ISIS and Boko Haram”.³⁶

34. EL CORÁN. Foundation of Islamic. Oom. S 47: A 33.; p. 507.

35. Spanish word for “*ayát*” which means sign or miracle. These are the “verses” of the Quran.

36. Conference “Sobre el Estado Islámico o DAISH” (On Islamic State or DAISH), given in April, 2015 by Felipe Maíllo Salgado in the Specialization in Arab, Arab- American and Islamic Studies at the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero.

37. A similar process with clone groups of ISIS is nowadays appearing in Libya.

ISIS is a biased creation of what Islam represents, in its dimension of great cultural and religious tradition of humankind.

Therefore, in order to understand the phenomenon of the stereotype, we need to know the archetype from which it comes from, without this meaning they are responsible. Being guilty of the archetype is also a nonsense idea, beyond the fact that many Islamic societies must adapt their tradition to current times overcoming “medieval announcements” of “Salafi” movements.

ISIS is an actor that is functional to contradictory interests in the region and accelerates the most important geopolitical redesign process in the Middle East since the end of World War I, in the context of global geopolitics that are increasingly connected to the interests of great powers.

Its appearance as well as the appearance of other clone groups of ISIS³⁷, is guaranteed, at least, in the medium term. ■

> REFEREED ARTICLE

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