

VISIÓN CONJUNTA



ESCUELA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA CONJUNTA DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LA REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA

Año 14 . N° 26

Julio 2022

ISSN: 1852-8619

SPECIAL EDITION

40 YEARS OF THE MALVINAS WAR

Interview with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Lieutenant General Juan Martín Paleo





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ISSN: 1852-8619

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NUESTRO ÍCONO

Es el conocido Cubo de Rubik, ornamentado con los colores de la bandera argentina y con el escudo que identifica al Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas Argentinas. La elección de este ingenioso mecanismo para nuestra revista se debe a que éste es la representación visual de la complejidad del accionar conjunto.

La imagen simboliza el desafío de combinar armónicamente los elementos constitutivos de las Fuerzas Armadas para lograr el eficiente empleo del instrumento militar.

La adecuada utilización de las fuerzas permite configurar, en un mismo plano, el escudo del Estado Mayor Conjunto, que presupone un proceso mental para combinar variables en un escenario sumamente complejo.

Para obtener el éxito en la resolución de la situación planteada se necesita un esquema mental de gran amplitud que permita tener la percepción general del objetivo a lograr; esto define la "visión conjunta".



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INTERVIEW WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUAN MARTÍN PALEO

By **VISIÓN CONJUNTA**

In 2020, the current political leadership of Defence issued the corresponding directive that initiated a new planning cycle. What is your vision of Military Strategy in the light of this document?

I am grateful for the opportunity to express my views on these issues through this prestigious magazine that analyses military strategic thinking. Indeed, the planning cycle began with the issuance, by the political power, of the National Defence Policy Directive (DPDN), which led to its implementation at the military strategic level, the operational level, and finally at the specific level of the armed forces.

Based on this political definition, we issued a Directive for the Elaboration of Military Strategic Planning (DEPEM), with the purpose of precisely guiding the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, after the military strategic assessment and resolution - carried out with the utmost professional rigour, and in close interaction between the General Directorate of Military Strategic Planning, the Operational Command and the

Undersecretariat of Planning of the Secretariat of Military Affairs of the Ministry of Defence - allowed us to prepare and obtain ministerial approval of a Military Strategy Directive (DEMIL), a key document for subsequent planning.

We saw an interesting possibility in this cycle and took it as a challenge: to develop planning that was more realistic, that responded to "our strategic equation", firmly based on our country's context and possibilities. What do I mean by "more realistic"? If we start from the marked influence of different world views, the study of military history, the main doctrines in force, as well as the main conflicts in development in the global order, could lead us to make the mistake of copying or repeating strategies, tying ourselves to concepts that respond to other logics, to situations that are, in this strategic equation, different from our requirements.

I want to be clear that I am not opposed to the knowledge of other conceptual lines, of other strategic visions; on the contrary,

it is essential to consider them, because they are part of the cultural heritage, of history, and especially because the experience of others in the art of war is very valuable; what I do emphasise is the need to be creative and to develop responses that are appropriate to our particular situation.

Strategic thinking, starting with the conflicts that developed in Europe, was fundamentally tied to Jomini's Strategic Board, which was undoubtedly an attempt to mathematise the battlefield, useful and reasonable for the European reality, given the reduced spaces, the large numbers of troops and the enormous quantities of means, which were poured with mathematical criteria into

the board I mentioned. It is the principle of all doctrines and regulations whereby a brigade or a division or an army corps defends on a specific front with a specific depth.

The US doctrine, for its part, is based on the idiosyncrasies, possibilities and circumstances of the United States, whose main source was and is its unparalleled industrial production capacity; thus, in response to its military problems, it developed strategies of media saturation. Perhaps in terms of analysing the manoeuvres they executed, they might seem modest in terms of brilliance or creativity, but through the application of huge amounts of resources, they managed to prevail

in some conflicts. However, in our assessment, these types of solutions do not correspond to our situation, which does not mean that they should not be studied or considered.

The military strategic leader must consider them, but he must also have the vision of how to adapt this thinking to our reality, so as not to fall into what I colloquially call "psychotic planning", if I may be so bold, which consists of planning based on an imaginary reality, which is extremely pernicious. The challenge of this new planning cycle involves trying to think "outside the box" and adopting a strategy that responds to our challenges, i.e. one that addresses large spaces - the eighth largest country in the



Warfare evolved from the traditional or physical domains: air, land and sea, to ¿ non-physical domains: electromagnetic, space, cyber defence. We need to embrace these as domains in which military operations take place. To this end, we need to develop enablers to increase the effectiveness of a reduced military instrument.

world whose land area doubles if we project the maritime coastline and our Antarctic aspirations - with a population of 46 million inhabitants, and with a particular population density, since it has regions with less than one inhabitant per square kilometre.

The armed forces have a reduced troop capacity for these very large spaces and modest possibilities for the availability of resources; if they were doctrinally bound and took Jomini's strategy as the norm or law for defending on a given front and depth, they would need hundreds of divisions and brigades, which we will never have.

We believe that the most appropriate strategy is the "area restriction" or "multi-layer" strategy, which is the one used by the weakest. There is an abundance of literature analysing this strategy from a historical and statistical point of view. I recently read an article that analyses conflicts from 1800 to 1998, with an emphasis on how the weak win wars; it states and concludes that out of all that analysis of conflicts, the weakest who opted for a frontal strategy, a direct confrontation, were only successful in 19% of the cases.

On the other hand, when they adopted an indirect strategy, which we call "area restriction" or "multi-layered", success amounted to 69% of the cases. What does

it consist of? It is the use of the military instrument in a non-linear way, contrary to the previous or conventional doctrine that prevails in most countries, mainly in the United States and Europe. The "multi-layered" strategy consists of the non-linear use of the military instrument, seeking to avoid a direct or decisive confrontation, since our forces will always be insufficient for the demands of our spaces; we cannot afford to engage in an all-out battle, because we would surely lose the entire instrument or it would be left with a level of degradation incompatible with a confrontation with a superior force.

Why do I say a superior force? Because that is what the national defence planning directive states, which talks about the use of the military instrument against an external state threat. Obviously, we deduce that it must be a military instrument with projection capability.

Something that is part of our idiosyncrasy, that we must change and that takes a lot of effort, because it requires a cultural change - which is what takes the longest - is that we have always seen our immeasurable spaces as a hardship, instead of seeing them as an advantage. That is the change we need to bring about, to see these vast expanses as an asset.

How do we make these vast expanses work to our advantage in defensive terms? There are historical examples of large armies that were defeated in large spaces: the Napoleonic troops, or the German forces in the Russian theatre of operations during the Second World War; they were large war machines against smaller armies that used that space as a tool that forced that enemy projection force to overextend itself, and ended up defeating them because the moral collapse of those forces occurred. In effect, it is not physical destruction that is sought, but moral defeat.

At its core, what changes is the grammar of strategy, although the strategic principle remains the same. At its core, strategy is not a fuzzy science; it all boils down to the basic principle of military strategy, which has been fundamental since Clausewitz's time and even earlier: open or close space. In a conflict, one always seeks to open and the other to close spaces. The one who seeks to open spaces does so through offensive action, and the one who defends seeks to close spaces through defensive action.

In this sense, the strategy of area restriction is a specific grammar of how we seek to close spaces because we have an active defensive strategy, which is another

aspect that we have to learn and instil in our drivers and explain in our political leadership: active defensive, because of the small size of our forces.

Acting only by reaction can be extremely expensive, for which we need very effective military strategic intelligence that provides us with sufficient information to know when the enemy attack is imminent; it is unacceptable to wait for the first impact, because it would produce a decisive degradation of a naturally reduced force such as ours. So, our strategy must be defensive but with an active attitude. That is what we are doing.

How important is the implementation of the FONDEF (National Defence Fund-Fondo Nacional de Defensa) for achieving

the goals of the Military Strategy?

FONDEF is precisely the great catalyst that should enable us to move away from psychotic planning. For the first time in a long time, we will be able to acquire resources with a certain time horizon by having multi-year funding. Then, foreseeing that in a certain period we will have such means at our disposal, what we plan will allow us to recover or incorporate capacities, thus giving support to the forecasts, by planning on a more certain and predictable basis.

Does the implementation of FONDEF have an impact on training?

We are on the right track, FONDEF certainly helps in terms of availability of means, but for training we need more means and other types of resources geared to

the operating budget. If we look at the film, I am optimistic because some things are being done in a virtuous way.

In that sense, the activity of the three specific war colleges and the joint war college conducting exercises in an integrated way where activities are coordinated with the operational command are an encouragement. As we enter the development of the short-term plan phase within DEMIL, we want our students from the four schools - who are the best prepared minds - to make contributions and inputs as part of this process.

The long term, in terms of military strategic planning, implies close links with the national scientific-technological system. How do you envisage this interaction?

Now we have approved the



Military Strategy Directive (DEMIL) and we are continuing with a line of planning that contemplates this interaction. The Military Strategy works in the short, medium and long term. For the short term, the DEMIL envisages the development of plans for the employment of the military instrument with the means currently available; it is a question of how we do in the "meantime". There is also a medium-term DEMIL, which involves the gradual incorporation of certain means, to recover and maintain important military capabilities in a process that will take no less than ten years to complete.

What do I mean by important capabilities? Supersonic fighter interception, submarine capabilities, the renewal of a

complete line of armoured vehicles, short, medium and long-range air defence systems. To the extent that FONDEF allows us to foresee and realise this in the medium term, we will be recovering capabilities, and in the long term, we will fundamentally apply what is called a "genetic strategy".

What does this allow? When we issue the medium-term DEMIL, a message is sent from the defence jurisdiction, which states: this is what we need to develop in the medium term, in order to focus our efforts; and in this sense, we are working with the Ministry of Science and Technology, but also with the private sector, to coordinate their contributions to the defence area. We have had meetings in which we have presented our needs, for example,

that the next satellite, ARSAT 3, should include a transponder, initially a communications satellite for military use only; it is something intermediate, which aims at a long-term objective, since the evolution of warfare demands the development of a military satellite that will allow us to have data and images.

Warfare evolved from the traditional or physical domains: air, land and sea, to ¿ non-physical domains: electromagnetic, space, cyber defence. We need to embrace these as domains in which military operations take place. To this end, we need to develop enablers to increase the effectiveness of a reduced military instrument. Cyber defence is a case in point: it should not be seen as an anti-virus, but as a military power multiplier.



The Antarctic issue was defined in the National Defence Planning Directive as one of the fundamental aspects and for this reason we have taken concrete actions. The Antarctic Logistics Pole is being developed, with the integrated naval base.

A small force like ours, in order to defend itself against an attack, has to know how to attack, to be able to degrade an external military state threat from the maximum distances, so that it reaches our territory with the maximum possible wear and tear and allows its disarticulation; we must have these ingenuities that allow us to affect enemy military power from its very place of origin.

Today, the interconnectedness of computer systems makes such attacks possible. I should not fail to mention that we are always trying to identify trends and opportunities; in that sense the creation of the Cyber Defence Institute was a significant step forward. In the same way, information is used practically as a weapon, the manipulation of international public opinion directly affects the morale of societies, generates a global vision of who is the aggressor or provocateur and who is the aggressed, which has legal implications at the international level, and has a decisive influence on the evolution of conflicts.

We must therefore go beyond the traditional dimensions and prepare our drivers to execute military operations in all these non-physical domains.

It has been 40 years since the conflict with the United Kingdom

over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands. What is your analysis of this?

One of the conclusions of the Rattenbach Report, which was accepted by the armed forces and the political powers, was the clear need for joint military action. I note positively how the figure of the war veteran evolved; we went from a vision of concealment and denial to a plain and simple attitude of "they lost", i.e. not accepting what happened, as something almost sporting; then to a vision of "the children of war", where the war veteran was a victim.

Subsequently, this metamorphosis continued towards a more balanced perspective, arriving at the epic vision of the present, because the conflict was very much an epic.

Do you believe that the experiences of the conflict have been adequately integrated into the organisation and training of the armed forces?

It is a path that has begun and is in full process. Although there is still a long way to go, because it has several aspects, not only in training, but also in training, both are very much conditioned by the available resources, especially financial resources. Joint military training requires a logical sequence. If I want to do a joint exercise, the parties must first be trained.

Bringing together organisations that are not trained in the specifics can be dangerous. The logical thing to do is to train each force individually and when it reaches the required level, only then do joint training.

Ideally, these trained joint forces should participate at a higher level, in combination with other countries. We cannot send our organisations that are not specifically or jointly trained to participate in exercises, and even less so in operations, when there is a UN requirement to do so. This is complex because it is tied to several conditions.

How would you define the role of the armed forces in the execution of "Operation Belgrano" during the Covid 19 pandemic?

Pandemics are like war; they are never good. Despite this, the Armed Forces played an important role, which was positive because it made them visible, especially to the political leadership who saw in them a formidable tool with the capacity to react immediately - and who could make a fundamental contribution - because they are physically and psychologically prepared for a military conflict.

During the pandemic we had the opportunity to apply the experience we had gained with the electoral commandos and the operational command, that is, what it means to

manage a national election, which has to occupy the entire territory of the country in terms of deployment, to reach the last little school in the mountains or in Patagonia or on an island. We adapted that structure, and it allowed us to react quickly, with very short planning and to adapt the structure so that the 14 electoral commands became emergency zone commands. The important thing is that the state was able to respond quickly to a problem that at the time had more uncertainties than certainties about contagion and spread; for example, when the pandemic began, it was not known what protective measures should be used; that level of ignorance was extremely traumatic.

I believe that the military instrument was up to the task, and this was recognised by the political leadership and the population. The image of military fractions entering certain neighbourhoods, without weapons, bringing health aid, food, infrastructure, moving people who were stranded somewhere in the country or abroad, accessing inhospitable areas, islands in our rivers, was reflected in the opinion polls, which put the Armed Forces in a place of relevance, among other institutions.

What other community support operations are the Armed Forces carrying out?

We are now during the River Health Campaign. We started in Rosario; then we went to the area of Ibicuy, Ceibas, Ibicuycito, which are areas that are very difficult to access by land. We arrive in boats from the river naval area, with a Multi-agency Campaign, made up of people from the Ministry of Health, our health resources, doctors, nurses, and various types of assistance. Employees of the RENAPER (National Registry of Persons) also participate because there are areas of undocumented people. Later, in Misiones, the

Brigade of Monte XII installed a bridge to connect two important towns that had been cut off by a flooding river that had destroyed the bridge.

In the north, with the V Mountain Brigade, we are providing water purification support to the Wichis. In different parts of the country, we work with specific requirements.

During the summer, our brigades were very active in the National Fire Fighting Plan. The difference was that Operation General Belgrano was national in scope and spread over a period that required a supreme effort from the command-and-control elements to the last man on the front-line vaccinating or serving a hot meal.

Antarctica is a vitally important arena. What is your vision for the future of issues related to the white continent?

The Antarctic issue was defined in the National Defence Planning Directive as one of the fundamental aspects and for this reason we have taken concrete actions. The Antarctic Logistics Pole is being developed, with the integrated naval base. We are planning several facilities, an army unit on the Isla Grande of Tierra del Fuego, a forward deployment base for Air Force training in Ushuaia, the mobile radar that we are placing in Río Grande and, fundamentally, the investment we are making in the Petrel Base, which we want to transform into the new gateway to the Argentine Antarctic Sector, because we believe it has unbeatable conditions. Petrel was only a summer base, now it is functioning as a permanent base, and we want it to become the Argentine base with the greatest logistic capacity, even more than Marambio.

We are now working flat out throughout the winter, supporting the people who stayed there. We have a four-stage base development plan, which in

addition to infrastructure includes an airstrip - which will be easily accessible because it is above sea level - and a pier, which will lower the costs of Antarctic logistics. We are continuing with our plan to generate background information that can then be used as evidence for our just claim to Antarctic sovereignty.

Specifically on the Antarctic Peninsula, claims from several countries, many of them major powers, converge, so our expectation is to continue working so that when the international community defines the future of the Antarctic Treaty, we will have solid elements of judgement to be able to defend our claims.

Based on your vision of the role of Military Strategy, what do you expect from the Armed Forces Joint War College?

ESGC students must learn to think "outside the box", which is a short and simple phrase but complicated to implement. We in the military are very fond of traditions - the least mobile part of culture - and it is good that this is so, but sometimes we confuse what is tradition with what is not, and we believe that all military culture is like tradition, forgetting that culture is dynamic, and that doctrine is part of culture.

We must be perfectly aware of what is tradition, which it is desirable to maintain; for example, seeing a charge of the Grenadier Regiment, the parade of the Patrician Regiment, visiting the Sarmiento Frigate or the pioneering aircraft in a museum, moves anyone and is part of the *raison d'être* of the forces, but there are aspects in which we must evolve and understand what is tradition and what is not. Tying what should evolve to tradition can immobilise us in time, which is why it is important to learn to think by appealing to creativity and innovation. ■

AS AN INTRODUCTION

By Colonel(R) VGM. **ALBERTO V. APARICIO**

Invited by the UNDEF, Colonel Alberto V. Aparicio, Secretary of Extension of the ESGC pronounced these words on 9 June 2022, at the beginning of the commemorative act for the 40th anniversary of the Malvinas War.

“In 1967, I started first grade in Fiambalá, a small border town in the province of Catamarca; beyond it was the border with the Republic of Chile. At the back of the classroom, there was a world map, common in schools at the time. Among my earliest memories was the image of the Falkland Islands, as my height meant that my eyes were at that level.


I also remember the Manual Estrada, a textbook for primary school, widely used in those years; on one of its pages there was a drawing of the capital of the islands, a simple outline of little white houses, fences and green roofs. I mention these memories because when I touched down on the airport runway on 11 April 1982, those images immediately came to mind. Let these experiences serve then to symbolically link those provincial beginnings with the higher education in which I work at this National Defence University, which today is holding this event so dear to patriotic feelings, to emphasise the fundamental role of education in the construction of meanings about the Malvinas cause in the Argentine

collective conscience. To put it in a nutshell, the Argentine Army gave its best.

The courage and dedication shown in the combats of those dramatic days of 1982 were the result of a conviction that had long been deeply rooted in our hearts, which pushed our soldiers into action, and which also led to the spontaneous, sincere and patriotic support of society, regardless of the causes that guided political decisions. War as an extreme act of a society, means families in a long mourning, perhaps unfinished, with the pride of the hero who left his lineage high, as well as the pain for the loved one who did not return.

I ask for the understanding of this illustrious audience for these self-referential mentions, with the intention of transmitting to them my experiences as a war veteran, as a retired member of the Argentine Army, and my present as a teacher at the Joint War College.

The calm and reflection that higher education entails should serve as a spur to put the best of our talents and our energy into making these unredeemed islands and their surrounding areas return to the bosom of the homeland. Thank you, National Defence University, for your fervour in commemorating the 40th anniversary of the conflict, for keeping the Malvinas flame alive”. ■



MALVINAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ROOTS AND LEGACIES OF A NATIONAL CAUSE

By **MARÍA INÉS TATO**

First, I would like to thank the ESGC, organiser of the Symposium “40 years after the Malvinas Conflict: strategic, operational and tactical reflections”, for its invitation to share some thoughts on this subject in the context of the fortieth anniversary of the war. My intervention is based on the observation of the polysemy and historicity of this term and will attempt to specify the different meanings that the Malvinas Islands had for Argentine society before, during and after the South Atlantic Conflict.

It could be said that since the nineteenth century Malvinas has simultaneously alluded to two interconnected but different dimensions, to which a third was added after 1982. Firstly, Malvinas referred - and refers - to the 'Malvinas issue', that is, to the

Keywords:

- > Sovereignty
- > Malvinas Cause
- > South Atlantic Conflict
- > Polysemy



dispute of almost two centuries between Argentina and the United Kingdom over sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, a dispute that began with the British occupation of the archipelago on 3 January 1833.

Since then, both the successive governments of the Argentine Confederation and those of the Argentine Republic that succeeded it made constant diplomatic claims that were systematically ignored by the British authorities. Argentina based its claim on the assertion of the priority of discovery and occupation, on the transfer of sovereignty from Spanish hands after independence, and on the claim of geographical and geological continuity between the archipelago and the Argentine mainland. For its part, the UK also argued for priority in the discovery and occupation of the islands and emphasised the continuous nature of the occupation since 1833 as arguments for claiming sovereignty. In 1908 the UK grouped the sub-Antarctic islands, including South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and part of Antarctica, into the so-called Falkland Islands Dependency. In 1959, Argentina incorporated them into the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and

the South Atlantic Islands.

Both states thus made gestures that underlined their claims to sovereignty over the disputed territories. The creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 marked a turning point in the development of the Malvinas issue.

The United Kingdom also began to appeal to the principle of self-determination of peoples enshrined in Article 73 and placed the question of sovereignty in the hands of the islanders, an argument it would wield even more forcefully after 1982.

For its part, Argentina found in this international forum a new arena in which to renew its claims. In 1965, the United Nations took Argentina's claim into account by issuing Resolution 2065, which internationally recognised the existence of a sovereignty dispute, included the Malvinas in the decolonisation process envisaged in Resolution 1514 of 1960, and invited Britain and Argentina to negotiate.

These negotiations resulted in 1971 in a Communications Agreement that established a direct air link between Argentina and the islands and enabled the provision of services by two Argentine state-owned companies, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales and Gas del Estado. Ultimately, however, the negotiations that

followed throughout the 1970s proved unproductive as far as sovereignty was concerned. The alternatives that were considered to resolve the dispute ended up being discarded, as was the case with the proposal of an Argentine lease or an Anglo-Argentine condominium.

In 1982, "Operation Rosario" aimed to unblock the status quo and force a breakthrough in the diplomatic talks then underway, but the outcome of the subsequent armed conflict led to a new stalemate that persists to this day. Although post-war bilateral negotiations have made progress in some areas, as evidenced by the Malvinas Humanitarian Project Plan, the same is not true of the sovereignty issue.

Over the decades, this diplomatic dispute gave rise to the Malvinas cause (the second sense of the term), the ideal of recovering these unredeemed lands, which is inseparable from national identity. The historiography has not yet systematically explored the process through which this national cause was developed. Some of the junctures at which it took shape and crystallised have been identified, as well as some of the agents whose actions contributed to its construction. But the mechanisms and cultural devices that made possible the

In 1965, the United Nations addressed Argentina's demand by issuing Resolution 2065, which internationally recognised the existence of a sovereignty dispute, included the Malvinas in the decolonisation process envisaged in Resolution 1514 of 1960, and invited Britain and Argentina to negotiate.

formation of the Malvinas cause, and its development in other parts of our history, have yet to be explored.

Without claiming to be exhaustive, I will refer here to some of the milestones and actors recognised as crucial in this process. José Hernández has been singled out as a precursor of the Malvinas issue based on an article he published in 1869 in the newspaper *El Río de la Plata* accompanying the reproduction of a letter from Commander Augusto Lasserre referring to his trip to the archipelago. In his comments, Hernández vindicated Argentine sovereignty and denounced the supposed lack of interest shown by the national authorities in them (which was disproved by the facts: the claims were constant).

However, when attributing Hernández's opinion to public opinion, it should be borne in mind that at that time the author of the *Martín Fierro* was not yet as popular as he would become after the publication of his famous poem. It should also be borne in mind that, according to the First National Census (carried out in 1869), the illiteracy rate was over 77%.

In any case, the Malvinas sovereignty claim was present in the intellectual and political arena of the time, but its social

scope was very limited. In the context of the centenary of the May Revolution, another intellectual, Paul Groussac, published a book in French entitled *Les Îles Malouines* (The Malvinas Islands). In his work, Groussac offered historical and legal arguments to support the diplomatic claim.

The very fact that the book did not appear in Spanish indicates that it was aimed at a restricted audience: the Argentine elites, who spoke French as a second language. Once again, the Malvinas issue was present in the public sphere, but had not yet reached society at large.

However, although it is not clear when and how, the Malvinas issue had undoubtedly made significant progress over the decades, as would become apparent during the course of World War I. By then, German propaganda in Argentina highlighted British imperialist expansionism globally and its main local impact: the usurpation of the southern archipelago. At the time, German propaganda in Argentina emphasised British imperialist expansionism at the global level and its main local impact: the usurpation of the southern archipelago. At the same time, it affirmed the legitimacy of the Argentine claim and insisted on its legal and historical background.

On the other hand, local agents of German propaganda emphasised that Germany was a potential ally of Argentina in the recovery of the Malvinas and that, with its support, the archipelago could be returned to the national patrimony at the end of the Great War. Likewise, when in 1917 a series of diplomatic incidents with Germany put the foreign policy of Hipólito Yrigoyen's government in check, those in favour of maintaining neutrality also resorted to the Malvinas question to support their position on Argentina's conduct at this crossroads. In this way, the ongoing dispute with the United Kingdom was presented as an irremovable impediment to any solidarity or alignment with the cause of the allied nations.

This invocation of the Malvinas question was not restricted to discussions in the press or in the National Congress but was also expressed in massive street demonstrations in defence of neutrality, in which leaflets were distributed with the slogan "Give us back the Malvinas" and in which the same slogan was chanted.

At this juncture, the war demonstrated the remarkable capacity for social mobilisation that this issue aroused and would continue to arouse throughout the twentieth century. The



next important moment in the construction of the Malvinas Islands as a national cause was the Malvinas War.

as a national cause was in the 1930s, when numerous actions to reaffirm our sovereign rights over the islands proliferated. Among them, it is worth mentioning the bill by national senator Alfredo Palacios, which unanimously became law in 1934. Thus, Law 11.904 entrusted the *Comisión Protectora de Bibliotecas Populares* with the translation of Groussac's work, its publication in an abridged version and its distribution in schools and popular libraries.

This measure was very effective in disseminating the French intellectual's arguments, which, as mentioned earlier, originally circulated among a restricted audience, to broad sectors of society. Palacios also successfully promoted the prohibition of maps that did not mark the southern

archipelago as Argentine territory.

Other signs point to the advance of the Malvinas cause in the 1930s. Several exponents of Argentine nationalism widely propagated an anti-imperialist discourse and explicitly claimed Argentine sovereignty over the islands. In 1936, a civil association called "El Ceibo" proposed to the Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction the establishment of 10 June as "National Malvinas Day", commemorating the appointment of Luis Vernet as its Political and Military Commander in 1829.

This project did not materialise. It was not until 1973 that the National Congress sanctioned Law 20.561, which instituted the "Day of the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas", regulated by Decree 1.635 of 1974, which established the holding of ceremonies alluding to the date in "educational establishments of all levels, State and private, units and offices of the Armed Forces,

judicial headquarters and public administration offices, inside and outside the territory".

In 1938 another intellectual, Juan Carlos Moreno, published *Nuestras Malvinas: viaje de estudio y observación*. The book collected his impressions of the islands and their inhabitants after a two-month stay in the archipelago, financed by a grant from the National Cultural Commission. Moreno also recovered the historical, legal and geographical arguments on which the Argentine claim was based. His work went through numerous enlarged reprints, also dealing with the Antarctic question and consequently being renamed *Nuestras Malvinas y la Antártida* (Our Malvinas and the Antarctic). In 1950 the book was authorised as a reading text for primary schools.

In 1939 a group of intellectuals founded the Junta for the Recovery of the Malvinas Islands, initially chaired by Alfredo Palacios. Among the initiatives it promoted

to raise public awareness of the Malvinas question, the Junta financed several reprints of Moreno's book. However, perhaps his most enduring legacy was the competition he launched for the composition of the "Malvinas March", in which the version with lyrics by Carlos Obligado and music by José Tieri won.

First broadcast in 1941, the March soon became part of the school routine. It was declared compulsory by resolution of the Ministry of Education in 1978, which established that it should be sung at commemorative events on 10 June and 20 November (Sovereignty Day).

The 1960s also saw several episodes that contributed to spreading the Malvinas cause in public opinion. Among them was the trip of the Argentine pilot Miguel Fitzgerald to the islands in 1964. During his fleeting passage through Port Stanley (Stanley), he hung an Argentine flag on the racecourse and drafted a proclamation to the governor of the islands demanding British withdrawal.

In 1966, the "Condor Operation" took place, in which nationalist militants diverted an Aerolíneas Argentinas flight to the islands, raised the national flag in Stanley (Puerto Argentino) and demanded recognition of Argentine sovereignty from the governor. In 1968 Fitzgerald flew to the islands again, accompanying Héctor Ricardo García, journalist and owner of the newspaper *Crónica*. The vicissitudes of these three events were abundantly covered and disseminated by this newspaper, which helped to further amplify the social impact of the Malvinas question.

On the other hand, in 1974, García led a new campaign related to the islands, consisting of the recruitment of volunteers to proceed with the de facto recovery

of the archipelago. This initiative earned the newspaper one of its many closures, after being accused of promoting the crime of internal commotion. As we have seen, over the decades the confluence of state initiatives and the actions of intellectuals, political activists and civil associations around the Malvinas cause shaped the Malvinas issue into a widely shared national aspiration.

In other words, this national cause was built both from above and from below, both from the state and from civil society. The South Atlantic Conflict in 1982 was the apotheosis of the Malvinas cause, the test that validated its consolidation as a national cause and revealed its formidable potential for social mobilisation. Indeed, the Malvinas cause was at the heart of the culture of war that was forged in Argentina after 2 April. Here I understand war culture as the set of social representations of the conflict based on a common imaginary, shared values, feelings and experiences, which legitimised the recourse to war to achieve the supreme objective of recovering those unredeemed lands.

Society undertook a wide variety of initiatives to collaborate with the war effort: mass demonstrations and petitions in the press in support of the recovery, sending letters of encouragement and parcels to soldiers, registering volunteers to provide various services on the islands, fund-raising campaigns to support the war effort, among them the Patriotic Fund.

Undoubtedly, Argentines were mobilised in response to official propaganda, closely associated with the mass media, to which the war provided an avid market for news. At the same time, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that citizens were also self-mobilised because of the roots that

the Malvinas cause had acquired in the social imaginary over the course of almost a century and a half.

The patriotic fervour and commitment to the war stemmed from the widespread conviction in the legitimacy of the Argentine claim and the will to recover the archipelago, even by armed means. Without leaving aside the differences that in other areas confronted various political and social actors with the de facto government, a sort of "sacred union" was formed, with the participation of political leaders representing the entire party spectrum, trade union centres, chambers of commerce, rural producers, intellectuals, sportsmen and artists.

The Malvinas issue once again revealed its enormous capacity for social interpellation and for bringing together different party and ideological traditions. Returning to our initial argument, the events of 1982 added a new layer of meaning to the meanings of Malvinas that we examined earlier. As well as referring to the diplomatic issue and the national cause, the Malvinas issue henceforth also referred to the war. While during the conflict the Malvinas issue generated a broad consensus, after 14 June 1982 the war gave rise to polarised and antithetical readings, which either exalted it as a heroic deed or condemned it outright, and which raise the need to reflect on the ways in which Argentine society processes and manages its relationship with controversial and traumatic pasts.

In the immediate post-war period, society opted for a self-victimising attitude; it claimed to have been deceived or manipulated, and retrospectively distanced itself from its active support for the war, which it deliberately relegated to oblivion.

Over the decades, the confluence of state initiatives and the actions of intellectuals, political activists and civil associations around the Malvinas issue shaped the Malvinas issue as a widely shared national yearning. In other words, this national cause was built both from above and from below, both from the state and from civil society.

Defeat led to a search for those responsible, and society placed responsibility on the military institution, without distinguishing between the strategic and tactical levels. Consequently, responsibility was placed equally on the senior commanders who had designed the campaign and, on the officers, non-commissioned officers and conscript soldiers who, in the field and in adverse conditions, gave or risked their lives in the fulfilment of their professional role or civic duty. Thus, on their return from the front, veterans were met with indifference from a society that too often failed to recognise their sacrifice. Clearly, this is not an Argentine peculiarity.

As historian John Horne¹ has pointed out for other modern wars, in the post-war period the very presence of veterans brings society face to face with its previous support for a conflict from which it has distanced itself in the present and operates as an uncomfortable reminder of a past commitment that wants to be forgotten.

However, the distancing from the war that prevailed in the early post-war years had its correlate in civilian academia, which even

today tends to neglect it as a research topic. The South Atlantic conflict is usually interpreted in terms of domestic politics, as a by-product of the internal crisis of the National Reorganisation Process: the emphasis is on the military junta's strategic decision to launch Operation Rosario and later the war, and the role it played in the final collapse of the military regime and the recovery of democracy.

The emphasis on 2 April and 14 June detracted from the specific weight of the 74 days of the conflict and consequently relegated the only international war in which Argentina was involved in the twentieth century (except for its participation in the Gulf War) to a cone of shadows. Critical examination of the war and society's relationship to it is still an unfinished business. On this 40th anniversary, it would be desirable for the Malvinas War to be normalised and fully incorporated into our history, as were other difficult periods in our past. This is a task for the state, the academic field and ordinary citizens. Ultimately, as historian Henry Rousso has pointed out, memory implies learning to "live with the memory of tragedy rather than living without it (...) or against it (...) [it implies] accepting the irreparable"².

CV

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2. Rousso, Henry (1998) *La Hantise Du Passé*. France. Textuel Publishers.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR OF MALVINAS

By **ALBERTO OSCAR TREJO Y PATRICIO JUSTO TREJO**

Keywords:

- > Commando unit
- > Joint warfare
- > Theatre of operations
- > Falkland Islands
- > Sovereignty

The Malvinas War was a traumatic experience for Argentina, but for the rest of the world it was a cause for study and a source of lessons learned at all levels of leadership. This article aims to analyse the operational level, joint military action in the conduct of the war and the organisation of the theatres of operations during the South Atlantic conflict.

One of the principles of joint military action is unity of command. This became particularly evident during the Second World War, when the integration of the different components acquired importance, a paradigm in this sense being the conduct of Operation Overlord, the landing on the beaches of Normandy. President Eisenhower, who was its Supreme Commander, would later say: “The way of waging war in separate groups of land, sea and air is over forever. If we ever meet again in another war, we will

fight it with all the Armed Forces in a concentrated effort”.¹

It is interesting to note that this operation was planned in the UK. Likewise, Britain continued to operate in this way in the different conflicts in which it participated: the Korean War, colonial disputes in Southeast Asia, intervention in the Suez Canal, intervention in Northern Ireland and its participation as a member of NATO, which gave it a certain gymnastics in the organisation of joint forces with projection capacity, in addition to the specific characteristics of its armed forces with great influence from the Royal Navy, due to its insular position.

Although Argentina set up its Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1948, after the experiences of the Second World War, it had not developed much in this regard, so it did not have a joint doctrine either; at the same time, in some cases the equipment was not compatible and no exercises were conducted



to integrate the armed forces¹. However, the 1978 border conflict with Chile had allowed it to test aspects related to the mobilisation and organisation of theatres of operations. On that occasion, seven strategic commands had been formed: Southern Operations Theatre (TOS), Northwest Operations Theatre (TONO), Northeast Strategic Security Zone (SENE), Air Defence Command (CDA), Strategic Air Command (CAE), Naval Operations Command (COOP) and the Joint Transport Command (CCT).

The Military Board was the head of all these operational commands, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the coordinating and advisory body². Although seven strategic commands were organised, only the Joint Transport Command provided for full integration; the others were essentially specific in nature.

British organisations


For Britain, once conflict broke out, determining the initial feasibility of military employment fell to the Royal Navy; Admiral John Fieldhouse, then commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet, had extensive experience. A 1944 graduate, he had trained as a submariner and served as second-in-command of the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes in 1967, during the evacuation of Aden and later in the Hong Kong crisis. He had also been involved in the Suez Canal crisis (1956). Fieldhouse, aware that a refusal would deepen the budget cuts to which his armed forces were being subjected and seeing an opportunity to reverse this situation, considered it feasible to use military means to recapture the islands and immediately devised a plan. His initial structure was based on his experience and training, for

which he organised two Task Forces (see Figure 1).

Once the conflict had escalated, and based on the intelligence studies carried out, it was clear that they would have to fight a major naval air battle. Likewise, the lack of information would make it necessary to reconnoitre landing beaches and adopt alternative plans for their use³. Another decisive aspect for the organisation of the force was the combat power ratio. It was realised that the Argentine force on the islands was about 10,000 men, and that about 7,500

1. Lombardo, Juan José. *Malvinas: Errores, anécdotas y reflexiones*. Inédito, p. 14.
2. Trejo, Alberto O.. *Análisis histórico de la aplicación de los principios de la acción militar conjunta en la organización operacional en la movilización de 1978*. Escuela Superior de Guerra Conjunta de las FFAA, Bs As., p. 16.
3. Fieldhouse, John. "La Guerra de Malvinas Así Vencimos". *Revista Defensa* N° 62. junio 1983.

FIGURE 1. INITIAL ORGANISATION OF THE BRITISH COMMAND STRUCTURE (2 / 9 APRIL 1982)



Source: *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign*. Vol II.

A decisive aspect of the organisation of the British force was the ratio of combat power. It was appreciated that the Argentine force in the islands was about 10,000 men, and that about 7,500 of them were in Stanley; for this reason they needed at least one additional brigade and a divisional command to take command of both.

of them were in Port Stanley; for this reason, they needed at least one additional brigade and a divisional command to take command of both⁴.

Considering these aspects and others of a technical nature and reorganisation, especially of the amphibious and landing task force, a war council was held on Ascension Island, chaired by Admiral Fieldhouse and with the participation of the subordinate commanders, at which the new command structure was established in relation to the size of the expeditionary force⁵ (See Figure 2).

The command structure is organised by function, except for the South Georgia task force, which is organised by task⁶, since it was given all the necessary elements to carry out its mission independently. Among the conclusions that emerged from that meeting, it was established that Admiral Woodward would press with the Carrier Battle Group to try to win the air and naval battles before any amphibious landings took place. He would also be responsible for infiltrating, at the request of Clapp and Thompson, special forces


reconnaissance patrols. Meanwhile, the Amphibious Task Force would remain at Ascension to carry out the much-needed redeployment of men, effects and vehicles⁷.

All landings would take place on Soledad Island, with proposals to land on the Greater Malvinas rejected. Determining the exact landing site on Soledad Island would depend on several factors, including beaches and enemy deployment. Special forces patrols would be deployed to obtain information on these and other aspects. In the meantime, Clapp and Thompson would prepare several alternative landing beaches⁸.

The Marine Brigade was to be reinforced and measures to that effect were put in place. These reinforcements included an additional parachute battalion, another light gun battery, more medics, additional engineer troops, more Blowpipe missiles, and another light helicopter group. These reinforcements brought the Brigade's strength to about 5,500 men, including five battalions, 24 105mm light guns, eight tracked armoured scout vehicles, a surface-to-air missile battery, 15 light helicopters and a logistics regiment⁹. Air superiority was to be obtained before the amphibious



Operation Corporate Staff. From left to right: Vice Admiral P. Herber, General J. Moore, Admiral J. Fieldhouse, Vice Admiral V. Hallifax, Air Marshal J. Curtiss, Rear Admiral P. Hammerley.

FIGURE 2 . ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH COMMAND STRUCTURE (9 APRIL / 20 MAY 1982)

Source: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign. Vol II.

operation could take place.

This was categorically emphasised by Task Force Commander Admiral Fieldhouse, and not for the first time.¹⁰ The Amphibious Group needed more air superiority before the amphibious operation could take place. The Amphibious Group needed more ships, some of which were already underway, but others, such as a dock landing ship, had to be sent south immediately¹¹. Once the war began, Fieldhouse's confidence in the power of submarines was confirmed after the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, which meant that the Argentine

fleet did not undertake any further major operations.

However, it was never able to achieve air superiority, which caused serious disadvantages during the landings. Once the beachhead was established, the last modification to the command structure of Task Force 317 was made. Since two brigades were to operate for the attack on Port Stanley, it was necessary to form a divisional command, and General Jeremy Moore was sent with a small staff to take command and be Fieldhouse's representative in the field. Although this command did not provide extra forces, logistics

or communications, it did serve to coordinate the final effort over Stanley (see Figure 3). In the area of operations there was no unified command, but rather coordination between the commanders, which eventually resulted in General Moore being sent as Fieldhouse's representative.

Argentine Organisations

Oceanic interests were always an almost exclusive concern of the Argentine Navy, which is why the Malvinas Islands and planning for their recovery was a recurrent issue over time. Since UN General Assembly Resolution 2065 - which recognised a sovereignty dispute over the islands - the military option could be feasible as a back-up to international policy. However, the 1978 conflict with Chile had put this hypothesis on the back burner.

In 1981, Britain's recurrent refusal to discuss sovereignty

4. Idem.

5. Thompson, Julian. *La Savia de la Guerra*. Instituto de Publicaciones Navales. 1991, p. 327

6. According to the classification developed by Mintzberg, the various bases for grouping units within an organisation are reduced to two, by the "function" performed and by the "market" served. Neither is superior to the other, but in their use, the

different factors that make their use advisable must be evaluated. Mintzberg, Henry. *The Structuring of Organisations*. Prentice - Hall. 1979.

7. Thompson, op.cit., p. 327.


8. Ibidem.

9. Idem.

10. Idem.


11. Idem.

GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL MANEUVER OF THE BRITISH FORCES



Source: own elaboration

FIGURE 3. ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH COMMAND STRUCTURE (21 APRIL/14 JUNE 1982)



Source: The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol II.

over the Malvinas in the round of negotiations held in New York gave the first signs of a re-evaluation of the military option. In December 1981, Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, a member of the Military Junta,

ordered Vice Admiral Lombardo, who had just taken over as Commander of Naval Operations, to carry out preventive planning for the recovery of the Malvinas Islands, with the utmost secrecy.

Once completed, the plan was presented, and the initial feasibility was accepted with the naval means available, also pointing out that the defence of the Islands would require more



British ground commanders, planning the attack on Port Stanley. From left to right: Brigadier General J. Thompson, Major General J. Moore and Brigadier General A. Wilson. Wilson

in-depth studies. At that point the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been informed¹². The power disputes in the Military Junta made it necessary to reach an agreement to develop the plan and in the following months members of the Army and the Air Force joined the Working Commission set up for that purpose, but the contribution of means and troops to the operation was symbolic and would only be necessary once the

archipelago had been recovered when the amphibious incursion force withdrew. It was therefore decided that the operation to be carried out would be concurrent rather than joint.

This meant that the three forces would contribute resources and carry out successive and complementary but independent actions. This would make the whole appear as a single action, carried out jointly by the three forces, but

would avoid having to use common regulations, procedures, means and codes that did not exist¹³.

In mid-March 1982, once times had accelerated due to the scrap metal crisis in South Georgia,¹⁴ the Malvinas Theatre of Operations¹⁵ was created and, despite being an eminently naval area of operations, General Osvaldo García was appointed as commander, to give it greater institutional backing and a joint appearance. He was the commander of the 5th Army Corps, with responsibility for Patagonia.

General García, although he formed a General Staff, had a capacity of supervision and control over the deployed forces, limited and restricted to the Amphibious Task Force FT 40, because the overall plan was conceived,


12. Lombardo, J.J., *Malvinas: Errores, anécdotas...*, op.cit, p. 19.

13. Ibidem, p. 20.

14. Rattenbach Report (IR). Paragraph 150.

15. National Executive Decree 674/82 "S".

GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRE OF THE ARGENTINE FORCES



Source: own elaboration

All British landings were to take place on Soledad Island, proposals to land on the Greater Malvinas being rejected. The determination of the exact landing site on Solitude Island would depend on a number of factors, including the beaches and enemy deployment.

developed and executed mainly by the Naval Operations Command. Even Naval Task Force FT 60.1, which recovered the South Georgia Islands and was placed under his orders at the last minute to unify the operational command,¹⁶ escaped his real control, as did Naval Air Task Force FT 20, composed of the aircraft carrier 25 de Mayo, which had a covering mission and was not subordinate, but in support (see figure 4).

Once the Malvinas and South Georgia Islands were recovered, the initial objective of "Occupy in order to negotiate" was achieved. Popular support for the Military Junta's decision, United Nations Security

Council Resolution 502, passed on 3 April, and British intransigence to negotiate limited Ambassador Nicanor Costa Méndez's capacity for diplomatic manoeuvre and accelerated the timetable.¹⁷

On 4 April, General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was sworn in as military governor of the islands. For this task he set up a joint governing body, made up of secretaries from the different areas. General Daher, in charge of the land forces on the islands, drew up a plan and distributed the forces, as set out in Operations Order 1/82 Defence.¹⁸ (See Figure 5).


The British offensive reaction was immediate, and the lack of a

defence plan forced a review and reorganisation of the forces, leading to the creation of the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations¹⁹ which expanded the area of operations, for which Vice-Admiral Juan José Lombardo, who until then had been Commander of Naval Operations, was appointed commander. He had been mainly responsible for the initial planning, which is why he was aware of the development of the operations and to a certain extent the mass of the resources committed were naturally subordinate to him. General Ruiz and Brigadier Arnau were appointed as deputies.

Vice Admiral Lombardo, faced with the British offensive manoeuvre in progress and the absence of pre-established plans, had to draw up a new campaign plan, which was issued on 12 April²⁰. The plan assigned missions and tasks mainly to naval, naval air and search and rescue assets. Likewise, two naval commands were organised, one in South Georgia and the other in the South Sandwich Islands, and finally a joint command was set up in the Falkland Islands²¹.



Commanders of the Malvinas Theatre of Operations, after the recovery of the Malvinas Islands, from left to right: Brigadier L. Castellanos, Major General O. García, Rear Admiral C. Busser, Rear Admiral W. Allara and at the back General Daher. Allara and behind General Daher.

FIGURE 4 . INITIAL ORGANISATION OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND STRUCTURE (2 / 7 APRIL 1982)


Source: Rattenbach Report. Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.

In view of the tasks assigned to the land forces of the Malvinas Joint Command, it was decided to reinforce the troops already deployed with the X Mechanised Infantry Brigade, without taking their vehicles, but taking into account their characteristics as a main combat force. Also, its commander, General Oscar Jofre, was familiar with airmobile

operations as he had previously served as commander of Army aviation. The new operational plan also envisaged such a force.

The crisis generated by the recovery of the islands escalated with the British decision to send a powerful fleet to the South Atlantic, which forced the reorganisation of other operational commands, assigning forces from the rest of the country to be deployed in Patagonia, a region that became a strategic security zone, not only because of its proximity to the Malvinas Islands, but also because of its extensive border with Chile, with which there was still an unresolved conflict, creating a

situation that could favour British operations²².

In this sense, the 5th Army Corps assumed responsibility for the strategic security zone between the sea coast and the mountainous area bordering Chile. The III Infantry Brigade, based in Corrientes, was initially mobilised to this sector to reinforce it. Likewise, the IV Airborne Brigade was mobilised to Comodoro Rivadavia as a strategic military reserve.

The Strategic Air Command was assigned specific missions, which is why on 7 April it issued Operations Plan 2/82 "Maintenance of Sovereignty", which created the Air Transport Command and the

16. IR. Paragraph 259.

17. IR. Paragraphs 152 and 153.


18. Argentine Army (EA). Official Report of the Malvinas Conflict. 1983. Volume II.

19. Decree of the National Executive Power 700/82 "S".

20. EA. Informe Oficial del Conflicto Malvinas. 1983. Tomo II.

21. Ibidem.

22. Lombardo, *Malvinas: Errores...* op.cit., p. 55.

FIGURE 5. ORGANISATION OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND STRUCTURE (7 / 12 APRIL 1982)

Source: Rattenbach Report. Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.

Southern Air Force, assigning it the mass of air assets available in the country, distributing them to take-off air bases along the Patagonian coast²³.

Brigadier Ernesto Crespo was appointed commander of the Southern Air Force, formed his General Staff and issued an operations order clearly setting out the main tactical objectives (see Figure 6). Faced with the increase of forces in the Malvinas Islands, General Menéndez's initial government cabinet had to assume staff responsibilities. General Daher, who was with part of his units on the mainland, now a strategic security zone, was replaced by General Jofre

as commander of the land forces, who issued a full operations order on 15 April²⁴.


General Jofre did not change the initial defence concept, but deployed the entire brigade around Puerto Argentino as the most significant operational objective. Despite the concentration of resources, the 45-kilometre defensive perimeter was excessive, so he adopted a strongpoint defence on the surrounding key terrain and maintained the heliborne reserve. This, together with the mined obstacles, would channel British offensive attempts²⁵.

Despite the escalation of the conflict, negotiations continued,

but by 20 April Britain's refusal to talk was evident; this was compounded by the fighting in South Georgia, which made it necessary to review the Malvinas defensive position in view of the imminence of the fighting. General Galtieri visited the islands on 22 April and was informed of the need to increase the forces, since there was no adequate reserve to deal with a landing; he was also told of the need for commando troops.

In view of the urgency of the situation, the complete movement of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, which was deployed in Patagonia, was ordered and between 24 and 28 April, in a significant airlift effort,

GENERAL CONCEPT OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRE BY ARGENTINE FORCES



Source: own elaboration

it was possible to complete its transfer, but without the heavy material. The newly created 601²⁶ Commando Company also crossed over. General Omar Parada, who served as commander of the III Infantry Brigade, was a commando and had combat experience having led the 28th Infantry Regiment during Operation Independence in the Tucuman mountains.

With the arrival of a second brigade, the organisation of the Malvinas Joint Command was reformulated and a full staff was assigned to it, given that it would now coordinate two brigades and other formations, and General Daher²⁷, who had returned to the Islands, was appointed Chief of Staff. The restructuring of

the Malvinas Joint Command was issued on 25 April, forming two ad hoc organisations, the Agrupamiento Puerto Argentino on the basis of the X Mechanised Infantry Brigade, suitably reinforced, and the Agrupamiento Litoral on the basis of the III Infantry Brigade, reduced and disseminated into three task forces. The Malvinas Joint Command assumed direct control of other formations, but did not determine a reserve at its level, beyond what each grouping had at its disposal.

The III Brigade, now the Littoral Group, had already predetermined the places it was to occupy, assigning one regiment to Port Howard on Great Malvinas Island, another to Darwin and the rest joined the main effort in Port Stanley²⁸; it also added the 8th Infantry Regiment, positioned in Fox Bay. Despite being ordered to set up its command post in Darwin, it decided to locate it in Port Stanley, in order to be able to influence its dispersed elements in some way, using the airmobile reserve located there or with the close air support of the Air Force operating from the airport up to that time²⁹ (See Figure 7).

CV

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23. Ministry of Defence. Malvinas Report. 2012, pp. 34 and 38.

24. EA. Official Malvinas Conflict Report. 1983. Volume II.


25. Jofre, Oscar and Aguiar Felix. Malvinas, La Defensa of Puerto Argentino. Circulo Militar. Bs As. 1990, pp. 94 and 95.

26. EA. Informe Oficial del Conflicto Malvinas. Tomo I. 1983, pp. 34 y 35.

27. EA. Official Report of the Malvinas Conflict. Volume I. 1983, p. 34.

28. Argentine Army. Official Report on the Malvinas. Volume I. 1983. Page 35.

29. Parada, Omar E. Malvinas Llagas de una Guerra. Ed 1884. Bs As. 2012. Pag 255.

FIGURE 6 . ORGANISATION OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND STRUCTURE (13 / 24 APRIL 1982)

Source: Rattenbach Report. Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.


On 1 May, when the first bombing of Puerto Argentino took place, the organic development of the theatre of operations made it possible to respond to the initial attack, although it showed certain shortcomings due to the lack of coordination between the forces, as a result of the lack of joint integration³⁰. This led

to the downing of one of its own aircraft³¹.

On 2 May, the sinking of the cruiser ARA General Belgrano, and the lack of adequate anti-submarine capability, forced a rethink of the naval manoeuvre, effectively isolating the islands; from then on, only the air bridge kept them linked to the mainland.

However, the attack on HMS Sheffield on 4 May put some limits to the British advance; from then on there was a period of relative stability, with night bombing raids on the Port Stanley positions and raids by special forces reconnoitring landing beaches. On 15 May, the Calderón naval aerostation on Borbón Island was

FIGURE 7 . ORGANISATION OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND STRUCTURE (25 APRIL / 22 MAY 1982)



Source: Rattenbach Report. Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.

hit, which was the prelude to the amphibious operation, and on 21 May the expected landing at San Carlos took place.

With the objective fixed, efforts now had to converge. However, the operational structure prevented the flow of information. It was

30. Lombardo, *Malvinas: Errores*, op.cit., p. 20.
 31. Captain Gustavo García Cuerva, shot down by own fire when attempting to land in the Malvinas.

The British offensive reaction was immediate, and the lack of a defence plan forced a review and reorganisation of the forces, leading to the creation of the South Atlantic Theatre of Operations, which expanded the area of operations, for which Vice Admiral Juan José Lombardo was appointed commander. Juan José Lombardo, who until then had served as Commander of Naval as Commander of Naval Operations.

then that the need arose to set up a coordinating body at the highest level, which led to the creation on 23 May of the Joint Operations Centre -CEOPECON-, which began to operate physically in the city of Comodoro Rivadavia³².

Also, indications of British operations on the continent, such as the helicopter destroyed near Punta Arenas, led to the creation of this higher coordination body whose function was to integrate land, naval and air operations in the South Atlantic theatre of operations, including air, naval and naval air bases, military installations and logistical support points and any other place on the continent that could be the target of an enemy attack, as stated in its creation act.

CEOPECON was made up of Vice Admiral Lombardo - commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and highest representative of the Navy -, Major Brigadier Weber - strategic air commander and highest representative of the Air Force; and Major General García, commander of the 5th Army Corps in charge of the Strategic Security Zone and highest representative of the Army, who in turn had the final decision in case of dissent. It is remarkable to note how final authority shifted from the Navy to the Army after the withdrawal of naval surface assets and the preponderance of land operations

after the landing, transforming the land forces on the islands into the main instrument capable of preventing British success.

Likewise, this organisation contributed significantly in the last period of the conflict to coordinating logistical support and jointly integrating tactical operations, such as the attack on HMS Atlantic Conveyor, the auxiliary aircraft carrier and main logistical ship, whose sinking significantly affected the British plan. This operation, carried out on 25 May by the Super Etendards of the 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron, involved the participation of Air Force gunners, which enabled it to extend its range and attack from the north, an unexpected direction.

On May 30th, another joint operation was also conducted on the Invincible aircraft carrier, a target of operational magnitude. This time, the two Super Etendards of the 2nd Naval Fighter and Attack Squadron were joined by a squadron of A4C Skyhawks from Fighter Group 4, which now had to make a long indirect approach from the south, involving two in-flight refuelling, to reach the target from another unexpected direction. The operation was a success despite the downing of two aircraft³³. In less than two weeks, CEOPECON's performance yielded

positive results by effectively acting on important operational targets, as well as contributing to the determination of priorities for air transport, such as the transfer of the 602nd Commando Company, the Gendarmerie Special Forces Squadron, 155mm guns and the Exocet surface-to-sea missile launch system for coastal defence (see figure 8).

Conclusions


From the analysis carried out, we can highlight that, on the British side, the experience of the senior commanders, added to the gymnastics in forming organisations with the capacity to project to any part of the world, were decisive in achieving coherence and flexibility in the organisations. Despite the fact that initially there was no head close to the place where the operations were taking place, they were able to achieve an adequate integration that allowed them to achieve the objectives of the plan they had drawn up.

Likewise, although the general command of the fleet was the responsibility of Fieldhouse, the

³². Ministry of Defence. Malvinas Report. 2012, p. 27.

³³. History of the Argentine Air Force. Volume VI. Vol II "The Air Force in Malvinas", p. 450.

FIGURE 8 . ORGANISATION OF THE ARGENTINE COMMAND STRUCTURE (23 MAY / 14 JUNE 1982)



Source: Rattenbach Report. Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.

senior leadership was made up of a representative of the air force and another of the ground forces, which favoured maximum joint integration. On the Argentine side, the power disputes inherent to a collegiate body such as the Military Government Junta introduced this tension in the formation of the operational organisations, which were not established on the basis of the mission, but on the basis of the distribution of power. In this sense, the apparent integration was ineffective, superficial and lacked the trust necessary to interact. In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was transformed into a body that only reported the war through press releases.


Through this work, we can see that operational organisations are unique, they cannot be replicated, and three aspects must be taken into account in their formation: firstly, the organisational culture

of the forces that comprise them; secondly, the proposed purpose; and finally, they must be flexible to adapt to the evolution of the operations underway, which will shape their most appropriate form in order to achieve ultimate success. Lastly, in the constitution of these organisations, the theoretical and conceptual considerations must not be overlooked, regardless of the level of leadership, since a failure to determine a function, task or command relationship has serious consequences due to its influence on operations.

As an example, at the tactical level, the Condor Air Base created in Darwin by the Air Force had security elements, and until the end of April, Company C of the 25th Infantry Regiment was assigned to it as the airmobile reserve of the army component. However, when the 12th Infantry Regiment

was detached and the Mercedes Task Force was created, the Air Base continued to depend on the air component of the joint command in the Malvinas, an aspect that was negative during the fighting in Darwin and Goose Green, from 27 to 29 May; In the absence of a command unit, the military garrison did not achieve the necessary coordination of the available resources to successfully confront the British attack.

At the operational level, the configuration of the theatre of operations and its dependent organisations has direct consequences on the development of combat; the experience of the Malvinas War obliges us to be detailed in this sense and to maintain control and supervision over these organisations, permanently evaluating their performance and effectiveness in pursuit of the objective set. ■



UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUALS AND THE MILITARY, WHAT DID WE (NOT) MAKE OF OUR MALVINAS WAR?

By **ROSANA GUBER**

Keywords:

- > Malvinas War
- > University intellectuals
- > Military intellectuals
- > Interpretative frameworks

Abstract

This article presents a reflection on the three interpretative frameworks from which university and military intellectuals in Argentina have understood the Malvinas War against the United Kingdom in 1982.

This text presents how these frameworks gave and still give meaning to what happened then, the reasons for their extraordinary validity and, also, the limitations that derive from them at the moment of approaching the investigation of the event and, particularly, the understanding of its two novelties: being the only international conflict of the 20th century in which our country was the main contender, and being the only international war in which Argentina participated and which included Argentine conscripts. Here we offer some hypotheses about the limitations and derivations of these interpretative frameworks¹.

In these pages I am presenting some observations resulting from my work on part of what we call “Malvinas” in our country. Since 1989, that is, seven years after the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Malvinas and South Atlantic Islands in 1982, I have been trying to understand what we Argentines made of an event that brought at least two novelties: it was the only international war in which Argentina participated as the main contender during the entire twentieth century, and it was the only international war in which Argentine

1. This text is a reworking of the conference of the same name presented at the symposium “40 years after the Malvinas conflict: Strategic, operational and tactical reflections”. CEFAA - Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces - Joint War College. CABA, 24 May. I thank the director of the Joint War College, Brig. Fernando Valentich, and Colonels Alberto Aparicio and Juan Carlos Marossero, as well as Dr. Eliana de Arrascaeta, for this invitation. I am also deeply grateful for the careful reading of Héctor D. Tessey, Alejandra Barrutia and Daniel Chao.



REFEREED ARTICLE

The climate of unity among Argentines showed that the Malvinas gesture appeared to be a successful political initiative. The population immediately understood that it had to support its forces in the islands, and it did so on behalf of its sons, the soldiers.

conscript soldiers participated together with their Armed Forces since the creation of the Compulsory Military Service in 1901.

During these years I undertook several investigations trying to take advantage of the theoretical concepts of my discipline, social anthropology, and the methodological approach that social anthropologists call “ethnography”, the study in situ of ways of feeling, acting and thinking different from those we are used to, and letting ourselves be guided by our interlocutors instead of imposing our points of view and our notions.

The art of ethnography is precisely to learn to understand other human groups and their perspectives on life, past and experience. To do this we need those same people to tell us how to get to know them, what and how to ask, what and how to observe and listen, what and how to record. I graduated with a degree in Anthropology in 1981 from the University of Buenos Aires and began researching in a team that investigated the problems of the slums.

Precisely on that Friday 2 April in the Villa Tranquila in Avellaneda, I heard on the radio at Doña Silveria's house that the islands had been recovered. In 1986 I decided to go to the United States to do a doctorate in anthropology, to begin to understand what the Malvinas had been for the Argentines. It

was not enough for me to have been a contemporary of those 74 days. I needed a certain distance from what was usually said on the subject and also from my own academic environment. In short, my research career coincided with these post-Malvinas war years and with 39 years of hard-fought democracy. Shortly before the first decade, I began my “fieldwork”, that is, I began to see the faces of those who had been there, to talk to them and, sometimes, to ask.

Why this personal-historical introduction? Because no one can know from nowhere. People tend to think within our time and from our society. This is not because the era and society impose a homogeneous way of thinking, but because people, also researchers, think from the questions and debates that are generated in our time.

Also, from the silences. To put it more academically, our interpretative frameworks are oriented towards solving problems that mark the societies of our times. For this reason, we cannot ask just any question, but the one we consider significant according to the axes of discussion or debate that are the backbone of our social group of belonging. It is not just any debate, but the one we consider relevant, necessary, even urgent. From here, we formulate certain questions which, in turn, enable us to open up a certain range of

answers. I will now present what I identify as our main interpretative frameworks for thinking about the Malvinas and how they have affected our understanding and our research into what happened in 1982.

My thesis is that in these 40 years intellectuals, mainly but not only academics, have tended to moralise the debate on Malvinas and, in this way, we have closed the research questions to a very few possible ones. Thus, we forced ourselves to think and debate in a framework relegating the subject of the war to the informal sphere of the corridors and common sense.

The reader may believe that there are tons written on the subject, but I would like to show that the frameworks we adopted over these four decades were basically the same, and that the two most important ones were pre-1982. Consequently, in general, we produced texts in which we overlooked the two novelties I referred to at the beginning of this article: that the Malvinas was the only war of an international character in which Argentina was the main contending country and the only one in which conscripts participated.

If interpretative frameworks allow us to ask questions and give answers within certain possible ranges, the reasoning becomes circular. This leads to two diseases that are often lethal



to research (and to the objects we study): knowing what will be found and concluding without new questions. My proposal is that the dominant positions for discussing the Malvinas War in Argentine research are considered according to established moralities that are assumed to be independent of history and political conjuncture. It was precisely the proximity and even dependence and subordination to those conjunctures that drowned this field of study in predictable and closed reasoning.

A cause with history

By 1982, the Malvinas issue was a pending territorial sovereignty issue that was already highly politicised, that is, present in society and the political system as an instrument or resource of power. This politicisation had gone through different stages of the organisation of the nation and had two particularities: its continuity, since all governments since 1833

had demanded the return of the islands occupied by a small British naval force, and its plurality, because such continuity was made possible by the active intervention of politically opposed sectors.

Thus, Malvinas did not only exist in the silent and secretive domains of Argentine diplomacy, but also in the public arena. This was discovered by intellectuals of very different affiliations and origins, who began to support the Malvinas issue as a matter of state and as a national and popular cause. Becoming a national and popular cause meant introducing it as a “problem” dear to Argentines.

It is often said that we learned about Malvinas in primary school. Probably, but I am not sure it was because it was part of the school curriculum. In fact, it is difficult to find references to the history of its occupation, first by the French, then by the Spanish and then by the River Plate. The Argentine presence and the subsequent British occupation do not appear as topics in textbooks

CV

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or history courses. Only the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and the Antarctic sector appear on maps.

The impact of the school on the development of the Malvinas issue is parallel to the early literacy of the Argentine population, which coincides with the progressive involvement of intellectuals who talked about the Malvinas, British colonialism and Argentine rights. The issue of the British occupation of the Malvinas Islands reached society through the written word in newspapers and periodicals, books and magazines, small volumes of popular history and political essays.

Several of those texts were published on patriotic dates (in 1910, on the occasion of the centenary of 1810, Paul Groussac) and allusive to the loss of the islands and economic sovereignty (for example, 1934, a year after the Roca Runciman Treaty and the centenary of 1833). Thus, by 1982, although without much detail, Argentina's rights to the South Atlantic

archipelagos were well known in this country. Consequently, by the time news of the recovery of the islands arrived on 2 April 1982, "everyone knew" that "the Malvinas are Argentine", that they were occupied by "England" and that they should be recovered.

That consensus gave rise, after 2 April, to what anthropologists call *communitas*, an era of unity, equality and fraternity, a parenthesis of deep and genuine solidarity and national integration. However, as anthropologists also know, the primacy of *communitas* must come to an end at some point. In this case it lasted 74 days.

The strange thing about this concord is that it took place under an authoritarian regime or, as we say in Argentina, "the last military dictatorship". It was the self-styled National Reorganisation Process which, before 2 April, was already unpopular due to the oscillating economic policy, political closure and, finally, humanitarian reasons. To reiterate a well-known fact in

the commentaries of the time, three days earlier, the police had harshly repressed a large trade union march that had the support of the whole of the still outlawed political parties.

The explicit slogan was "Peace, Bread and Work"; the implicit slogan was for political openness. 2 April arrived and the prisoners of 30 March, including the secretary general of the CGT, were released to celebrate the territorial recovery. The climate of unity among Argentines showed that the Malvinas gesture appeared to be a successful political initiative.

The population immediately understood that it had to support its forces in the islands, and did so in the name of its sons, the soldiers. Support was reinforced in demonstrations and contributions when the war began on 1 May. However, it would be hasty and simplistic to read popular, public and enthusiastic support as support for that administration, as Sofia Vassallo and Juan Natalizio's research shows².



The recovery of the Malvinas enjoyed enormous political and military legitimacy at home and abroad. And this was in 1982, that is, after the fateful years of what some call "dirty war", "war against subversion" and others "state terrorism". However, as is evident, recognising the legitimacy of the recovery by the armed forces and standing behind them on the battlefield was not seen as contradictory.

When General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri, who presided over the military junta, stepped out onto the balcony of the Casa Rosada, the seat of the national executive branch, he was not applauded by the crowd gathered in the Plaza de Mayo for his person or his investiture, but for the landing on Isla Soledad. Certainly, it is difficult to imagine how someone portrayed as politically basic by his contemporaries could have avoided getting "dizzy" in a scenario more typical of other times, and inaugurated as a political site alongside the origins of Peronism. In 1982, the general had to listen to some of the assembled sectors cheering Perón and the Malvinas, not the military in the government, but the military in the Malvinas.

The news of the Argentine arrival at Port Stanley (Puerto Argentino) aroused the population's perplexity at first, then enthusiasm, and political, material and human support from then on until the afternoon of the Argentine surrender on 14th June. The recovery had the almost absolute consensus of the Argentine population resident in the country, including the political prisoners who volunteered to go to the front and the political prisoners who offered their blood for the wounded.

There was also the support of the Argentine population living abroad, particularly the exiles, mostly intellectuals, who in their public statements were at pains to distinguish their support for the anti-colonial recovery from their support for the regime. For their part, the leaders of all the political parties, despite the ban, went to different countries to explain to the governments with which they had ideological affinity the Argentine decision... not that of "the dictatorship". In short, the recovery of the Malvinas enjoyed enormous political-military legitimacy inside and outside the country.

This was in 1982, after 1976 and 1977, the dark years of what some call "dirty war", "war against subversion" and others "state terrorism". However, and as is evident in the "offerings" of political prisoners and exiles to national and anti-colonial unity, recognising the legitimacy of the recovery by the armed forces and standing behind them on the battlefield was not experienced as contradictory.

The thoughts and proposals came after 14th June, with Argentina's defeat by Great Britain and with the "Monday paper" in hand. From then on, talk of "the Malvinas adventure" began, the climate of *communitas* came to an

end and another stage began. There was too much to explain (or justify), not only on the part of the military in government or, rather, leaving it, but also on the part of all those who had participated and, therefore, had made that venture of unity possible. Of course, not all sectors did so.

The Malvinas Paradox

The post-war period was beginning and, at the same time, the political end of the "Process". The oral reflections and texts published in the media and magazines tried to resolve the dismay, anger and even surprise at the defeat, seeking to identify "the guilty parties". Obviously, all the blame fell on the perpetrators of the political-military initiative, that is, on those who had held military and political power: the owners of the regime that had been in power since 24th March 1976.

However, it is one thing to be the author of the initiative and the movement of troops, their logistics and the strategic planning that affects tactical development, and quite another to be the sole political protagonists of such an event. And while the concentration of political

2. Juan Natalizio and Sofia Vassallo are members of the Malvinas Observatory of the National University of Lanús.

The Malvinas issue paradox goes like this: a national and popular cause, considered just and anti-colonial by the Argentine people, was taken up by a dictatorial, unpopular and anti-popular regime. In the form of a question, the paradox said: Could a national and popular cause, considered just and anti-colonial by the Argentine people, be taken up by a dictatorial regime?

and military power was not new for the Argentines, this time its limits of action had been extended as never before, to the point of crossing borders (including Chile, a quasi-war that remained in that country's memory as more than just a mere memory).

The news of 2nd April initially aroused great perplexity because days earlier the regime had repressed Argentines in the streets. Now it was taking back the Islands with an anti-colonial preaching more typical of the sectors it had confronted. That same perplexity returned, in the form of a question/accusation, as soon as the outcome of the conflict became known and was expressed in the form of a paradox which, in my opinion, presents the problematic knot of the Argentine relationship with the 1982 war conflict.

The Malvinas issue paradox goes like this: a national and popular cause, considered just and anti-colonial by the Argentine people, was taken up by a dictatorial, unpopular and anti-popular regime. In the form of a question, the paradox said: Could a national and popular cause, considered just and anti-colonial by the Argentine people, be taken up by a dictatorial regime?

A paradox is a statement with two terms that are in contradiction, that are incompatible. But the

particularity of the paradox is that this contradiction is apparent. That is why paradoxes are interesting: they move us to think about the contradiction and to rearrange its terms, that is, they invite us to debate whether the contradiction between the terms is real or supposed. This has several derivations because it forces us to evaluate what has happened, our own position in its course and possible future courses of action. That is, as long as we keep the two components in relation, that is, we do not discard either of the two elements of the statement and, above all, its challenging articulation.

As we shall see below in the prevailing positions with which we have tried to explain the war conflict, we Argentines have ignored one of the two terms and, therefore, the meaning of their apparent contradiction. We did it in two ways, at the beginning, and added another, at the post-war 25. For example:

Argentina's surrender, technically called "capitulation", to Britain immediately gave rise to two positions that tried to resolve the paradox in order to situate themselves (the speaker and their political and/or social sector) in the face of what had happened (the enthusiasm for war) and what was

to come (the fall of the "Proceso", the elections and the occupation of posts in the new democratic administration). The first two positions were born at the end of the war but took up some of the assertions of the pre-war period. Although the validity of each has continued to the present day, they have been revitalised at different national political junctures.

A first line understands that everything is justified if the unredeemed lands are recovered, regardless of the political persuasion of the government that carries it out. Given that the islands were re-occupied by Britain, it is necessary to continue to uphold the Malvinas issue as just, because talking about the incapacity and delegitimisation of the third junta (Galtieri-Anaya-Lami Dozo) only supports the British argument. Thus, beyond the mistakes made by the national political-strategic leadership, the recovery is worthwhile. The Argentine military, including its soldiers, put up a tough fight.

This vision began to be made public in 1987 with the uprising of middle and junior army officers against their General Staff and, in fact, against the National Executive (the media called the rebels "carapintadas"). The uprising called for support for the institutional

authority of the army in the face of the growing number of trials for crimes against humanity, but in the meeting between President Alfonsín and the officers at the Campo de Mayo garrison in Buenos Aires province, the experience of some of them on the Islands took on an unexpected significance. After the parley, the president returned to Plaza de Mayo and from the usual balcony of the Casa Rosada declared the Easter Week conflict closed. It was nightfall on Sunday 19 April and at the opening of his speech President Raúl Alfonsín said that some of the rebels were “heroes of the Malvinas”.

This line of interpretation, which in other publications I have called “heroic”, had a diverse political presence, and despite its ups and downs came to occupy second place in Argentina’s main province, Buenos Aires. However, it should be made clear that this relationship between political conjuncture and interpretative line with respect to the Malvinas in 1987 did not mean

that the heroic line was generated by the uprising.

Strictly speaking, its basis of argument was the same as that held by most Argentines in their support for the 1982 recovery. With nuances, this position is shared by many war veterans, both conscript and military. The second line of interpretation affirms that Malvinas was a new victimisation of Argentines, embodied in the conscripts, by the armed forces. Accustomed to persecuting unarmed civilians, they tortured the soldiers, fled the battlefield and surrendered the square to the British.

This line, which I called “dictatorial”, maintains, like its opposite, that the Malvinas issue is a national and just sovereignty issue, but claims that the war was “a deathblow by the genocidal dictatorship”, with dark and petty purposes: to perpetuate itself in power. This line of reasoning began to be put forward almost immediately after the defeat and prevailed during the democratic

transition, subsided with the uprising of 1987 and resurfaced since 2003, especially in academic and university circles, and occupied some national state leadership. Its revitalisation accompanied the new series of trials for crimes against humanity, trying, unsuccessfully, to convict officers who were on the islands.

Twenty-five years later, in 2007, some voices appeared that changed the axis of the argument, saying that sustaining the foreign policy issue of the Malvinas issue as if it were a national and popular cause brings us more problems than solutions, and is appropriated by populist governments and authoritarian sectors, as in 1982.

What should be dealt with is the diplomatic issue in a way that does not affect Argentina’s insertion in the world market. This position is claimed by some intellectuals who have aligned themselves with the opposition to Peronism in the 21st century.

The first two lines are the most widespread and are developed in



a speculative relationship. The recovery is due to the military function of the Armed Forces, for the first, and the loss of the islands is due to the political function of the Armed Forces, for the second. The Armed Forces fought, according to the former; the Armed Forces did not fight, according to the latter. The soldiers were fighters, for the former; the soldiers were boys tortured and abandoned by their superiors, for the latter. Every opposition of this kind hides a coincidence which is its object in dispute and which both values. Although it exceeds the limits of these pages and the strict time frame of the war, it could be offered as a hypothesis that both lines compete in claiming the ability to defend the homeland and represent the unity of the nation.

In any case, intellectuals entered the conflict from one of these positions, which inevitably affected the type of research questions and the possible range of conclusions. Post-dictatorship interpretative

positions or frameworks are stated in moral terms: the heroic, the dictatorial, the abusive, the courageous, and so on. When interpretative frameworks are posited as moralities that authorise or deny what can be said, questioned, thought and enunciated, there is no academic discussion, no knowledge, only confirmation. Empirical research ends up being subsidiary to the moral statement; it matters that the conclusions coincide with certain lines of thought or, as it is often said, with certain theory. It is worth remembering that theory allows us to understand, and that without concepts and theoretical approaches there is no research.

But it is also true that subordinating oneself to theory before, or despite, the data coming from the field leads to elaborations where researchers make “reality” say what they want it to say beforehand. When it comes to the Malvinas this turn resembles dogmatism and exoticisation.

Shattering the apparent contradiction

For more than a century anthropologists have been analysing the phenomenon whereby some humans are regarded as utterly different because their behaviour, norms and values are unintelligible to us. Based on our studies, we have tried to show that, even when they do not obey the moral dictates of European civilisation, so-called “savage” or “barbaric” peoples have order, coherence, logic and history.

Indeed, the point is that the recognition of this “Other” as exotic denounces the existence of a social relation, for no one is exotic per se, but from the one who has so labelled him or her. Exoticisation has expressed these relations at the global and regional level. But there are also exotics at the national level. Wars are powerful sources of exoticisation. The enemy is always portrayed as an unprincipled and unmoral other, even if he is an old acquaintance, as the Russian indictment of alleged Ukrainian Nazism shows.



At that time, the national cause and the dictatorship were not perceived as irreconcilable, not even by "enemies" of the regime, such as exiled intellectuals and political prisoners. All of them postponed their objections to the government while stressing the justice of the anti-colonial measure, and took up the war emergency, accompanying the regime's political-military decision by means of mass mobilisations towards the public squares and, also, towards the war.

In wars, people and combatants are exoticised. After 14 June (only after 14 June!), the armed forces became a favourite target of exoticisation for civil society and for some political sectors that inhabited, especially, university academia. It was from these spheres that the Malvinas paradox remained in force throughout these 40 years. Let us return to it.

A popular and national cause for a pending sovereignty issue undertaken by a dictatorial regime. First, it would be very easy to demonstrate that there is no reason why a dictatorial regime should be prevented from occupying unredeemed territories and, at the same time, being celebrated by its people. The cases are innumerable in the past and present. The case of the Malvinas is one of them. The popular cause and the dictatorial government went together and were received together, because that is how the popular reaction was expressed from the moment they heard of the territorial recovery. However, at that time the national cause and the dictatorship were not perceived as irreconcilable, not even by "enemies" of the regime, such as exiled intellectuals and political prisoners.

All of them postponed their objections to the government while highlighting the justice of the anti-colonial measure, and took on board the war emergency, accompanying the regime's political-military decision by means of mass mobilisations in public squares and, also, towards the war. But, as we have already pointed out, this accompaniment was neither automatic nor unconditional, because the people, the masses or whatever one prefers to call the multitude gathered in public spaces, did not support the military in their political function, but in their military function.

This conditionality allowed for a rapid change of position as soon as the surrender was known (what many call "exitismo", an adjective that does not seem to apply to the "loyalty" observed during 17 years of political proscription and exile of another military man: Juan Domingo Perón).

In this climate, the military returned from the islands to their units, and the troops to their homes and villages. From 15 June 1982, civilian attention focused on regime change and political openness, on the one hand, and on the soldiers returning from the front, on the other.

Former soldiers were the only direct protagonists of the war who would not be held responsible for the defeat. They represented the "people in arms" and the nation, as established by the 1901 Compulsory Military Service Act. This was stipulated in Article 21 of the National Constitution, which considered conscription a civic duty whereby "every Argentine citizen is obliged to arm himself in defence of the homeland and this Constitution, in accordance with the laws passed by Congress and the decrees of the National Executive".

And the soldiers had complied. But their political power as former soldiers came from having represented civil society, the people, on the battlefield. During the Argentine presence on the Islands, the collections were for them, as were the letters, the declarations of the trade unions and the political parties. The treatment was different for the officers and NCOs who were doing what they had been trained for, the war. The special attention was for "the sons of the workers and the Argentine people" who were now defending the sovereignty recovered in the South Atlantic. Of course, after 14

Throughout these 40 years, the former soldiers tended to be listened to and interpreted from considerations that were not warlike but political-repressive, from a scenario of internal, not international, conflict.

June things changed: the armed forces were now accountable to the public.

When it was all over, the soldiers returned to their family and neighbourhood networks, to their communities and to their cities, towns and villages. It is often said that they did not want to talk because of the traumas of war or because of the pledge of silence signed in the confinement centres prior to discharge. It is possible, although it is hard to believe that such an institutional commitment to discredited forces would have been honoured to the letter and in all cases: did none of the thousands of young men who were able to return tell their parents, brothers and cousins, friends or girlfriends anything about their experience? What also happened was that, as they began to recount their experiences, the new arrivals found themselves strangely surprised by those who were waiting for them. And the reciprocal.

Neither they knew how to talk, nor their families, companions and neighbours knew how to listen to them. Whether out of fear that remembering would hurt them, or because of the superficial, banal or just plain stupid questions (did you kill? were you hungry? were you cold?), the basic incomprehension of the fact of war was evident. The interpretative frameworks discussed above were an important

part of the attempts to understand what had happened, both for those who were conscripted and for their contemporaries on the continent.

Meanwhile, in those early years, former soldiers began to be heard by social scientists in the universities of the new democratic era. For a long time, ex-soldiers were the only socially and politically acceptable interlocutors for sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and social workers. These young people had new experiences and had fought and suffered alongside those soldiers.

But this understanding held only during the interviews. When it came to interpreting the data and writing the monograph, report or thesis, it was necessary to adopt a certain interpretative framework accepted in the academy at the time. This framework referred to crimes against humanity and state terrorism. From this perspective, soldiers who had fought in the South Atlantic, especially on land against British forces, ended up being characterised as “abused” by their superiors in an internal political-military conflict.

Interpreting the Malvinas war as a clandestine insular detention camp - the interpretative framework I called dictatorial - evaporated the fact of war, while the soldiers began to be portrayed outside the war and the military structure that had trained them,

taken them to the islands and, in many cases, thanks to which they were able to return alive. The soldiers were turned into young men tortured by agents of the terrorist state, unrelated to their military function.

Thus, disciplinary sanctions, logistical deprivation, the rigours of the sub-Antarctic climate, starvation, the obvious physical and psychological wounds of each person, all came to feed the incrimination of “the military”, rather than the visualisation of the rigours of war. This certainly does not remove responsibility for the strategic plotting and logistical improvisation that affected some units. But many of the ex-soldiers who claim victimisation of their own superiors, as a distinctive feature of their role in the Malvinas, do not and did not then have the elements to attribute their failings to the omnipotent decision of their superiors, to the British encirclement and advance, and to the basic discipline of any operational unit.

For this reason, and throughout these 40 years, former soldiers tended to be listened to and interpreted from considerations that were not warlike but political-repressive, from a scenario of internal, not international, conflict. Under the influence of university intellectuals, the Malvinas war became a supplementary issue to



the great thematic star of the Social Sciences in Argentina until the end of the 1990s: “human rights”, humanitarian organisations and the disappeared.

Far from deserving attention, the war ended up being pulverised along with the two novelties that 1982 brought us: the only international war in which Argentina was a contending country, and the only war in which conscripts participated on an international battlefield alongside its Armed Forces. In this act of conceptual magic, two central actors in the war drama disappeared from our research: the Argentine professional military in its defence role, and the British enemy.

However, the military world also had its intellectuals. The military world also had its intellectuals and academics. What happened to them? The first analytical and systematic contribution to the war was made by the six retired military officers who produced the research known as the “Rattenbach Report”, so named by its chairman, General Benjamín Rattenbach. Its official name is the CAERCAS Report, the

Commission for the Analysis and Evaluation of Responsibilities in the South Atlantic Conflict.

The report was requested by the fourth junta of the “Proceso” and its president, General Bignone. When the work was completed, its materials, testimonies and elaborations were closed to the public and classified as “secret” “until effective sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is achieved” (Decree 2971/83). That is, sine die. In the meantime, the offices of each Force produced some institutional reports with data from spreadsheets and administrative records. The Army’s two-volume “blue cover” report is a chronological account of the events, with numerous annexes containing maps, tables and diagrams.

The Navy has reports by weapon, such as Admiral Martini’s volume³ on naval aviation in the Malvinas, which includes different versions of the same event by its protagonists. The first interpretative and comprehensive work on this Force belonged to Admiral Mayorga. The

first edition of his book *No Vencido*⁴ gave an account of decisions, planning and improvisation in this complex and diverse military institution, but was seized from the sales stands.

After being corrected, it was republished. Brigadier Rubén Moro’s aeronautical report remained almost intact in its transformation from institutional publication to popular volume, although the title of the latter, *La guerra inaudita*⁵, is critical of the force that went to war with political decisiveness and little preparation and equipment for waging war in a naval air scenario. Except for the relentless Rattenbach Report, which is restricted to the political and strategic level, none of these comprehensive works critically reviews the actions of the institution itself. Since neither the army nor the navy had institutional

3. Martini, Héctor (1992). *Historia de la Aviación Naval Argentina Tomo III*. Buenos Aires.

4. Mayorga, Horacio (1998). *No Vencidos*. Buenos Aires. Editorial Planeta.

5. Moro, Rubén (1996). *La Guerra inaudita*. Editorial Pleamar.

interpretative reports, the task was left to senior officers, heads of units such as the ARA General Belgrano cruiser and Marine Infantry Battalion 5 in the navy, and Infantry Regiment 7, Infantry Regiment 12, III Infantry Brigade, Artillery Group 3 in the army.

In 1093 crew members, Ganso Verde, from the Front and Llagas of a war, among others, show us what happened in the campaign and in the fighting, and how the respective authors justify the decisions taken during events. The soldiers, for their part, first appeared thanks to journalism, which cut out which segments of their stories could be “more interesting” to the public. The soldiers and young NCOs who decided to reconstruct their war experiences in writing did not always have professional and adequate interpretative frameworks to account for the course of the war and their hardships.

In general, these works recount what happened to each individual and from the limited perspective of one's own position in the field, up to

the climax of the fighting, then the return and some reflections. Almost all of these publications include an account of Argentine claims to the islands, which confirms the author's perception of his legitimate presence in the theatre of operations.

It is quite understandable that in military careers, especially in the first two post-war decades, officers have refrained from expressing critical perspectives on what happened in 1982. And this is not only because of the silence imposed by successive commanders. The senior commanders of the Forces left the government and, over time, lost the power they had held in the past.

Prestige, too, in the face of legal proceedings for crimes against humanity. To state a critical perspective by a career officer, who was also a war veteran, could give rise to misinterpretations by both superiors and comrades. Any ambiguity could be interpreted as “going over to the other side” (I am not referring to the British), all this during successive legal proceedings

“for crimes against humanity committed in the Malvinas” and, since 2007, for crimes against humanity committed in the Malvinas.

Constantly on the defensive vis-à-vis the civilian political world, and with the Code of Military Justice extinguished in 2007, most veteran officers tried to avoid confusion. It all depended on whether the institution enabled its members to think, analyse and speak openly, narrowly or not at all. But the enabling was very narrow, and the Forces left little room for joint analysis and self-analysis, i.e., for study and review of what had been done that could lead to a thorough critique of the superior leadership of both the other military institutions and their own.

After a long time of talking to officers, I learned that they are the ones who are most aware of the mistakes, some of which were made at the time, others due to ineptitude and lack of foresight, others due to bad faith, just as they are also the ones who know the right things, the things done well, the courageous



We concentrate on the internal matter, discussing whether or not the Armed Forces were the legitimate leaders and representatives of the Nation, that is, whether or not they were its legitimate defenders, whether or not they defended the people who gave them their children, as well as the moral, political and material support to defend the national territory.

acts, “doing one's duty”. They are the ones who know when a decoration was deserved and when it was not.

We owe them our share of the debt

This is by the way a somewhat sketchy overview and is intended to be provocative enough to appeal to different kinds of readers. It is true that there are always lone strands that make attempts to break through in one direction or another. Also, in the case of Malvinas. But they are just that, solitary and often unheeded and silent threads that can emerge on round dates, as in these 40 years. The two lines of interpretation that have accompanied us until now and that continue to dominate the debate on these issues stand as speculative versions representing civilian and military academia.

Despite systematically avoiding each other, civilian academics and military intellectuals have maintained a mutually defensive and incriminating relationship. This axis keeps us stuck and prevents us from thinking about the warlike and international nature of that war. We prefer to concentrate on internal matters, discussing whether the Armed Forces were the legitimate leaders and representatives of the Nation, that is, whether they were its legitimate defenders, whether they defended the people who gave them their children, as well as the moral,

political and material support to defend the national territory. For university academics, the soldiers were the victims of state terrorism on the islands.

For military academics, the soldiers were as misunderstood combatants as the officers and NCOs who took part. Both lack passion, both lack analysis. The military defeat and the change in the final objective a few days after 2 April are as undeniable as the wartime performance of numerous military units.

Today, 40 years after the Malvinas (and 39 years after another recovery, that of democracy), it is extremely difficult not to associate these reflections with the conditions facing the Armed Forces and the non-existent (or unknown) Defence policy.

Neither the first nor the second line of interpretation that we have presented tells only truths, nor even lies. But this confusion is not resolved by legislating on the past, but by trying to understand it. Perhaps the conditions under which the Argentine state was organised in 1982 are not too different from those of 2022. Perhaps it is not a question of governments, but of state construction and functioning. In this sense, the third and last interpretative line we pointed out above only wants to address the sovereignty issue and confine it to the diplomatic milieu, while

trying to banish the national and popular cause as an instrument of retrograde nationalism (or populism).

No matter how well-intentioned it may be, this new turn faces several difficulties. The most serious is probably the fact that we Argentines have fallen in 1982 who went to war to defend a territory that the Argentine Republic claims as its own; that they did so as members of national institutions that, whether we like it or not, were made up of sons and daughters of our entire country; and that no social or political sector of the time protested the use of conscripts for defence.

This is made clear by the popular commemorations of this year 2022 and the popular donations to the front. Death in war always carries with it a mystique that is watered and grows, in many cases, with the families and offspring, the “bereaved” of those who have fallen. This is neither good nor bad, it is not nationalistic, retrograde or revolutionary. It is and happens where wars have occurred, perhaps in every corner of the globe. As intellectuals we could concentrate on bravely assuming the payment of our debt, make our own self-criticism and begin to study the Malvinas as our only international war of the 20th century and the only one in which conscripted soldiers participated. ■



VISION COMJUNTA, A VIEW TO 2050 FROM THE ESGC'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND SENIOR LEADERSHIP COURSE

By BM(R) **ALEJANDRO MORESI**

In the year 2021, the ESGC's Advanced Course in Military Strategy and Senior Management had to solve a long-term military strategy problem that in the situation was posed as a requirement of the National Strategy that demanded answers about the future, so it had to immerse itself in strategic uncertainty for its resolution. Here is the problem:

The Strategic Planning area was asked to propose actions to optimise the strategic situation for the period 2030 - 2050 in the Antarctic and South Atlantic area, based on three problems detected by the national strategy, which foresees at least three working hypotheses. The aspects to be resolved in the case of Argentina are as follows:

- > Characteristics of the future conflict
- > Scenarios - Strategic environment.
- > Use of the "proxy" concept for the confrontation in the South Atlantic (positions and actors involved).
- > Capabilities required of the Argentine Military Instrument (IMA) for the cases:
- > Neutrality
- > Strategic confluence with one of the two powers, Eastern or Western.
- > Proposed general requirements

for other branches of government.

A summary of the conclusions of the work were as follows:

SCENARIOS

Overview of the 2050 environment

Global technological innovation will constitute the main form of competition between actors and future conflicts in 2050, affecting the nature of military applications and influencing military and national strategy. Globally, technological innovators will be inclined to engage in science and technology; revolutionary creations may occur largely outside the state sector and, even more so, because of fortuitous adaptations and combinations of existing technology and state-of-the-art industrial processes.

The cognitive domain will be the space of military rivalry in 2050, more important than the other domains (land, sea, air, cyber and space). Warfare in this cognitive domain will mobilise a wide and different range of military strategies, tools and techniques, and the legal and jurisdictional structures of state competition will be put to the test.

From the statistics analysed in recent decades, conflicts between the armed forces of states have been decreasing; internal or civil wars are more involved. In contrast to what happened during the Cold

War, the world context is one of multipolar competition between the main global powers such as the US, China and Russia.

The environment would present ambiguous characteristics, such as the absence of ideologies and geographically differentiated blocs like the divisions seen in the last century. It would also be highly globalised, containing multi-directional alliance systems, with deterrence and multi-layered defence functions. The technological and economic divide will have a high likelihood of becoming geostrategic divisions.

In this sense, the revision of the **Antarctic Treaty** system in 2048 would have an impact on Argentina's national interests. In addition to this, the strategic-military chessboard of the **South Atlantic** scenario would take on greater prominence due to its geostrategic position and associated natural resources.

Argentina's probable scenario

In the study of possible scenarios for Argentina in 2050, the following variables and indicators were considered, which, for the sake of brevity, are not developed in this article:

- > Types of conflicts.
- > Strategic conduct of defence.
- > Evolution of defence investment.
- > Projected military capabilities.

In terms of technological progress in recent years, there has been exponential growth, with Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and Data Mining at the forefront.

> Impact of advancing technology.

From the analysis and integration of these drivers, we can see a trend towards an environment that is perceived as **unfavourable** for Argentina. If this tendency and possible future scenarios continue, the Military Instrument would not be capable, both in terms of resources and in the strategic management of defence, of facing the possible new challenges to come in the second half of the 21st century.

The work was approached for an environment in the year 2050 in the geographical area comprising Patagonia, Argentina's jurisdictional waters and continental shelf, the Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina, and the archipelagos and jurisdictional waters of the Southwest Atlantic under sovereignty dispute with the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

PRELIMINARY STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The strategic challenge facing the national defence system implies adopting new tasks and roles. In this sense, the IMA will have to be deterrent and potentially effective, possessing anticipation, prevention, strategic communication, resilience and innovation. Such a military force must be "necessarily and unavoidably" based on joint action, also of a combined nature, of an

effective type; be capable of inter-agency action; be multidisciplinary, multi-layered and sustainable over time; capable of facing the risks and threats to come in an uncertain and continuously evolving strategic scenario, to sustain the nation's vital interests.

The key to the development of the future design should be based on effectiveness, sustainability and adaptability based on a balance between the employment concept, the structure and its financing.

In short, the IMA should primarily rely on rapid response organisations and main defence forces. These should be networked, adaptable, modular, highly specialised and technified, with a high degree of effectiveness in carrying out decisive actions, encompassed in a deterrent context and with an adequate doctrine, with a comprehensive and multidisciplinary capacity to operate in cyberspace, prioritising the use of units with capabilities to obtain strategic effects on high-value targets. The purpose of these forces will be the maximum possible control of sovereign spaces and surveillance of areas of interest.

INTEROPERABILITY CRITERIA

Initial interoperability criteria

The preparatory criteria leading to the achievement of the

preliminary strategic concept should include:

- > The full development of joint, interagency and combined doctrine.
- > The compatibility of command, control and information systems at the joint and combined level.
- > Common equipment.
- > Standardisation as an inescapable process of development of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs.
- > Joint, inter-agency and combined training.
- > The formation and consolidation of Rapid Deployment Forces.
- > Compatibility and the ability to function within the same security and defence system.


Advanced interoperability criteria

Those that should be addressed at a more developed stage include:

- > Inter-agency organisational structures.
- > National and regional R&D&I (Research, Development and Innovation) projects.
- > Integration and complementarity in regional defence organisations.
- > The compatible legal framework for an integrated defence system.

JOINT CAPABILITIES TO BE ATTAINED

Among the existing capability areas, substantive consideration should be given to the concepts of effectiveness, sustainability and



adaptability, prioritising inter-agency, cyberspace, intelligence, surveillance and control and critical infrastructure protection issues.

The development of these capabilities may be carried out on its own or in combination with other actors, prioritising the regional framework, with the aim of achieving greater interoperability and moving towards the most modern concepts of "standardisation". Complementarily, in a secondary effort, the rest of the capabilities must be developed, which cannot be overlooked or separated from those mentioned above, to achieve a defence system that allows for flexibility in the face of events of a volatile strategic nature that may arise.

To this purpose, a programme to review and update specific,

joint, interagency and combined doctrine should be produced within the national defence system, and the aim should be to master cyberspace, without clinging to current means and incorporating employment concepts that prioritise first-rate technologies.

It is also necessary to implement a system for acquiring and sustaining IMA resources that are in line with procurement times, considering increasingly accelerated technological and military environments. All of this needs to be accompanied by a system of high levels of technical and professional training of a theoretical but fundamentally practical nature for planning joint and combined operations.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

The Argentine Republic needs an

CV

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agreement between the political forces on security and defence for the environment described above, which is foreseen for the year 2050. Both the international situation and the current state of our defence make it necessary and urgent to devise broad guidelines for the design of a modern and efficient defence policy, integrated into the functioning of democratic and republican institutions.

The 2050 scenario requires updating the existing legal architecture. Reforms will be needed in legislation and its implementation, in institutional and organisational forms, in the distribution of competencies among the various actors, in working methods and in institutional culture. The scenario that lies ahead presents trends that are not seen as favourable for the area of national defence. The prioritisation of the IMA's capabilities, the updating of the strategic management of defence, and the support of appropriate budgetary guidelines will help to minimise the risks to be faced.

Some initial proposals

- > Create a heterogeneous and multidisciplinary centre dedicated to the development and study of doctrine for the 2050 scenario.
- > Promote actions to raise awareness in society of defence issues in the national territory with an inter-agency and geostrategic vision in the face of the aforementioned scenario.
- > Linking the functions and tasks of other government agencies, both provincial, national and others, which have an impact on the national agenda.
- > To take advantage of the human resources of a "potential reserve" in order to strengthen the concept of inter-agency work, but fundamentally to approach the

different issues from different perspectives.

- > Prioritise training systems that use state-of-the-art virtual, augmented and mixed reality technologies.
- > Establish multidisciplinary working groups to analyse and find solutions to encourage the recruitment and retention of new personnel in the Armed Forces.

Some complementary studies

The studies carried out included the approach of different topics that were useful for the analysis and interpretation of the Future Scenarios. In this sense, the work focused on possible particular scenarios for Argentina in the South Atlantic by 2050, with 4 geographical areas of interest that have not been included in this brief article:

- 1.Argentine jurisdictional waters and continental shelf.

- 2.Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina.

- 3.Archipelagos and jurisdictional waters of the Southwest Atlantic in sovereignty dispute with Great Britain.

- 4.Patagonia.

Each of the scenarios was analysed through two options, where the first was the situation of maintaining the current conditions (continuity) and the second was tending to achieve a more convenient/favourable/desirable situation. Although not all of the approaches taken will be addressed, a summary of the analysis of risks and threats to the geographical scenario "Jurisdictional waters and Argentine continental shelf" is included as an example.

RISK AND THREAT ANALYSIS


Case Effective exercise of maritime control in the jurisdictional zone.

Risk	Threat	Probability	Impacto
Loss of maritime control	Uncontrolled economic activity	B	B
	Indirect actions of non-state actors	G	B
Environmental catastrophe	Anthropogenic causes	G	G
	Natural causes	G	G
Variables/drivers	Capacities	Actions	
IM+interagency	Surveillance/control	Procurement of sensors, AI, VNTs, platforms, satellite information	
Economic	-		
Political/diplomatic	Maintaining the framework		
R&D&I	Development of domestic industry	AI research, space cargo launch, satellite communication	
Informational	Information operations	Influencing people's opinion	

References: G=good B=Bad H=high


Geographical scenario Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina

FIGURE 1. MAP SHOWING THE ZONES CLAIMED BY EACH OF THE COUNTRIES THAT SUBMITTED THE RELEVANT COMPLAINT



Source: Global Terrorism Database (2015)

GRAPH TABLE 1. CONTAINS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICTS FROM 1945 TO 2016



Source: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-in-state-based-conflicts?country=Africa-Europe-Americas-OWID_WRL-Middle+East-Asia+%26+Oceania

Geographical scenario: disputed archipelagos and jurisdictional waters of the Southwest Atlantic


In extreme synthesis, the Southwest Atlantic has three fundamental strategic advantages: it is a communications area, a source of hydrocarbon, mineral and fish wealth, and provides access to Antarctica. (see figure 2 on page 50).

Future Conflict Studies

According to the statistical study in Table 1, there has been a trend towards a decrease in inter-state conflicts and an increase in intra-state conflicts (civilian conflicts involving foreign state actors). On the other hand, the projection of defence investment through FONDEF (National Defence Fund) has the advantage of facilitating the extension of the useful life of current means and the procurement of other means deemed necessary, but these must be adapted on a more significant scale and consider the characteristics of possible conflicts to be addressed in the future. Without FONDEF, the situation would worsen/deteriorate more rapidly.

The exercise allowed in a framework of academic freedom to work and discuss concepts related to the military strategic level in the long term, the following participated as advisors: BM (R) Alejandro Moresi, GD (R) Gustavo Motta and CL (R) Gustavo Trama; the task was carried out by the members of the Military Strategy and Senior Management course of the Armed Forces Joint War College (ESGCFFAA): TC Reynolds (USA), CR Walker (BR), and CL (R) Gustavo Trama, and the following members of the Military Strategy and Senior Management course of the Joint War College of the Armed Forces (ESGCFFAA): TC Reynolds (USA), CR Walker (BR) and CL (R) Gustavo Trama. UU.), CR Walker (BR), CR Cabral (BR), CR Bou Kater (BR), CM Pons, CN Bianchi, CN Berterreix, CN Gonzalez, TC Albarracín. ■

FIGURE 2 . MAP SHOWING ARGENTINA'S TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME CLAIMS



GEOPOLITICS OF THE *GLOBAL COMMONS*: SECURITISATION OF SPACES AND RESOURCES NOT SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION

By DR. JUAN JOSÉ BORRELL

Keywords:

- > Geopolitics
- > Global commons
- > Environment
- > Natural resources
- > Securitisation

ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, large spaces not subject to state jurisdiction under the concept of global commons have entered the security considerations of NATO's central powers. *Think-tanks*, international development agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations have been dealing in reports and official documents with various initiatives on a global scale to implement actions for the projection, control and denial of access to the global commons.

These initiatives, which also include the sovereign spaces of developing and peripheral

countries, particularly regions with a rich endowment of natural resources such as land, water, forests, fish fauna and biodiversity, are evidence of a clear process of growing strategic interest, which at the same time is coupled with pre-existing dynamics of securitisation of the environment, both of which could potentially legitimise the *ius ad bellum*.

Today, the projection of power over the global commons takes on a structural, indirect, asymmetric, dispersed, soft and discrete mode. This subject is of vital importance for National Defence, as it is evidence of the new character that hegemonic competition has acquired in the 21st century.



REFEREED ARTICLE

The so-called global commons are directly related to the environment in a planetary perspective, and in turn to the actions of high-level leaders and agencies of the powers of the Anglo-sphere, large corporations, non-governmental organisations and international bodies.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2020 the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos launched The Great Reset initiative, whose purpose was to offer *“perspectives to help inform all those who determine the future state of global relations, the direction of national economies, the priorities of societies, the nature of business models and the management of the global commons”*.

Alongside opening remarks from WEF Director Klaus Schwab, the UN Secretary General, the head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the CEOs of Microsoft and British Petroleum among others, the Prince of Wales said: *“There is a golden opportunity to make something good out of this crisis... global crises know no borders and highlight how interdependent we are as one people sharing one planet”*¹.

The so-called global commons are directly related to the environment in a planetary perspective, and in turn to the actions of high-level leaders and agencies of the powers of the Anglo-sphere, large corporations, non-governmental organisations and international bodies.

What impact does this issue have on the defence affairs of countries that do not have a pre-eminent position on the global geopolitical chessboard?

The aim of this article is to carry out a geopolitical analysis of the recent process of securitisation

of the global commons, i.e. the inclusion in the security agendas of maritime powers of large spaces that are not subject to state jurisdiction. According to the classical security paradigm, the object of protection of any nation-state is sovereignty over its own space. In recent decades, however, spaces beyond state jurisdiction, such as the atmosphere, the high seas, the polar regions and outer space, have gained strategic interest.

In this sense, the paper is divided into sections that briefly address certain central aspects of the issue: first, how the global commons issue emerged during the last decade of the Cold War, and in particular to which actors and entities it is linked. Then, during the 1990s, the double dynamic, tending to converge in the following years, of linkage with the environmental discourse of international organisations and non-governmental organisations, and in the sphere of NATO Defence, the passage from a perspective based on the military supremacy of the unipolar moment to a conception of domination over the global commons based on the deployment of complex technological systems.

In the next section, a relationship is elaborated with the change in the multidimensional approach to space and the conception of the

new generations of warfare, an issue currently being pondered in strategic reports by the United States and the United Kingdom. The implications for peripheral and developing countries of extra-regional powers projecting power in the spaces of intersection between the jurisdictional and the non-jurisdictional are inferred as the analysis progresses between the third and last sections. Without the intention of concluding this dynamic and complex subject matter in this article, the final section considers, according to current trends, the possible geopolitical implications of a ‘global closure’ from a structural level to spaces not only not subject to state jurisdiction, but also to sovereign spaces rich in resources and biodiversity.

Although central aspects of the environmental question and how it relates to the global commons are mentioned, variables of the degrowth paradigm commonly referred to as “sustainable development”, such as demography, energy, industrial and agricultural production, food, education and propaganda, and the use of time and resources, are not addressed in detail. The major importance currently given to the environment by the Anglo-sphere’s state secretariats, international bodies and non-governmental organisations requires a treatment



of the subject that would go far beyond the scope of this study.

Beyond the explanatory scope of this paper, which is the result of a research project at the IIFA for the years 2020-2021, a task to understand in greater depth the implications of this issue should bring together a heterogeneous team of specialists for the discussion and formulation of prospective scenarios around the global commons, in particular on the possible means for the violation and defence of the global commons. This article is not only academically relevant, but also of great importance for national defence, given that it is evidence

of the character that hegemonic competition has acquired in the 21st century.

I. Genealogy of the *global commons* issue

The original concept of “commons” refers to certain common law benefits that commoner, in particular peasants and shepherds, had during the Middle Ages to usufruct meadows, streams and portions of land for agriculture. These spaces, which were not entirely free but under the control and allocation of local lords, were the material basis for hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers to produce their livelihood.

From the 17th century onwards, the English Parliament began to restrict this system with a process of legal change and privatisation of land on a large scale, the so-called Enclosure Acts. In our time, the concept of commons, although it still covers small portions of territory in the British Isles, has moved to the international level to refer to global commons, i.e. a broad set of large spaces that are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state, such as the atmosphere, the high seas and deep oceans, outer space, the North Polar region and the South Polar region, particularly the Antarctic continent.

Such a shift to the international level was initiated in 1980 by a group of influential environmental organisations in the Anglo-sphere: the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN),² together with United Nations (UN) agencies such as the United Nations Environment

1. On: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/06/great-reset-launch-prince-charles-guterresgeorgieva-burrow/>, y en: <https://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/thegreatreset> (última consulta: 12 febrero 2022).

2. Both IUCN and WWF were created at the initiative of the biologist Sir Julian Huxley. The former in 1948, when he was director of the newly created UNESCO; the latter in 1961, together with Prince Philip, Duke of

Edinburgh, King Bernard of the Netherlands, Royal Dutch Shell, Barclay's Bank and Royal Navy admirals. Since then, WWF has been the world's largest (para-governmental) conservation organisation. See: Borrell, Juan José. 2008. "Un panda verde en el jardín: el caso de la World Wildlife Fund - WWF y su geoestrategia internacional", in *Ambiental*, UNR, Nº 8, Year 8, pp. 203-230.

Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). The joint document, “World Conservation Strategy. Living resource conservation for sustainable development”.

Living resource conservation for sustainable development, calls for international action to restrict the use of natural resources as they consider the planet’s ecological systems to be saturated. On the one hand, they suggest a targeted change in the domestic legislation of each country, and on the other hand, they propose the implementation of an international conservation law and the strengthening of multilateral agreements. In the publication they introduce the concept in question to refer to those areas that are beyond the jurisdiction of the state and should be included in a global programme:

“A Common Good is an area of land

or water that is owned or used jointly by members of a community. The global commons include those parts of the earth’s surface that lie outside national jurisdictions - in particular, the open ocean and the living resources found there - or that are held in common - in particular, the atmosphere. The only landmass that can be considered part of the global commons is the Antarctic, in particular the open ocean and the living resources found there. The only landmass that can be considered part of the global commons is Antarctica, although several countries have claimed parts of it (the claims are currently frozen under the Antarctic Treaty)”³.

The document is produced in a unique context in which the notion of “sustainable development” will appear on the scene, a catch-all word or key word repeated since then in every report on the environmental issue, as for example currently in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals or Agenda 2030. In its current meaning, the notion is a slogan that

generically proposes taking care of the environment and natural resources in the present so that future generations can make use of them in equal proportion. However, beyond the idealism and formalistic discourse of international diplomacy, the term signifies a gradual but ultimately structural change in the economic and social organisation of countries as it has been held since the beginning of modernity.

The opposite of the universal goal of sustainable development would be ecosystemic collapse, i.e. a sort of apocalyptic future planetary scenario. The underlying assumption of such a pessimistic narrative for large-scale restrictions on both resource use and world population growth is set out in the report *The Limits to Growth* in 1972. Drawn up by scientists meeting at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) for a closed group of representatives of the industrial powers brought



The environmentalist approach no longer looks at the economic organisation of each country and the central pillars of classical geopolitics (territory and population) from the perspective of national-state sovereignty, but rather disaggregates them into "problematic" issues from a supposedly global perspective.

together by the Club of Rome, the document proposed a paradigm shift in the growth matrix: the population + capital equation would lead to civilisational collapse. With a long-term prospective model, they pointed out that if the growth of developing countries continued to be driven forward, the planet's resources would not be enough for everyone, and ecosystems would be severely polluted and depleted to the point of no return. The response had to be a global shift towards degrowth⁴.

In the same context, various institutions emerged to globally promote programmes with a similar Malthusian perspective, such as the United Nations Population Fund in New York in 1969 at the behest of the Rockefeller Foundation, the United Nations Environment Programme in 1972, and the influential Trilateral Commission in 1973, also an initiative of the Rockefeller clan coordinated by Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In the field of strategic security, in 1974, under the presidency of Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger's Secretary of Homeland Security drew up the much-mentioned National Security Memorandum No. 200, entitled "Implications of worldwide population growth for U.S. security and overseas interest", which was implemented as foreign

policy from 1975 onwards.

For their part, in the field of scientific popularisation in the Anglo-sphere, various studies with similar proposals had great resonance, such as *The Population Bomb* (1968) by the biologist Paul Ehrlich, and *The Tragedy of the Commons* (1968) by the ecologist Garrett Hardin, in which the idea that the planet's "commons" were being subjected to extreme pressure by human economic activity was put forward early on. Sir James Lovelock develops the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the entire planet earth is a single integrated bio-cybernetic system, a sort of entity with its own life and intelligence that is being preyed upon by humans, a "naturally" aggressive "species".

The "one world, one ecosystem" approach of Lovelock, decorated in the 1990s with the title of Commander of the Order of the British Empire, has great influence in scientific circles and international organisations. In the framework of the Cold War, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the classical paradigm of nation-state security, which understood territorial sovereignty as its object, still prevailed. Thus, although these organisations had begun their efforts by pointing out global dilemmas, issues that posed risks and threats to the nation-state still

played an important role.

It was not until the end of the 1980s that the environmental issue and concern for natural spaces not subject to state jurisdiction returned to the highest level of multilateral diplomacy. In 1987, at the initiative of the United Nations General Assembly, a World Commission on Environment and Development was set up, which produced an influential report on the subject: *Our common future*.

The report, also known by the former Norwegian minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who chaired the Commission, is an obligatory reference for international organisations and environmental organisations in terms of establishing "the global agenda for change". The publication, under the seal of Oxford University, states that:

"Traditional forms of national sovereignty are increasingly challenged by the realities of ecological and economic interdependence. Nowhere is this clearer than in shared ecosystems and 'global commons', those parts of the planet that lie outside national

3. *World Conservation Strategy. Living resource conservation for sustainable development*, 1980, p.58.

4. Meadows et. al., 1972. Three decades after the first edition, the authors published a study that updates the approach: Meadows, Dennis et. al. 2005. *Limits to growth. The 30-year update*. London: Earthscan.

Regardless of whether the fateful prospect of climate change takes place in a long-term prospective scenario, it is a powerful argument in the immediate term that serves in fact to exploit environmental issues as a just cause for security over spaces not subject to state jurisdiction.

jurisdictions. Here, sustainable development can only be secured through international cooperation and agreed regimes for monitoring, development and management in the common interest. But what is at stake is not only the sustainable development of shared ecosystems and common goods, but that of all nations whose development depends to a greater or lesser extent on their sound management. Likewise, without agreed, equitable and enforceable rules governing the rights and duties of states with respect to the commons, the pressure of demands on finite resources will destroy their ecological integrity over time”⁵.

The general discourse of the Brundtland report was to be in tune with the new era of so-called globalisation: “one planet, one world”, “common future”, “common concerns, common challenges”, “common efforts”, “global agenda”, “world community”, “common goods”, etc. Although, at bottom, it upheld the assumption installed a decade and a half earlier by the Club of Rome: the planet is finite and the pressure on resources will lead to a collapse, so it is necessary to establish a strict international regime to restrict action on common spaces. According to the commission, the following priority challenges should be addressed: world population growth, food supply, depletion of species and

ecosystems, polluting energies, reduction of industrial production, and modification of cities.

In short, the environmentalist approach no longer views the economic organisation of each country and the central pillars of classical geopolitics (territory and population) from the perspective of nation-state sovereignty, but rather disaggregates them into “problematic” issues from a supposedly global perspective. After the end of the Cold War, as is well known, the environment is one of the main issues around which a cosmopolitan globalist narrative takes shape. With the fall of the Soviet bloc in Eurasia, and the security dilemma of a bipolar world no longer relevant, the care of ecosystems became a central issue on the international agenda of the thalassocratic powers, regardless of ideological differences and local particularities. Although the world during the unipolar moment seems a safer place, “the daily destruction of natural resources, water and air threatens global security as much as nuclear weapons. Policies for growth and development must now integrate efforts to sustain the global commons”.⁶

II. From post-Cold War unipolarity to a multipolar context

The 1990s is a time of great expansion of the maritime

geostrategic sphere. The retraction of Russia’s geopolitical borders generates an advance and repositioning of NATO’s Anglo-Saxon powers in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; countries formerly under Moscow’s influence join the Atlantic alliance, and the European Union in turn expands eastwards. Corporations from the industrialised nations drive new competition in a now globalised economy, the international financial system gains new momentum, and in 1995 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is formed. The international organisations under the umbrella of the UN were given the liquidity to expand their reach, and a proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the former Third World countries proliferated, with funding and diplomatic support from the maritime powers.

During this long and dynamic decade, coinciding with the unipolarity of the US superpower, from the fall of the Soviet bloc to the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers in New York and NATO’s subsequent advance in the Middle East, the environmental issue has remained in the background, latent, subject to multilateral negotiations and as an instrument of soft power projection. It is time to spread “ecological concern” from international organisations,

development agencies and non-governmental organisations, but without hindering the expansion of the hydrocarbon matrix or extractivist models in less developed countries.

In the US, presidential administrations have alternated between placing the environment on the foreign agenda under the Democrats (Clinton-Gore 1993-2001 and Obama-Biden 2009-2017), and the desecuritisation of the issue under Republican administrations (Bush-Cheney 2001-2009) (Floyd, 2010). In other words, there is no firm line on the issue beyond the change of governments, as Britain is going to do. In such a context, the military and technological supremacy of the US has no rival with similar technical capabilities to prevent it from deploying anywhere on the planet. Full freedom of action and effective access translates into the “communality” of those spaces outside any state jurisdiction: they are not my own, nor do they belong to anyone else, but if I can cross them, they are under my dominion.

As political scientist Barry Posen stated in the well-known article *Command of the commons*: “The US military currently holds command of the global commons (...) The ‘commons’, in the case of sea and space, are areas that belong to no state and provide access to much of the globe. Airspace technically belongs to the countries below, but there are few countries that can deny their airspace above 15,000 feet to US fighter jets.

Command does not mean that other states cannot use the commons in peacetime. Nor does it mean that others cannot acquire military assets that they can move through or even exploit without the United States hindering them. Command means that the United States gets far more military use of the sea, space and air than others; that it can credibly threaten to deny

their use to others; and that others would lose in a military competition for the commons if they tried to deny them to the United States”.⁷

In general terms, it could be argued that the global commons issue is closely related to an increase in the securitisation of environmental issues. And in the last two decades, environmental issues have entered the security agendas of the maritime powers in parallel to the economic growth and expansion of emerging countries; that is, those that during the Cold War were part of the broad Third World and carried the label of “developing”, but towards the end of the 1990s began to steadily increase their GDP and have greater influence in international affairs, as in the case of China, India, Russia and Brazil, among others.

Although the growth of the so-called emerging countries is taking place peacefully - though not without tensions - within the framework of the international economic system, from a realist perspective the marked trend towards a multipolar distribution of the world system is perceived as a threat by the central maritime powers. Greater economic quantum would unbalance the regional balance of power and could translate into increased military power. Meanwhile, Russia’s growing presence in the Arctic Circle and China’s expansionary behaviour in sub-Saharan Africa, in the Americas, and specifically in the South Atlantic and Antarctic space, is perceived as a clear penetration into maritime geostrategic spheres “outside” its immediate zone of influence. Even a strategist like Zbigniew Brzezinski, aware of the distribution of the global geopolitical chessboard into regions of influence, understands that outside Eurasia the common spaces serve in some way as zones of intersection between geostrategic spheres; as “glue” spaces that,

while they may be crossed by a rival power, are extremely vital as the nexus and scaffolding of a global projection.

There is no projection of power and global hegemony without the mastery of the communicating vessels, that is, the global commons. In this regard, in his latest book *Strategic vision* he euphemistically stated: “The protection and management in good faith of the global commons - sea, space, cyberspace, nuclear proliferation, water security, the Arctic, and the environment itself - are imperative for the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuity of basic geopolitical stability. But in almost every case, the potential absence of constructive and influential American leadership could fatally undermine the essential commonality of the global commons.”⁸ Brzezinski, 2012, p. 119.

Of all possible rivals, it is the military superpowers Russia and China that increasingly have the capabilities to eventually compromise the free deployment of the US in all space on the planet. Today, Posen’s assertion of two decades ago that the US can costlessly deny other powers access to common space is no longer entirely credible. For this reason, since the second decade of the 21st century, in parallel to development agencies and international organisations, the global commons issue has been climbing up the ranks of environmental defence. Ecosystems, beyond the contamination and depletion they may suffer, become the depository spatiality of a new type of chrysogenic phenomenon that would affect stability and security on a global scale.

5. WCED, 1987, p. 261.

6. Sandler, 1992:16.

7. Posen, B., 2003, p. 8.

8. Brzezinski, 2012, p. 119.



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Such a phenomenon, which is widespread in this context but did not exist in the environmentalist documents of the 1970s and 1980s, is climate change. As the former British Treasury Secretary and World Bank economist, Sir Nicholas Stern, develops in his well-publicised report, humanity's industrial and agricultural activity is supposedly altering the average temperature of the planet due to the level of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere, which when increased would trigger a series of disruptive ecosystemic effects, thus leading the world to an apocalyptic future.

To avoid these consequences, "it is in developing countries where adaptation efforts must be accelerated the most", as "over the next few decades, between 2 and 3 billion people will be added to the world's population, almost all of them in developing countries. This will only add to the existing pressure on the

natural resources - and social fabric - of many poor countries and expose more people to the effects of climate change. A broader effort is needed to encourage the reduction of population growth rates. Development in the dimensions defined by the Millennium Development Goals, and particularly income, women's education and reproductive health, is the most effective and sustainable way to address population growth.⁹

Meanwhile, according to the same climate change doomsday narrative, between various disruptive events, the polar ice caps are melting, and in the long term vast, previously closed spaces will be open to unprecedented geopolitical competition. For example, under this scenario, as the US Deputy Secretary of Defence stated in 2017: "we now have to be able to operate in the Arctic because we have a whole new ocean in front of us"¹⁰.

If it is possible to maintain a leading position in the technological gap, the argument of respecting the "communality" of spaces not subject to state sovereignty is even a powerful diplomatic-discursive instrument that plays to one's advantage.

Whether or not in a long-term prospective scenario the doomsday prospect of climate change will take place, it is a powerful argument in the immediate term that in fact serves to exploit environmental issues as a just cause for security over spaces not subject to state jurisdiction. In this line, regardless of the political colour of the government, the Pentagon incorporates environmental issues into military thinking and doctrine as a major factor generating or 'multiplying' disruptions, risks and disasters that could require the intervention of the armed forces in overseas areas.¹¹ In any case, in parallel with the Pentagon, the Pentagon is also incorporating environmental issues into military thinking and doctrine as a major factor generating or 'multiplying' disruptions, risks and disasters that could require the intervention of the armed forces in overseas spaces.

In any case, in parallel to the figure of unilateral or alliance-based intervention backed by military supremacy for "environmental" causes or "natural disasters", the concept of a macro-level approach to global spaces based on complex technological systems is gradually developing, if possible, in a multilateral manner¹². In this sense, a report by NATO analysts in 2011, including

cyberspace in the definition, affirmed that the value of the global commons "lies in its accessibility, communality, and ubiquity as the system of systems"¹³. In other words, "the global commons is a multi-domain concept, and military strategists prefer to view these domains as a complex interactive system".¹⁴

Driven then by the trend towards a multipolar sociogram of powers, a shift in the concept takes place: from the unrivalled military supremacy of the unipolar moment to the super-structural technological control of the multipolar context. In 2001, dominance is synonymous with the unilinear projection of military vectors: the global commons are any space that belongs to only can be flown by my fleet, my strategic bomber, my satellite. From the following decade onwards, and to an increasing degree, dominance will depend on deploying technological systems that indirectly act as a key to access/deny access to common spaces. In this vein, a 2017 US Army Training and Doctrine Command document stated: "The physical dimension of warfare may become less important than the moral and cognitive dimension. Military operations will increasingly aim to employ the cognitive and moral dimensions to target the will of the enemy."¹⁵

III. Multi-domain spatiality and new generations of warfare

As is well known in academies of military training and strategic thinking, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) being promoted by the US armed forces is redefining the forms of warfare and, in depth, the configuration of the space of force projection. Along with the incorporation of sophisticated technologies (unmanned aerial vehicles, robots, biotechnology, nanotechnology, cybernetic networks, electromagnetic fields and complex devices), a new conception of generations of warfare is emerging.

Are global commons the new spatiality of fourth generation warfare? Without enough space in this article to develop an extensive explanation of analyst William Lind's concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), it is only worth noting that a permanent and all-encompassing projection of power during peacetime that does not distinguish the classical internal/external figure of the battlefield from a ubiquitous spatiality is the

9. Stern, 2007, p. 99.

10. Klare, 2019, p. 126.

11. Klare, 2019.

12. Treverton, Nemeth y Srinivasan, 2012.

13. Barrett, Bedford, Skinner, y Vergles.

14. Redden y Hughes, 2011.

15. TRADOC G-2.

In the last two decades, environmental issues have entered the security agendas of the maritime powers in parallel to the economic growth and expansion of emerging countries; that is, those that during the Cold War were part of the broad Third World and carried the label of "developing", but towards the end of the 1990s began to steadily increase their GDP and have a greater impact on international affairs, as is the case of China, India, Russia and Brazil, among others.

latest trend that can be observed in different spheres¹⁶.

In this regard, a recent report by two influential analysts at the RAND corporation, David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, is revealing. They interpret this trend of new technological developments with the emergence of a unified spatial dimension, called the noosphere, which implies a deeper and more encompassing shift in the multidimensional approach to strategic objectives. The key concept of noosphere that Ronfeldt-Arquilla takes is understood as "a global 'circuit of thought' and a 'realm of the mind', a collective form of intelligence enabled by the digital information revolution" (Ronfeldt-Arquilla, 2007).

This would require a new kind of strategic action called noopolitics: "the concepts of noosphere and noopolitik will fare better in the future the more they are associated with the concept of global commons (...) This seems likely given that both have links to the biosphere. This could put noopolitik in the path of several strategic issues"¹⁷.

The authors refer to a complex web resulting from various subsystems of multidimensional projection that integrate the

macro-environmental with the micro-spatial: logistical bases, supply ports, scientific platforms, satellite coverage and telecommunications (including cybernetic), complex devices of the electromagnetic spectrum, digital sensors, biomolecular prospecting, nanotechnology, genetic decoding and modification, patent registration and control, artificial intelligence, Big Data, etc. Already two decades earlier, in 1999, Ronfeldt and Arquilla had developed an approach along the same lines to formulate a US strategy in the face of the information and cyberspace revolution. In contemporary times, the scope of the projection has become more complex and includes the environment through the figure of the global commons¹⁸.


Analysts understand that in a world of increasing multipolar competition, unilateral kinetic dominance for military supremacy as posited by Posen in 2003 has no place in the long run. As long as it is possible to maintain a leading position in the technology gap, the argument of respecting the "communality" of spaces not subject to state sovereignty is even

a powerful diplomatic-discursive tool that plays to one's advantage.

The thalassocratic superpower watches over the global biosphere, while minor actors must request access to the usufruct of "humanity's" resources. The form of restricting and blocking access to space and resources would not necessarily depend on superior firepower, but on a state-of-the-art technological infrastructure deployed in different dimensions of space - including the nanometric - covering the entire electromagnetic, satellite, cybernetic, and biotechnological spectrum.

In the same vein, the latest UK Ministry of Defence white paper sets out the need for a multi-domain strategic approach to the changing battlefield of the future; that is, a strategy that is integrative "across" the space, cyberspace, maritime, land and air domains: "We will move beyond the traditional concept of 'jointness' to a deep integration of multiple domains that adds much more than the sum of its parts"¹⁹. A multidimensional hazard scenario similarly requires anticipatory responses and initiatives directed at possible interacting factors or

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UK Ministry of Defence, 2021. *Defense in a competitive age*. London, Ministry of Defence, page 6

subsystems in integrated times and spaces.

This raises a key question: do global commons have limits? According to international law, projection into spaces not subject to state jurisdiction should stop when it reaches a country's border. But the Anglo-Saxon concept of global commons has a double singularity: on the one hand, semantically it does not coincide with the spatial-territorial configuration according to which we define "Argentine Antarctic sector", "Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands", or "Province of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands" (at least as defined by Argentina's National Defence Policy Directives).

On the other hand, as mentioned above, from a technical point of view, "communality depends on the capacity to freely project oneself in depth over a space in peacetime: "ensuring freedom in the global commons could be the sign of a 21st century security challenge"²⁰. It follows that "sovereign" spaces under the state jurisdiction of peripheral countries, particularly because they lack the necessary technical capabilities, could be violated by technologies, platforms and power projection systems, not

necessarily military, operating within the global commons.

In this sense, areas of intersection between spaces under the state jurisdiction of peripheral countries and spaces considered global commons could be violated or be subject to pressure from the actions of powers with interests. Hence, such intersecting spaces become living geopolitical frontiers, generating a wedge effect on the line of least resistance.

While the environmental cause of global agendas serves to exert permanent pressure on sovereign spaces rich in biodiversity and natural resources, at one extreme, the environmental discourse could eventually legitimise a unilateral *ius ad bellum* or an international coalition for intervention and punitive actions against sovereign countries and spaces; or with respect to the predatory action of third parties outside their zones of influence, for example a company from a smaller country, or a rival power such as China and its fishing fleet in the South Atlantic.

Hence, the all-encompassing deployment of technological capabilities on the one hand, and the discourse of global care for the biosphere on the other, tend to converge. In the long term, even spaces subject to state jurisdiction in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries, which are large, sparsely polluted, rich in resources and biodiversity, could be exchanged under "green" financial schemes (as is already happening in several sub-Saharan African countries), or else alienated and internationalised under the declaration of having become a global commons for reasons of environmental care, or "heritage of humanity", "reserve"

16. Borrell, 2017.

17. Ronfeldt-Arquilla, 2020, p. 68.

18. The notion of the noosphere is tributary to earlier multidisciplinary studies in theology, physics, chemistry, evolutionary biology, genetics, ecology, cybernetics and global ecosystem theories such as

Gaia, by authors such as Vladimir Vernadsky, Teilhard de Chardin, Julian Huxley, James Lovelock, Lynn Margulis, Richard Dawkins, and Marshall McLuhan, among others (Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 2020).

19. UK MoD, 2021, p.12.

20. Ronfeldt y Arquilla, 2020, p. 61.

or “natural sanctuary”, etc. This could imply a loss of sovereignty or limited sovereignty schemes in, for example, portions of the Amazon, Patagonia, Antarctica or the South Atlantic²¹.

IV. Implications: towards a global enclosure act?

Since the late 1980s, the global commons issue has been occupying an important place on the agendas of international organisations, environmental parastatal organisations and Anglo-sphere state agencies. In recent decades, environmental issues have become part of a global process of multiplication of transboundary regulations that have been uprooted from national legal systems and even relatively autonomous from international law²². It also became part of the security planning and strategic projection of NATO's central powers: “access to the global commons is vital to US national interests”²³.

These initiatives have recently been joined by powerful consortiums such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, which brings together large financial funds, the largest Western corporations and Anglo-sphere governments. Together with the UN, they are globally promoting the environmentalist agenda for the year 2030 of the so-called Millennium Development Goals, with a marked anti-industrial and neo-Malthusian bias. During the 2020 summit - mentioned in the introduction - at which the edition of the Global Risks Report that includes this theme was presented, the press pointed out that the gurus of global finance agreed that the environment, the care of resources and the global commons were essential for the markets:

“Stephen Schwarzman (Blackstone) sees the fight against climate change as an opportunity. George Soros (Soros Fund

Management and Quantum Fund) takes a more philanthropic view of corporate social responsibility; and David Solomon (Goldman Sachs) places the climate crisis as one of the two most important challenges facing the global economy”²⁴. For its part, the world's largest financier, New York-based BlackRock, warned that companies that do not take climate change and environmental and governance criteria seriously²⁵ will fall off the fund's investment radar²⁶.

Significantly, in 2019 the Rockefeller Foundation launched the Global Commons Alliance in New York, a lobbying platform that brings together powerful consortia and influential organisations such as the World Economic Forum itself, the Club of Rome, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), World Resources Institute, International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), The Nature Conservancy, and more than fifty smaller entities and centres. The strategic function of these associations, in addition to serving in the immediate term for tax exemptions via philanthropic foundations, is to permeate the management institutions of sovereign states and install modes of action and thinking that are confluent with those of the above-mentioned transnational organisations.

This is why their ideological role and the production/reproduction of knowledge is key. To illustrate this point, academic centres and environmental agencies with generous funding and press have even promoted the idea of reconceptualising the planet's geological eras and calling the current period the ‘Anthropocene’, characterised by the ‘harmful impact of humans on terrestrial ecosystems’.²⁷ Coinciding with this deterministic, catastrophist and partial perspective, which is functional to the idea of restricting

the activities of the more than 7,000 people who live on the planet's land, the current period has been called the ‘Anthropocene’.

Coinciding with this deterministic, catastrophist and partial perspective, functional to the proposal to restrict the activities of the more than 7.5 billion inhabitants of the planet, the website of the Rockefeller Foundation's Global Commons Alliance explains: “There are two definitions of global commons: one is based on geopolitics. In this definition, the global commons are areas, and their potential economic resources, that lie beyond national jurisdiction: the atmosphere, the high seas, Antarctica and outer space.

The second definition is rooted more in economics than geopolitics and relates to how some can abuse shared resources at the expense of others, regardless of national jurisdiction.

Both definitions are relevant to the Global Commons Alliance, but we are more concerned with the second definition (...) While we all need and share these global commons, some are overusing them at the expense of others. This has now reached a critical point. Ultimately, we are jeopardising the stability of a planet that has sustained civilisation for 10,000 years”²⁸.

As a conclusion

For the actors involved with structural power in the international system, the obvious question arises as to whether ever greater global restrictions on resource use and economic growth will be pushed to the point of severely compromising nation-state sovereignty. What strategic and long-term stance should countries like Argentina and those in the region take in the face of this challenge?

In extremis, the options seem to boil down to only two: either

The environmental cause of global agendas serves to exert permanent pressure on sovereign spaces rich in biodiversity and natural resources. At one extreme, environmental discourse could eventually legitimise a unilateral or international coalition *ius ad bellum* for intervention and punitive actions against sovereign countries and spaces, or against the predatory actions of third parties outside their zones of influence.

to fight multilaterally for the recognition of the republican principle of self-determination and respect for sovereignty while resolutely advancing along a path of integral growth, financing, modernisation and deployment of advanced defence systems in their own space; or to bow to the diktat of the “military dictatorship”; or to yield to the diktat “one planet, one people” and give in to the reduction of industrial infrastructure, fossil and nuclear energy consumption, the violation and reduction of the population, the alienation through indebtedness and transnationalisation of sovereign spaces rich in resources and natural reserves; in other words, the demolition of the founding pillars of all geopolitics; obliteration as a country.

Without being predetermined and in the face of the daunting challenge ahead, weightings in the decision-making process of high politics should consider the following central notions:

1. The so-called global commons present themselves as a new multidimensional spatiality of hegemonic competition in the 21st century.
2. The projection on the global commons has the capacity

to penetrate indirectly and deeply into spaces subject to state jurisdiction, although it has the limitation of not being able to make sovereignty claims over spaces not subject to state jurisdiction (but to internationalisation).

3. The US openly expresses as a strategic objective to be hegemonic in competition with rival powers that are also projecting themselves (although without an environmentalist banner, such as Russia and China). Other actors with projection capabilities and intentions: the UK, Canada, France and Japan.
4. It is inferred that there is an open race to control access (ergo denial of access) to the

global commons, by means of platforms, infrastructure or devices that maintain the apparent “communality” of the goods, although they effectively restrict access to third actors.

5. The securitisation discourses argue that the global commons are subject to risks and threats of an ecosystemic nature because of anthropogenic environmental damage, which is why they agree on the need to limit and restrict the actions of third actors in such spaces.
6. Technology will be a determining factor in the future in the competition for access to multidimensional spaces considered global common.
7. The various forms of projection are multi-domain:

21. Of the countries that share the Amazon region, for years Brazil has been considering the issue of internationalisation as a possible defence issue. In this regard, during the 2019 forest fires in Brazilian territory, environmental organisations and influential Anglo-sphere media such as the BBC referred to the phenomenon as evidence of the “inability” to care for the planet’s natural assets. Even the President of France said in a widely circulated speech that “our home... the lungs of the planet” was burning, that “this catastrophe concerns the world” and was an “international crisis” that merited the intervention of the G7 bloc. See: <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/08/23/foretamazonienne-propositions-emmanuelmacronactfortheamazon> (last accessed: 15 February 2022)

22. Sassen, 2010.

23. Hutchens, Dries, Perdew, Bryant, y Moores, 2017, p.134.

24. Farràs, 2020.

25. The insidious concept of “governance”, widely circulated in the documents of these entities, is not synonymous with government. It is a code word that refers to natural space and resource management schemes applicable to peripheral countries, in which decision-making is horizontalised between the host state (which has become a junior partner), environmental organisations and transnational corporations, international organisations, banks and eventually groups of “original” settlers.

26. Sullivan, 2020.

27. Simangan, 2020.

28. <https://globalcommonsalliance.org/global-commons/> (última consulta: 12 febrero 2022)

logistical bases, ports and scientific platforms, satellite, telecommunications, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, digital sensors,

biomolecular prospecting, nanotechnology, genetic decoding, modification and registration of patents, artificial intelligence, Big Data, etc.

8. The main form that the strategic approach to global commons spaces has taken is structural, indirect, asymmetric, dispersed, soft and discrete. ■

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DESCRIPTION AND HERALDIC MEANING OF THE DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM

In the centre is highlighted the flagship of the General Staff of Armed Forces. The background is constituted by the checkerboard that symbolizes the Military Art; the colours are light blue and white in representation of the National Flag. The first colour resembles the justice, the zeal, loyalty and truth; the second

colour represents the pureness, integrity, obedience, endurance, determination, surveillance and eloquence.

The outline contains in the upper part the name of the school in golden letters while in the bottom part there are three words in Latin: *Nexus*, *Sententia* and *Actio* which mean: Union, Thought and Deed.



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Therefore, the school will run post graduate careers in two levels:

Level 1: To be given to Chief Officials of Argentinean Armed Forces as well as other nations in the Major hierarchy or greater.

Level 2: To be given to Superior Officials and Chief of Argentinean Armed Forces as well as other countries in the hierarchy of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel or equivalent.

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The Joint War College will be the Military Academic Institute of highest level in the refinement of Argentinean Superior Military Staff and from other countries and the university graduated as in acknowledgments as in skills related to National Defence.
